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 Computable General Equilibrium Modelling of the Common Agricultural Policy 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
With improvements in computational facility over the last twenty years, there has been a 
burgeoning of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) applications in the trade 
literature. Indeed, CGE is seen as one of the most important recent developments in 
empirical trade research, with its inherent ability to measure the inter-sectoral and 
regional resource redistribution effects resulting from liberalisation.  
 
In constructing a multi-region CGE trade model, one is faced with the arduous task of 
collecting input-output, trade and support data which must be mutually consistent with 
the market clearing conventions of the model framework. Alternatively, one can resort 
to using an existing CGE database. This research follows the latter approach and draws 
on the work conducted by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) which was 
established in 1992. In its entirety, the GTAP consists of several components:  
 
1. A fully documented, publicly available, global data base.  
2. Software for manipulating the data.  
3. A global network of researchers with a common interest of multi-region trade 
analysis and related issues.  
4. A consortium of national and international agencies providing leadership and a base 
level of support for the project. 
 
In this thesis, the focus is on employing the CGE approach to re-investigate the costs of 
the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Moreover, this research 
identifies two particular features of CGE modelling of the CAP which remain under-
explored. First, the majority of studies characterise CAP support solely through tax and 
subsidy data underlying the model structure. Evolutionary developments in CAP 
support, predominantly under the MacSharry reforms, has rendered this approach 
somewhat ineffectual in attaining a ‘true’ cost figure. For example, in the case of de-
coupled support (area compensation, headage payments), using a direct measure such as 
an output subsidy is a less than ideal treatment. The other issue which is under-
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developed in the CGE literature on CAP liberalisation is the incorporation of imperfect 
competition in many of the downstream food (i.e., food processing) and non-
agricultural sectors of these models. Moreover, the notion of varietal diversity to food 
buyers in global markets, which represents an important decision variable in both final 
and intermediate consumer behaviour, is also largely overlooked.  
 
Results of the research presented here suggest that under CAP abolition, the EU-15 
gains 0.54% of GDP, with gains to the UK and EU-14 of 0.90% and 0.29% of 
respective GDPs. The EU-15 gains are similar to the more recent estimates of CAP 
costs in the literature. Increasing ‘varietal effects’ within the UK leads to larger EU-15 
gains of 0.57% of GDP from CAP abolition. Other experiments on firm concentration 
levels and conjectural variation effects are also conducted. Results from these 
experiments suggest a wider range of costs associated with the CAP. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Economic Costs of the CAP 
 
The inception of a common market was the result of a desire amongst a nucleus of 
western European countries to catalyse a political and economic union following the 
resolution of the second world war. From this ideology, the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) was born, targeted at curing balance of payments and food shortage 
problems resulting from the war effort, as well as offering the benefits of further 
political integration.  
 
However, successful though the policy was at achieving greater EU food security, the 
CAP also faced ‘internal’ pressures for reform. Critics argued that the policy penalised 
poorer consumers (due to high internal food prices), encouraged inefficient production, 
benefiting larger farmers disproportionately to small farmers (since support was based 
on production levels) and led to oversupply (due to technological change). Moreover, 
the CAP was also under external pressure to comply with world trade policy 
restrictions, ratified under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).1       
 
Thus, the somewhat turbulent experience of the effects of CAP support on EU internal 
and world markets has been a subject of intense debate amongst academics and policy 
makers alike. As a result, there have been numerous attempts by academics and policy 
makers to quantify the costs of the CAP.  
 
This chapter examines some of these attempts and in so doing discusses the nature of 
CAP costs. Section 1.1 uses a partial equilibrium schematic framework to highlight 
some of the cost concepts involved. Section 1.2 compares Partial Equilibrium (PE) and 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approaches and briefly assesses their relative 
merits and drawbacks. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 present a chronological survey of empirical 
estimates of CAP costs and show how model applications have been affected by 
changes in economic and political developments surrounding the CAP. Moreover, some 
interpretation of model structures and results is offered along with, where possible, 
comparisons and conclusions. Section 1.5 presents a caveat to this analysis in the form 
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of the distributional issues underlying the costs of the CAP. Section 1.6 summarises and 
concludes on the empirical costs of the CAP, as well as providing a new perspective on 
the costs of the CAP which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
1.1 A Simple Theoretical Analysis of CAP Costs and Benefits     
 
“there is no such thing as an absolute cost. The cost of anything can only be 
measured in terms of what has to be given up to achieve it, that is, the cost 
relative to some alternative”  (Buckwell et al., 1982, pp39).  
 
This statement of opportunity cost is true of all of the empirical estimates that follow. 
The ‘alternative’ most commonly used is that of complete agricultural liberalisation 
within the EU, i.e., abolition of the CAP.  
 
The simplest way to undertake an examination of the effects of CAP-type price support 
on domestic welfare is through the use of a single-good PE analysis, although many of 
the assumptions underlying the model limit its use. Demekas et al. (1988) highlight 
these shortcomings which are discussed in section 1.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pc
 
 
 
Pw 
  a        b   c1     c2    d 
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    S      D 
g       h      i        j       k 
l         m 
D                                       S 
Net Importer                                                                   Net Exporter 
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    Pw 
 
 
 MI    ME                                                                      XI          XE 
Figure 1.1: Transfers arising from the CAP 
 
A PE single commodity representation (Buckwell et al.,1982) of a two-country 
community including community preferences and common financing is presented in 
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1 Now superseded by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
figure 1.1, where the world and internal prices are given as Pw and Pc respectively. 
Moreover, Imports and exports have been disaggregated into intra- (MI; XI) and extra- 
(ME; XE) community trade, where extra-community and intra-community trade are 
valued at world and common (internal) prices, respectively. This price differential is 
due to community preference, where trade between partners within the EU is free from 
any 'external' trade barriers. The analysis also includes the role of common financing of 
CAP market support, which is characterised by export subsidies. Moreover, levies on 
extra-EU imports are paid into the FEOGA account.2 The accompanying transfers of 
income are presented in table 1.1.  
 
            
  
             Net Importer                  Net Exporter 
 
Trade Flows: 
1. Export receipts                                      l+m+h+i+j+k 
2. Import payments                               c1+e+f+c2                 
3. B. of agric T. (1+2)                            -(c1+e+f+c2)                            l+m+h+i+j+k 
 
Budgetary Flows: 
4. Export refunds                                                      j+k 
5. Import levies                                                        c2                 
6. Net FEOGA expenditure                           -c2                                  j+k 
    to each region (4+5)  
7. Total community expenditure                                                      -c2+j+k= Z 
8. VAT contributions (α7)                        -(αZ)              -(1-α)Z 
 
9. Bal. of FEOGA payments(6+8)                               -(c2+αZ)                      j+k-(1-α)Z         
 
Welfare Effects:  
The Costs of CAP abolition 
10. Producers                               -a         -(g+h+i+j) 
11. Consumers                                      (a+b+c1+c2+d)                                g+h   
12. Taxpayers                     (αZ+c2)       (1-α)Z-(j+k) 
13. Overall welfare     (b+c1+2c2+d+αZ)            -(i+2j+k)+(1-α)Z 
14. Net overall welfare            (b+d+h+k) 
        
Table 1.1: Transfers in a Two Country Community 
(Adapted from Buckwell et al. 1986) 
 
Thus, the first two rows of table 1.1 show the total revenues from and expenditures on 
exports and imports within the community. The summation of these value flows for 
both member states is the balance of agricultural trade. The next three rows in the table  
 
show the breakdown of the FEOGA budget, which are summed in row 7 under total 
community expenditure (Z) and split (row 8) into member state contributions by the 
share parameter α. Row 9 is the sum of rows 6 and 8, and shows the net contributory 
                                                 
2 French acronym for the community budget. 
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position of the two countries. The net importer pays αZ to the common budget as well 
as handing extra-community import levy revenues over to the community. The net 
exporter receives income in the form of export subsidies, and contributes (1-α)Z to the 
community budget.  
 
The final rows in the table examine the costs of the CAP compared to the alternative of 
free trade. The transfer of funds to producers from consumers and taxpayers under this 
policy scenario is a measure of the economic or resource costs of this policy. The 
taxpayer costs represent the effect of removing the net contributory positions each state 
holds under the CAP. Thus, in both regions, producers lose and consumers gain due to 
lower supply prices. The extent to which transfers of funds do not sum to zero reflects 
the inefficiency of the policy in supporting producers (in this case), and is known as the 
dead-weight welfare cost (row 14). Dead-weight costs (i.e., the gains from CAP 
abolition (b+d+h+k)) arise since subsidising agriculture draws resources away from 
other sectors where resources could be better employed. 3
 
1.2 Partial Equilibrium vs General Equilibrium 
Much of the literature on CAP costs throughout the 1970s and ‘80s was based on a 
partial equilibrium approach. However, it has been recognised that this approach does 
suffer from certain limitations (Demekas et al. 1988):  
 
• PE treats the market for agricultural commodities as mutually exclusive from 
the wider effects of resource reallocations on factors of production in the rest of 
the economy (i.e. non-agricultural sectors).  
• In economic terms, there are no cross-price elasticity effects, as the prices of 
goods/services in other markets are assumed fixed.  
• The analysis assumes that the country is a price-taker (i.e., the 'small' country 
assumption) in the world market, such that changes in domestic production will 
have no affect on world prices.  
• PE restricts attention to one (agricultural) sector. This often restricts the 
modeller to capture only one specific policy from a plethora of CAP support 
instruments, which in turn will bias welfare results.  
• All demand is 'final' and does not capture the 'intermediate' nature of demands 
which characterises much of the agricultural sector. 
                                                 
3 A useful discussion is given in Atkin (1993). 
 4 
 Demekas et al. (1988) highlight how the use of multi-country, multi-commodity models 
(Tyers, 1985; Anderson & Tyers 1988, 1993) can overcome some of these problems, 
although the resultant level of complexity can be significant. Moreover, it is stressed 
that,  
 
‘even a model of such sophistication....is essentially limited by the constraints of 
partial equilibrium methodology’ (Demekas et al., 1988, pp118). 
 
With the advent of more advanced computer software, as well as multi-region database 
syndicates, usage of CGE now dominates much of the current trade literature, including 
that pertaining to the CAP. Hence, CGE explores the ramifications of a policy change 
throughout the entire economy. By its very nature, this approach captures all 
interactions between agriculture and non-agricultural sectors which typically magnify 
the costs of a given policy compared to the partial equilibrium counterparts (de Janvry 
and Sadoulet, 1987; Hertel, 1992). Indeed, in some cases, PE and GE can produce 
contradictory results for the same scenario.4  
 
Thus, it is widely agreed that to identify the detail of economy-wide relationships, CGE 
models are a clear advance on partial equilibrium. However, this advantage does come 
at the cost of a degree of pre-conditioning of the model results by parameterising (e.g., 
‘borrowing’ elasticity values from the literature) or calibrating behavioural parameters 
to the existing data set. Thus, it is more difficult to know whether the results are a 
reflection of reality or symptomatic of model structure. Nevertheless, such an extension 
is entirely necessary if the modeller wishes to better approximate the full effects of 
policy changes which go beyond the 'first-round' effects of partial equilibrium studies. 
 
1.3 Earlier Empirical Estimates of CAP Costs 
There are several review papers offering good coverage on estimates of CAP costs 
throughout the 1970s and ‘80s, and it is not the intention here to identify each and every 
                                                 
4 Anderson and Tyers (1988)  predicted in their study of trade liberalisation under the Uruguay Round, 
that a fall in the economic welfare of the developing countries would follow liberalisation by 
industrialised nations due to the rise in international food prices, with consumer losses outweighing 
producer gains. The same scenario was conducted under CGE conditions (Burniaux and Waelbroeck, 
1985; Loo and Tower, 1989) both of which showed welfare gains, due to the effects of the non-
agricultural sectors. Noting the reconciliation of the structural differences between the model approaches, 
Anderson and Tyers (1993) reverse their initial estimates from a sizeable loss (1985 US $14bn) into a 
significant gain (US $11bn). 
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study over this period.5 This section merely attempts to give a brief resume of the types 
of cost concepts measured and the range of estimates attained 
 
Buckwell et al. (1982, pp59) present a summary of several early (1975-1979) partial 
equilibrium estimates of CAP costs, where each is measured against the alternative of 
nationally financed agricultural support at existing price levels without community 
preference. Although there is a large consensus between studies on which countries are 
the gainers and which are losers, there is a large margin of error in terms of the 
magnitudes of the results, largely because data discrepancies occur in terms of years 
used, commodity coverage varies and differences exist between model structures. It is 
therefore difficult to draw comparisons or conclusions. 
 
Source Countries Model Structure % of GDP 
Morris (1980) EC-9 PE 0.50 
Harvey & Thomson (1981) EC-9 PE 0.50 
Buckwell et al. (1982) EC-9 PE 0.50 
Tyers (1985) EC-9 PE 1.10 
Roberts (1985)  EC-10 PE 0.30 
Spencer (1985)              EC-9 GE 0.90 
Burniaux et al. (1985) EC-9 GE 2.70 
Tyers et al. (1987)  EC-12 PE 0.27 
Stoeckel & Breckling (1989)   EC-46  GE 1.50 
Table 1.2: Estimates throughout the 1980s of the dead-weight costs of the CAP 
 
Table 1.2 presents the costs of the CAP in terms of the dead-weight costs of the policy 
as a percentage of GDP foregone. This statistic illustrates the relative inefficiency of the 
CAP in the total economy. All of the PE studies are multi-sector and have a broad level 
of CAP commodity coverage. It is clear that all the studies indicate a substantial cost to 
the EU from the CAP. Yet again, however, the variance of estimates is broad mainly 
due to methodological differences (e.g., PE vs GE) which makes comparisons difficult. 
The range of estimates vary from 0.27 to 2.7 per cent of GDP, where the larger 
estimates are given by CGE models which capture the extra multiplier effects of inter-
                                                 
5 For fuller coverage of all empirical studies (PE and CGE) on CAP costs, the reader is advised to 
consult Buckwell et al. (1982), Winters (1987), Demekas et al. (1988) and Atkin (1993). 
 
6 This application models the four biggest economies of the EU (Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
Italy and the UK) which account for 86% of total EU-10 GDP. 
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sectoral relationships within the broader economy, although as Atkin (1993) notes, even 
the smallest estimate (0.3% of GDP) represents a significant cost.7
 
1.4 CGE Estimates of CAP Costs in the 1990s 
Although some CGE studies were still evaluating the impact of complete CAP abolition 
(e.g., Hubbard, 1995a, 1995b), political and economic developments in the 1990s 
pertaining to EU agricultural trade prompted a change of direction in much of the 
literature. Emphasis was no longer placed on complete abolition of CAP support, but 
rather on the impact of the 1992 CAP reforms and compatibility with GATT 
requirements (Blake et al. 1998, Weyerbrock 1998). Moreover, other important issues 
pertaining to European expansion (Frandsen et al. 1996, 1998, Herok & Lotze, 1998) 
have added a further dimension to CAP reform studies. A final point to note is that 
CGE model structures have evolved radically to better characterise the intricacies of the 
CAP.  
 
Throughout the 1980s, CGE policy modellers contented themselves by approximating 
CAP protection, insulation and distortionary effects through exogenous ad valorem 
tariff/subsidy equivalents. However, more recent studies of the CAP have sought to 
provide a more detailed coverage of agricultural sectors, by introducing endogenous 
behaviour through the explicit modelling of CAP support instruments including set 
aside, direct payments on land and cattle, and budgetary effects (Gohin et al. 1996, 
Harrison et al. 1995, Weyerbrock 1998).   
 
Some CAP related CGE studies have attempted to impose a specific time horizon to 
more realistically quantify the impact of CAP removal/reform. Frandsen et al. (1996), 
in studying European expansion of the CAP to cover eastern block countries, present a 
projected benchmark through to 2010, against which to compare CAP liberalisation 
scenarios, where their projections are based on estimates of productivity, endowment 
growth and population change.  
 
A final consideration has been the advances made in CGE market structure. These 
studies not only characterise the standard efficiency gains of resource reallocations 
from perfectly competitive agricultural sectors, but also capture additional welfare 
                                                 
 
7 Although efficiency gains from CAP abolition in the order of 0.5% of GDP are more usual (see 
Winters, 1987). 
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effects emanating from firm economies of scale, as well as utility effects from increased 
levels of varietal diversity.8 Consequently, these CGE model structures typically lead to 
larger estimates of welfare gains from agricultural liberalisation.      
 
Whilst a rich range of industrial organisational structures have been employed in 
applications pertaining to the effects of the Uruguay Round (see Francois et al. 1995, 
Harrison et al. 1995a, 1995b), enlargement of the EU (Baldwin and Francois, 1996) and 
European market segmentation (Mercenier, 1992), with the exception of Blake et al. 
(1998), very little appears to be directed towards liberalisation of the CAP. Table 1.3 
presents a range of recent estimates based on CAP abolition/reform in a comparable 
form (% of GDP). All of the studies highlighted, bar one, are CGE in nature.  
 
Using a partial equilibrium approach, the European Commission (1994) measures the 
economic inefficiency of the CAP as being just over 13.7 billion ecu, which translates 
as approximately 0.22% of EU GDP. Three of the member states (Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland) actually gain from the existence of the CAP compared with the policy 
alternative of CAP abolition, with the rest of the world continuing to protect and distort 
their farm sectors as before the Uruguay Round. As expected, this result is towards the 
lower end of the range of estimates presented, since this analysis implicitly ignores the 
cross market interaction effects that such a policy change can be expected to have 
elsewhere in the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Model Structure Market 
Structure 
Countries % of GDP 
Commission (1994)           PE Perfect Comp. EU-9 0.22 
Harrison et al.(1995)           CGE Perfect Comp. EU-10 0.10 
Hubbard (1995a)           CGE Perfect Comp. EU-12 as single 0.80 
                                                                                                                                              
 
8 'Scale' effects emanate from movements down the average total cost curve with increases in firm 
output. Pro-competitive effects include this effect but also examine the simultaneous reduction of the 
mark-up price distortion. A fuller discussion is presented in chapter 6; This is a Chamberlinian concept 
commonly referred to in the CGE literature as the ‘love of variety’. For further discussion see Spence 
(1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and chapter 3. 
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region 
Hubbard (1995b)           CGE Perfect Comp. EU-12 as single 
region 
0.14 -1.3 
Folmer et al. (1995)           CGE Perfect Comp. EU-9     0.309
Blake et al. (1998)10
 
          CGE 
          CGE 
Perfect Comp. 
Imperfect Comp. 
EU-12 as single 
region 
0.42 
0.44-0.5311
Weyerbrock (1998) 
 
          CGE 
          CGE 
          CGE 
Perfect Comp. 
Perfect Comp. 
Perfect Comp. 
EU-12 as single 
region 
   0.2012
   0.4013
   0.1014
Table 1.3: Recent estimates of the dead-weight costs of the CAP 
 
 
Hubbard (1995a) uses a standard perfectly competitive, constant returns to scale Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) was 
established in 1992 and essentially includes a fully consistent global database with an 
accompanying model framework and software to operationalise the model. Hubbard 
uses the GTAP model to examine complete abolition of the CAP.15 The model 
characterises labour and capital as perfectly mobile and land as agriculture specific, 
with the CAP represented using exogenous tariff wedges. Hubbard (1995a) compares 
the counterfactual CAP abolition scenario with the benchmark GTAP data, and predicts 
specialisation effects in non-agricultural sectors leading to EU welfare gains of 0.8% of 
GDP. Moreover, the removal of the CAP results in global gains of 0.4% of GDP. This 
‘standard’ treatment sits well with (smaller aggregation) earlier studies predicting EU 
gains in the region of 0.5%. Using the same model specification, Hubbard (1995b) 
conducts a sensitivity analysis of the trade (‘Armington’) elasticities that determine the 
mix of imperfectly substitutable imported and domestic goods. A quadrupling of these 
elasticity values results in a range of resource costs from 0.14% to 1.3% of EU GDP.  
 
Harrison et al. (1995) conduct an evaluation of the impact of the CAP on ten members 
of the EU-12 and a 'rest of the world' region.16 The model uses a standard CAP 
                                                 
9 This estimate is based on the MacSharry CAP reform. 
10 CAP reform including the full Uruguay Round reform package. 
11 This study employs a Cournot oligopolistic structure similar to that used in Harrison et al (1995a). 
12 CAP reform only. 
13 CAP and GATT reform plus further reductions in intervention prices for sugar and dairy to meet 
GATT requirements. 
14 CAP and GATT reform plus quantity controls required to meet GATT targets. 
15 The GTAP is essentially a consortium approach to the construction of a mutually consistent global 
database.  
16 The authors had no data on Greece or Luxembourg. 
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abolition scenario and is calibrated to time-series data running between 1974-1985. 
Counterfactual results can thus be interpreted as providing some measure of the 
historical impact of the CAP in each year. Thus, from each base year, the study 
examines different time horizon (short run (SR), medium run (MR) and long run (LR)) 
scenarios based on assumptions about factor mobility. In the LR scenario, all factors are 
mobile, with land characterised as agriculture specific. The MR scenario is the same as 
the LR, except that the authors capture the downward rigidity of wages by including 
Europe-wide unemployment. The SR scenario further assumes sectoral specificity of 
capital.  
 
This study also captures the essence of the CAP more effectively by introducing 
endogenous behaviour into CAP policy instruments (i.e., variable import levies, support 
buying, export subsidies, community budget) compared to the 'traditional' approach of 
exogenous tax/subsidy wedges.  
 
The LR model suggests that the abolition of the CAP in the earlier years (1974/'75) 
would have been detrimental to a number of member states at that time (France, 
Netherlands, UK, Denmark, Ireland), although for most countries these losses turn to 
gains in the later years, with an overall gain to the EU throughout the 1980s of only 
0.1% of EU GDP. The principal beneficiaries of the CAP over the time period are the 
Netherlands and Ireland. The effects on the rest of the world are negligible.  
 
While the range of welfare magnitudes in the MR is broadly similar to the LR, the 
distribution of gainers and losers is different. For some regions (Germany, Belgium) the 
gains from CAP abolition in the MR are much greater. Harrison et al. (1995) maintain 
that in these cases,  
 
'elimination of the CAP.....reduce(s) surplus labour (in the benchmark) raising 
the welfare gain from liberalisation of product markets' (pp241).  
 
In other countries (UK, Italy), the reverse is the case, with the model predicting 
unemployment increases. Indeed, those nations whose non-agricultural sectors expand 
the least cannot employ as much displaced agricultural labour and their unemployment 
rates rise.  
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One clear pattern in the SR is that sectorally 'trapped' capital dampens the decline and 
rise in agricultural and manufacturing industries respectively following CAP removal, 
which might suggest smaller magnitudes in regional welfare gains. However, many EU 
regions' welfare gains are larger than in the LR and MR scenarios, and the variance of 
gains and losses across members is also greater, although the reasons for this are not 
clear.17  
 
Folmer et al. (1995) look at the effects on the EU-9 of a reform scenario characterised 
by the elimination of all agricultural production, consumer and input subsidies, 
compensatory lump sum transfers for the reduction in production and export subsidies, 
the abolition of set-aside and the relaxation of sugar and milk quotas.18 The reported 
resource cost estimate of 0.3% of EU GDP is lower than most estimates of reform of 
the CAP. This is because the CAP reform is only partial (i.e. not complete abolition). 
More interesting perhaps, is the fact that the authors estimate the MacSharry proposals 
to be broadly compatible with the Uruguay Round commitments, although further 
reductions in import tariffs are expected to be required.  
 
Blake et al. (1998) study the combined effects of the 1992 CAP reforms and the UR 
package. Using a 17 commodity, 13 region aggregation of the GTAP database (1992 
base year), the model includes special features such as agricultural specific factors, 
endogenous export subsidy behaviour, set aside and de-coupled compensatory 
payments.19 A model variant characterising food processing sectors as imperfectly 
competitive is also used.  
 
Blake et al. (1998) predict a welfare gain to the EU of 0.42% of EU GDP. This result 
may be smaller than expected due the dampening effects of specific factors, and 
endogenous export subsidy behaviour, where a 36% required reduction in export 
expenditure requires less than a 36% reduction in the exogenous subsidy rate (as is 
usually applied in other studies). Introducing imperfect competition into the food 
                                                 
17 -0.7 to + 0.6 in 1985 compared to the same years for the Long Run (-0.4 to + 0.3) and Medium Run  
(-0.3 to + 0.8). 
18 Authors did not have enough data to include Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
19 50% of each factor employed in agriculture is assumed farm specific. The returns on these factors is 
considered as farming income as opposed to returns on all factors in agriculture which is classified as 
agricultural household income (not necessarily accruing to the farmer). 
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processing sectors increases welfare gains by between 0.44 - 0.53% of EU GDP 
depending on the number of firms specified in the benchmark.20
 
Weyerbrock (1998) also assesses the policy effects of CAP and GATT reforms. This 
model is similar to Blake et al.(1998) insofar as CAP support instruments are explicitly 
modelled (set-aside, compensation and headage payments, CAP budget).21 As well as 
estimating the welfare impacts of CAP reform, this study attempts to ascertain whether 
or not CAP reforms meet the GATT requirements. The main findings are that CAP 
reform alone results in a 0.2% increase in EU GDP in the long run. Contrary to Folmer 
et al. (1995), Weyerbrock (1998) predicts that CAP reforms will not meet many of the 
GATT commitments over the longer term. Although GATT internal domestic support 
targets are met, import rules and export competition criteria in the sugar and dairy 
sectors are violated under the 1992 reforms. Moreover, the CAP budget is increased by 
32% as expenditure on headage premia, compensation payments and structural 
programs exceed savings on export and oilseed subsidy payments.  
 
Based on this evidence, two further scenarios are considered comparing the relative 
merits of price support and supply management. The first scenario evaluates the welfare 
implications of CAP reform plus further reductions in EU intervention prices and 
elimination of intervention buying of dairy and sugar to meet GATT requirements. The 
second scenario represents a further tightening in cereal set-aside and dairy/sugar 
production quotas to meet GATT restrictions. The results show respective long run 
gains of 0.4% and 0.1% of real EU GDP. Weyerbrock concludes by confirming that 
price reductions are more efficient at curbing budgetary problems compared to quantity 
controls, since in the former scenario, dairy and sugar farmers are not compensated for 
intervention price reductions, whereas in the latter scenario, extra compensation must 
be paid on further cuts in land areas.22   
 
As in Harrison et al. (1995), Weyerbrock employs further assumptions about wage 
inflexibilities and possible unemployment to characterise different time horizons. This 
leads to smaller resource movements in the EU and, contrary to Harrison et al. (1995), 
                                                 
20 The smaller the number of firms the greater is the mark-up in the benchmark and hence the greater are 
the potential gains from CAP liberalisation. 
21 Conducting sensitivity analysis with set-aside levels, Weyerbrock (1998) predicts that if the EU sets 
aside 3-15% of its agricultural land, between 10,000 and 56,000 workers will leave the rural sector in the 
long run with farm output declines between 0.3% to 0.8%. 
22 The budget situation actually improves 11% from the base under further price reductions compared 
with an increase in budgetary pressure of 11.5% under further quantitative restrictions. 
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the welfare gains are smaller in these cases reflecting different assumptions about the 
workings of factor markets.   
  
1.5 Distribution Issues 
Before concluding this summary, a caveat is in order. All of the results presented 
indicate that the EU benefits from reform/abolition of the CAP. However, CGE models, 
whilst able to report on some of the income transfers between agents in the economy, 
pay very little attention to evaluating the distribution of welfare gains among different 
agents.  
 
The convention in economic theory is to adopt the principle that the marginal utility of 
income is equal for all recipients.23 Using this convention, the evaluation of losses and 
gains can be undertaken using the compensation principle, which states that if the 
gainers from the policy can compensate the losers and still be better off (or the potential 
losers cannot ‘bribe’ the potential gainers to retain the status quo, and still be better off 
than they would be with the policy change), then the policy is Pareto-improving.     
 
Despite the mass of work quantifying the effects of the CAP in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the empirical literature of the dispersion of the gains to various agents in the economy 
is thin. Harvey (1989) attempted some preliminary analysis of the producer gain for the 
UK. On the basis of a land price model, he estimated that land prices were, on average, 
inflated by 46% due to the CAP, which in 1986 amounted to an increase of £655/ha. 
This amounted to £631m, which Harvey estimated as being 55% of the farming gain.24 
Thus, just over half of the support afforded to agriculture through the CAP manifested 
itself as land values and rents to the land owners, with the remainder (45%) distributed 
across factor and input markets to other factors of production used by the industry.  
 
Renwick and Hubbard (1994) examine the distributional impacts on food consumers 
and taxpayers in the UK of changing from support prices to compensation payments 
and premia as a result of the 1992 reforms of the CAP. They find that high income 
households bear more of the taxpayer costs, whereas the consumer cost, when 
compared with income, falls more on lower income households. The move away from 
                                                 
23 In other words a £ is a £ regardless from whom it comes or to whom it goes. However, the fact that 
many political systems in the West ascribe to progressive tax rates makes this theoretical assertion of the 
real world somewhat nonsensical. 
24 This inflation in land prices can be associated with a policy induced rent increase based on an 
estimated relationship between rents and land prices provided by Lloyd (1989). 
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support prices toward compensation payments and premia results in a shift in burden 
from consumer to taxpayer, which they conclude, will lead to an improvement in the 
relative position of low income households.25         
 
1.6 Conclusions and Further Issues 
Clearly, the evolutionary path of the CAP has sparked much debate amongst politicians 
and agricultural economists alike, which in turn has led the latter to quantitatively 
measure the effects of the CAP on producers, consumers, taxpayers as well as trade 
protection and distortion effects. Thus, this chapter reviews some of the main attempts 
to empirically estimate CAP costs, placing emphasis on studies employing PE and CGE 
frameworks. Whilst all the estimates converge on welfare gains resulting from CAP 
abolition/reform (at least in the long run), there is much debate on the ‘true’ figure.  
 
Studies in the 1980s place estimates between 0.27% - 2.7% of EU GDP, although more 
recent estimates (1990s) suggest smaller gains of between 0.22% - 0.8% of EU GDP.26 
This is due, in part, to the treatment of set-aside and headage support which is no longer 
characterised as direct (i.e., output subsidies), but is now modelled through either lump 
sum transfers (Folmer et al., 1995; Weyerbrock, 1998) or input subsidies (Blake, et al., 
1998, 1999). Moreover, the incorporation of special features such as specific factors 
helps to dampen the supply response of agriculture to changes in the level of support, 
resulting in smaller estimates of welfare gains from liberalisation scenarios. Finally, 
more recent CGE applications pertaining to CAP liberalisation (Blake et al. (1998) and 
Weyerbrock (1998)) focus on CAP reform vis-à-vis complete abolition.  
 
Perhaps the main conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is that comparisons 
between models is, at best, problematic where the scope of model structures (e.g., 
elasticities, factor mobilities), data sets, commodity coverage and aggregation all have 
far reaching implications on welfare results.27 For this reason, it is better sense to 
interpret CAP costs within a range of model estimates.  
 
Although the measurement of CAP costs is not new from a research perspective, the 
principal methodology employed has changed dramatically over the last 15 years. The 
                                                                                                                                              
 
25 Welfare for households in the lowest quintile rises 2.5%, and falls for households in the highest 
quintile by 1%. 
26 This does not include the CAP reform studies. 
27 See Arce & Reinhart (1994) to see how aggregation affects welfare results. 
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development of multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) trade models 
allows modellers to capture a broad range of feedback effects between those trade 
policies under observation and their concurrent effects on key trading partners.  
 
The discussion in section 1.4 showed that recent attempts to quantify CAP costs in the 
CGE literature led modellers to re-characterise CAP support within the model structure 
to keep in step with the shift in price support to direct payments. To this extent, the 
literature is still relatively new, and is constantly undergoing transformation in an 
attempt to keep up with what has come to be a radical decade in the evolutionary 
reform process of the CAP. One aspect of this study continues in this vein with 
significant commodity coverage of key CAP policy mechanisms within the model 
structure.  
 
This research will also examine the impact of quality perceptions (predominantly in 
food products) by consumers based on region of origin. Very little CGE work has been 
done examining the role of variety, preferences and choice patterns, and the impacts of 
policy change on purchasing behaviour, trade patterns and regional welfare. Thus, this 
study examines the implications of CAP reform on consumer utility, where preferences 
are seen to be patriotic (although the model allows for different characterisations of 
purchasing behaviour). Evidence of this is readily observable in the ‘real world’ (e.g. 
Buy British campaigns) as well as within the food marketing and management 
literature. Moreover, certain productive sectors in this study are classified as 
imperfectly competitive, where producers are aware of their competitors and strategic 
conjecture and pro-competitive effects play an important role on welfare.  
 
 
 
Some of the issues to be explored:  
• How do the welfare results reported in this study (incorporating explicit modelling 
of CAP policies, imperfect competition and product differentiation) compare with 
estimates of CAP costs from the literature? 
• Are welfare gains significantly improved/worsened when consumer preferences are 
characterised as more patriotic?  
• How does the degree of consumer loyalty by consumers affect resource allocations 
between sectors? Trade flows?  
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• How important is the role of strategic conjecture by firms? To what extent do firm 
numbers affect welfare results? 
 
Finally, the structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 examines the key issues in 
CGE model design and implementation. Chapter 3 discusses some of the imperfectly 
competitive trade theories within the literature, including the role of product 
perceptions and region of origin. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the standard Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and database. Chapter 5 discusses the specific 
aggregation used in the final version of the model employed in this study and details the 
modelling issues surrounding a full characterisation of, inter alia, the CAP and the 
Uruguay Round constraints. Chapter 6 gives a detailed discussion of the modelling 
issues pertaining to the incorporation of imperfect competition and hierarchical 
preferences within the model framework. Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the results 
and conclusions of the study. Chapter 8 summarises and concludes. A glossary 
providing a complete listing of all model notation is provided at the end of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Computable General Equilibrium Theory and Practice 
 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models use neo-classical behavioural concepts 
such as utility maximisation and cost minimisation to characterise the workings of the 
economy. Although these principles have long been recognised by economists, 
operational usage of large scale (multi-region) CGE models has only become more 
prevalent through improvements in computational facility.  
 
Once the model structure is formalised and calibrated to a static data set, specific 
macroeconomic or trade policy scenario questions may be posed. The model responds 
with the interaction of economic agents within each market, where an outcome is 
characterised by a new set of interdependent equilibria. To ensure that the model obeys 
the Walrasian laws of general equilibrium, a large system of accounting identities are 
introduced to guarantee that households and producers remain on their budget and cost 
constraints respectively and that zero profits prevail in all production sectors. 
 
The strength of the CGE approach lies in the ability to characterise all economic 
feedback effects not inherent in partial equilibrium studies; moreover, CGE models are 
able to explicitly incorporate support policy mechanisms (i.e., quotas). However, CGE 
models suffer from the complexities of data gathering and manipulation required to 
create a consistent data set. Such a high level of information on commodity detail 
precludes the use of time series data; moreover, unlike stochastic estimation techniques, 
there are no statistical tests to support deterministic parameter values. 
 
The chapter begins with a detailed discussion of the more popular types of functional 
forms used in CGE analysis. This is followed by a simple stylised CGE model of a 
closed economy in section 2.2 which looks at the mechanisms behind the general 
equilibrium solution to a system of equations. The chapter also examines the issues of 
closure (2.3), calibration (2.4) and model solution methods (2.5). Section 2.6 concludes 
with a more detailed look at nesting, which forms the basis for the implementation of 
the Armington assumption. The Armington mechanism becomes the subject of further 
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debate in chapter 3. Appendices are provided at the end of the chapter. 
 
2.1 Functional forms 
CGE modellers tend to favour the family of ‘convenient’ functional forms. In a similar 
fashion, the CGE trade model in this study uses Leontief, Cobb-Douglas (CD) and 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions. Importantly, within the final model 
structure, the use of linearised functions is favoured over the more familiar levels 
representations given in the following sections. With added sophistication in computer 
software, there is very little difference in levels or linearised model results (Hertel, 
1992), although calibration procedures are simpler with linearised representations. A 
further discussion of linearisation is provided in section 2.5.3 and an illustrative 
example of a nested linearised structure is developed in appendix A.  
 
2.1.1 Leontief Function 
The Leontief function is the basis of upon the input-output approach to economic 
modelling. At the simplest level, the Leontief function assumes perfect complementarity 
between inputs (commodities) in the production (utility) function. In production theory, 
this   
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Figure 2.1: Leontief Isoquant 
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 implies that there is zero substitution between inputs such that there is only one method 
of production for any level of output. The isoquant is thus ‘L’ shaped, as presented in 
figure 2.1. In the figure, the corner of the isoquants, Q and Q’, represents the best point 
for the firm (industry) to operate at the specified outputs. All other points along the 
isoquants are sub-optimal since they employ more of one input (although not less of the 
other) to produce the same level of output. 
 
In the case of ‘n’ inputs, the Leontief function is algebraically expressed as: 
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where it is assumed that the minimum number of units of all (intermediate) inputs Xi,j 
required to produce an extra unit of output (Qj), is given by the parameter Ai,j. This 
fixed relationship between output and each input implies constant returns to scale. 
 
The nature of the function implies that to produce an extra unit of production, rational 
cost minimising producers will only employ the minimum number of input units, giving 
demand functions: 
 
        (LF.2) jjiji QAX ,, =
 
where demand for each input ‘i’ is a function of the fixed input-output parameter Ai,j. 
Note, that Leontief demands remain unaffected by changes in relative prices. This can 
be illustrated in figure 2.1 above, where changes in the slope of the iso-cost line running 
through optimal production point ‘a’ (along the ray), has no effect on input intensity. 
 
The composite output price over all ‘i’ inputs (i=1…n), Pj, can be derived by assuming 
zero profits in industry ‘j’: 
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=
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 where 
jQ - Output in industry ‘j’. 
jP  - Output price in industry ‘j’. 
jiX , - Demand for input ‘i’ in industry ‘j’. 
jiR , - Price of input ‘i’ in industry ‘j’. 
 
Substituting expression (LF.2) and dividing by Qj gives: 
 
       (LF.4) ji
n
i
jij RAP ,
1
,∑
=
=
 
The Leontief function is a common specification in many CGE models. In this study, 
Leontief functions are chosen to characterise (zero) substitution possibilities between 
composite value added and composite intermediate inputs. In an agricultural context, it 
may be argued that such a treatment of producer behaviour is not realistic, where for 
example a farmer may use a different fertiliser application in response to a relative price 
change with respect to land. However, with a general lack of data on substitution 
possibilities between composites of this nature, most CGE applications favour the 
Leontief approach.    
 
2.1.2 More advanced functions 
The Cobb-Douglas (CD - Cobb and Douglas, 1928) and Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES - Arrow et al., 1961) functions are more advanced treatments of 
producer/consumer behaviour, as they allow substitution possibilities between inputs 
(commodities). Thus, the shape of the isoquant is smooth and convex with respect to the 
origin as presented in figure 2.2. Changes in relative input prices, denoted by 
movements in the iso-cost line, imply substitution between factors (commodities). 
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In the next two sub-sections, CD and CES production functions are assessed on three 
criteria: 
 
(i) The response of short run output to variation in a single input, all other inputs 
held constant (marginal and average product). 
(ii) The substitution possibilities of one input for another (applies equivalently to 
consumer theory) 
(iii) The response of long run output to an equiproportional change in all inputs 
(returns to scale).  
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 X1’’    X1’             X1 
Figure 2.2: A Smooth Convex Isoquant 
 
In the final model, input and commodity demands are Hicksian (compensated) with the 
exception of the top nest (see section 2.6 for a discussion on nesting) in the ‘regional 
household’ demand structure which is CD Marshallian (uncompensated). Hence 
compensated own-  and cross- price elasticities are derived for CD and CES as well as 
the uncompensated income elasticity for CD.1
 
 
                                                          
1 Typically elasticities are partial equilibrium in nature since prices of other goods are assumed fixed. 
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2.1.3 Cobb-Douglas Function 
A two input CD production function is of the form: 
 
        (CD.1) βα 21 XAXQ =
 
where demands for input 1 and 2 are X1 and X2 respectively, Q is output, A is an 
efficiency parameter and α and β are elasticities. First order partial derivatives give 
short run marginal products: 
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The average product (for input 1) is given as: 
 
 βα 2
1
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Substituting (CD.4) into (CD.2) gives the relationship between marginal and average 
products: 
 
 11 APMP α=        (CD.5) 
 
The production function must obey either concavity or strict concavity (see appendix B) 
to be consistent with the theory, which restricts the range of values that the parameters 
may assume in the chosen function (see appendix B).2 As a result of these short- and 
long-run theoretical restrictions, Beattie and Taylor (1985) demonstrate that production 
functions exhibit three stages of production (see appendix C). Thus, CD functions 
which are restricted to strict concavity only exhibit stage II of production either with 
                                                          
 
2 In theoretical terms, ‘Short-Run’ production functions must exhibit Diminishing Marginal Returns; 
‘Long-Run’ production functions must exhibit some form of returns to scale. 
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respect to each factor (short-run) or with respect to scale (i.e., proportional changes in 
all inputs). Similarly, strict quasi-concavity in CD functions implies stages I or II with 
respect to either each factor or scale (see Beattie and Taylor, 1985, pp68-69). 
 
The elasticity of substitution (σ) is a measure of the curvature of the isoquant and is 
given as the proportionate change in the slope of a ray to the isoquant, divided by the 
proportionate change in the slope of the tangent at the same point. For a two input 
production function: 
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The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is the ratio of the marginal products, or the 
slope of the isoquant (Koutsoyiannis, 1979, pp73). Dividing (CD.2) by (CD.3) gives: 
 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
2
12 . X
XMRS β
α       (CD.7) 
 
Expressed explicitly, (CD.6) is: 
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In equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution (slope of the isoquant) is equal to the 
ratio of input prices (slope of the iso-cost line), so that expression (CD.6) can be 
rewritten as: 
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Thus, a 10% increase in the factor (commodity) price ratio (R1/R2), leads to a 10% 
increase in factor (commodity) intensity (X2/X1). This implies that in CD functions, the 
cost (expenditure) shares are fixed. 
 
It is also possible to measure the change in long run output (Q) with changes in scale 
(i.e. equiproportional change in all inputs). Thus, in the two input CD production 
function, assume that X2 = ϑX1 such that the ratio X2/X1 is constant with increases in 
scale, then the CD production function may be rewritten as: 
 
      (CD.10) βαββα ϑ +== 121 XAXAXQ
 
Thus, the elasticity of output with respect to proportional changes in inputs is given as: 
 
 βα +=
Q
X
dX
dQ 1
1
       (CD.11) 
 
where if: 
 α + β < 1  - decreasing returns to scale 
 α + β = 1 − constant returns to scale (CRS) 
 α + β > 1 − increasing returns to scale 
 
As α and β are constants, the elasticity of scale for the C-D function is also a constant, 
so it is invariant to changes in the level of output.  
 
Standard CGE applications employ perfectly competitive structures, where each firm 
faces perfectly competitive input/factor markets as well as behaving competitively in its 
relevant output markets (i.e., takes prices as given). Moreover, constant returns to scale 
(CRS) is assumed, implying that long run average cost ( ) is equal to long run 
marginal cost ( ). Given the assumption of long run zero profits, output price 
equals average unit cost, as well as long run marginal cost (due to CRS), which is a key 
characteristic of perfectly competitive market structures (Koutsoyiannis, 1979).  
QTC /
QTC ∂∂ /
 
When a production function does exhibit constant returns to scale then it is said to be 
‘linearly homogeneous’. This relationship between homogeneity and returns to scale 
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can be proven mathematically. Taking Cobb-Douglas production in an initial period as 
Q0, multiplying each of the inputs by a scalar ‘c’ gives output in period Q1:  
 
       (CD.12) 
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where the new output level Q1 can be expressed as a function of c (to a power α+β) 
multiplied by the initial output, Q0. The power of c is the degree of homogeneity of the 
function where linear homogeneity in inputs is established by restricting α+β equal to 1.  
 
Minimising cost subject to the Cobb-Douglas function gives the first order conditions: 
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where Ri (i=1,2) are input prices, and Λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. Divide (CD.13) by 
(CD.14), rearrange in terms of X2 (X1), and substitute into (CD.15). Rearranging the 
resulting expression in terms of X1 (X2) gives CD Hicksian demands: 
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Note that in consumer theory, there is no income effect in compensated demand 
functions.3  
                                                          
3 Hicksian final demands are a function of utility and prices only. 
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 Given the assumption of zero profits: 
 
       (CD.18) 2211 XRXRPQ +=
 
it is possible to derive the composite output price, P. Substituting Hicksian demands 
(CD.16) and (CD.17) into (CD.18), simplifying and factorising for prices Ri gives: 
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Assuming CRS (i.e. α + β = 1), the composite output price, P, is linear homogeneous in 
Ri and zero degree homogeneous in output Q. Further, it can be shown that the 
underlying demands of a linearly homogeneous function are zero degree homogeneous 
in prices. Thus, for (CD.16) increasing the input prices by a scalar ‘c’ and factorising for 
‘c’ gives the expression: 
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Thus, uniform increases in all prices by x% has no effect on the level of demand (i.e. no 
money illusion).4  
 
Taking the demand for input (commodity) 1 as an example, Hicksian elasticities of 
demand are given as: 
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4 Homogeneity proofs can also be demonstrated in the case of other ‘convenient’ functions (i.e. CES, 
CET), although this is not demonstrated in the text. 
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 cancelling terms gives: 
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provided α+β=1. Similarly, the Hicksian compensated own-price elasticity for input 
(commodity) 2 is: 
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Compensated cross-price elasticities are given as: 
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Maximisation of a 2 commodity Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
 
        (CD.26) βα 21 XXU =
 
subject to a budget constraint gives first order derivatives (marginal utilities). Dividing 
the first order conditions for commodities 1 and 2 and rearranging in terms of 
commodity 2 gives: 
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Substituting (CD.27) into the first order condition Λ∂∂ /L  and rearranging in terms of 
X1 gives: 
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Substituting β with (1-α), and simplifying gives the Marshallian Cobb-Douglas 
household demand function for final commodity 1:5
 
 α
1
1 P
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where ‘Y’ is consumer (household) income. Using a similar procedure, it is possible to 
derive the household demand function for commodity 2 as: 
 
  β
2
2 P
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From the Marshallian (uncompensated) demands it is a straightforward procedure to 
demonstrate that own- and cross- price elasticities are -1 and 0 respectively. Moreover, 
the income elasticity of demand is restricted to one, which is highly restrictive in light 
of empirical evidence showing food products to have income elasticities considerably 
less than one. Finally, it is apparent from (CD.29) and (CD.30) that the underlying 
Marshallian demands are zero homogeneous in prices and income. 
 
2.1.4 Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) Function 
The CES production function can be expressed as: 
 
 [ ] ρρρ δδ vXXAQ −−− −+= 2111 )1(     (CES.1) 
 
                                                          
5 Where α + β =1 
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where A is an efficiency parameter, δ1 is a distribution parameter, ρ is an elasticity 
parameter and v is a scale parameter (see below). Taking first order partial derivatives 
gives short run marginal products (assuming v=1 – the significance of v is discussed 
below): 
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which can be further simplified as: 
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and similarly for input 2: 
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Thus, marginal product is unambiguously positive with positive inputs, outputs, scale 
and distribution parameters. The average product (Q/Xi) can be related to the marginal 
product via expressions (CES.3) and (CES.4) as: 
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As with Cobb-Douglas, strict concavity in CES functions implies stage II of production 
with respect to each factor (short run) and scale. Similarly, strict quasi-concavity in CES 
functions implies stages I or II only with respect to each factor and scale (see Beattie 
and Taylor, 1985, pp68-69). 
 
The CES marginal rate of substitution is given as: 
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To derive the elasticity of substitution, differentiate MRS12 with respect to the input 
ratio: 
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Moreover, since: 
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substitute (CES.9) into (CES.8) to give: 
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Rearranging to give the formula in (CD.6) gives a CES elasticity of substitution value: 
 
 ρσ += 1
1        (CES.11) 
 
Thus, the elasticity of substitution of the CES is constant and depends on the elasticity 
parameter, ρ, which is constrained to be greater than –1.   
 
As with CD, it is possible to measure changes in the scale of output (Q) with 
proportional changes in all inputs. Referring to the two factor CES function (CES.1), 
assume that X2 = ϑX1 such that the ratio X2/X1 is constant with increases in scale. Thus, 
the CES production function may be rewritten as: 
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where the elasticity of output with respect to proportional changes in inputs is given as: 
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The elasticity of scale is a function of the scale parameter ‘v’. For example, where v < 
1, then the CES function specifies decreasing returns to scale. From the discussion of 
CD returns to scale above, CES functions are restricted to CRS, so v=1.6 Given the 
relationship between homogeneity and returns to scale (see (CD.12)), CES production 
functions are homogeneous of degree ‘v’ in inputs. Moreover, it can be proven (this is 
not done here) that the composite output price function is also homogeneous of degree 
‘v’ in input prices, and compensated demands are homogeneous of degree v-1 in 
prices.7
  
To derive compensated demands, minimise cost subject to the CES function which 
gives first order conditions:  
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Dividing (CES.14) by (CES.15), cancelling terms and rearranging in terms of X1 gives: 
 
                                                          
6 In subsequent chapters, the value of ‘v’ in CES (and CET) will assume the value of 1. 
7 Marshallian (uncompensated) commodity demands are homogeneous of degree v-1 in prices and 
income. 
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Substituting (CES.17) into (CES.16) and simplifying gives: 
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where σ is defined in equation (CES.11). Rearranging in terms of X2 gives the Hicksian 
CES demand function for input (commodity) 2:  
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Employing the same techniques, it is possible to derive the CES Hicksian demand 
equation for X1: 
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Differentiating (CES.19) with respect to R2:  
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         (CES.21) 
 
Multiplying (CES.21) by R2/X2 and substituting X2, Q and A gives the Hicksian 
(compensated) own-price elasticity of demand for input 2: 
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Similarly for input 1: 
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Compensated cross price elasticities of demand are given as: 
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2.1.5 Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) Function 
The CET is the corollary CES function, where the production possibilities of the firm 
(industry) are a function of different combinations of supply activities. The algebraic 
representation of the CET function for combinations of supply activities is:  
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where Z is a measure of the firm’s overall capacity to produce, and Qi is a measure of 
the output level of each supply activity ‘i’. As with the CES, B and γi are efficiency and 
share parameters respectively and ρ is a transformation elasticity.8 Moreover, the 
function shown is linearly homogeneous, where a doubling of output from each supply 
activity (Q) doubles the firms overall capacity of output (Z).  
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The derivation of activity supplies is a revenue maximisation process subject to a 
production possibilities frontier. The mathematical derivations are parallel exactly to the 
CES function, where the elasticity of transformation between supply activities is 
equivalent to the elasticity of substitution in inputs.  
 
2.2 The Theoretical Structure of a Stylised CGE Model 
This section discusses the core principles behind the development and structure of 
computable general equilibrium modelling. At the simplest level, a CGE model consists 
of a system of equations specifying the behavioural characteristics of producers and 
consumers, where the aim is to find a vector of prices and quantities which satisfies the 
market clearing mechanisms.  
 
For purposes of illustration, the model structure chosen here contains a single household 
and 2 “single-output” industries each employing 2 primary factors. The economy is 
assumed to be ‘closed’ (i.e. no external trade) with no government intervention and no 
savings. Behavioural equations are derived from constrained optimisation techniques 
based on established principles of neo-classical theory (i.e. utility maximisation, cost 
minimisation).  
 
2.2.1 Demand for Final Commodities 
Household demand is based on the maximisation of a linearly homogeneous Cobb-
Douglas utility function for a two commodity (i=1,2) economy: 
 
        (CGE.1) βα 21 XXU =
 
subject to a budget constraint: 
 
       (CGE.2) 2211 XPXPY +=
 
From section 2.1.3, uncompensated demands are given as: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 The difference between CES and CET is that in CET, ρ is limited to be less than–1 whereas with CES ρ 
is greater than –1. Thus, CES is convex with respect to the origin and CET is concave with respect to the 
origin. 
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2.2.2 Demands for Factor Inputs 
On the production side, it is assumed that the production of commodity 1 and 2 (Qi 
(i=1,2)) is governed by a CRS CES aggregate of primary factors labour (Li) and capital 
(Ki): 
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Denoting ‘w’ and ‘r’ as the price of primary factors labour and capital respectively, 
minimising the cost of the factors, subject to the CES production function gives 
Hicksian demands:9
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2.2.3 The General Equilibrium System of Equations 
Having derived the behavioural equations pertaining to each agent (producers and 
household) in the model, it is now possible to enforce equilibrium conditions by 
introducing market clearing equations. Assuming perfect competition and perfect 
mobility across factor markets, the demands for commodities and factors (i.e. full 
employment) are equal to their respective supplies. Finally, an accounting equation is 
                                                          
9 It is assumed that factors are perfectly mobile between industry 1 and 2, although it is not uncommon to 
specify factors as “sluggish” yielding different factor rewards by sector. This approach is employed in the 
final model and is discussed in chapter 4. 
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introduced which ensures that the household collects payments from the ownership of 
the factors of production. 
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Figure 2.3: A Stylised Closed Economy CGE Model 
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where factor payments are exhausted on the purchase of commodities 1 and 2 given by 
the household budget constraint. Finally, zero profits in both industries are assumed:10
 
 2,1∈+= irKwLQP iiii     (CGE.9) 
 
In essence the model becomes a closed “circular flow” economy, where production of 
commodities yields factor income to the household, which in turn is equal to total 
commodity expenditures. Thus, the value of total output by both industries is equal to 
the value of household income, which is by definition equal to household expenditure. 
The solution of the model will be determined by the vector of commodity and factor 
prices which enables all markets to clear. The model consists of 15 variables given as: 
X1, X2, Q1, Q2, L1, L2, K1, K2, Y, P1, P2, r, w, L* and K*. The latter two variables refer 
to the total endowment of each factor in the economy and are held exogenous to ensure 
correct model closure (i.e., number of equations and variables are equal – see next 
section). The full stylised 13 equation model is presented in figure 2.3. 
 
Two further issues need to be addressed, the root of which lies within Walras’ Law. 
First, due to zero homogeneity in prices in the demand functions, the absolute price 
level has no effect on the level of demand. For example, to show zero degree 
homogeneity for all prices in the commodity demand functions, substitute (CGE.8) into 
(CGE.3) and (CGE.4) and impose the factor market clearing equation which yields: 
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where commodity demands X1 and X2 are clearly zero degree homogeneous in all 
prices. 
 
                                                          
10 Where composite output price and quantity variables are linear homogeneous in input prices and input 
quantities respectively. 
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This property implies that any level of absolute prices is consistent with a general 
equilibrium solution. In other words, the absolute price level is indeterminate and thus 
holds no intrinsic meaning. It is often convenient to remove this indeterminacy by 
setting one of the prices to unity. Thus, if the price of commodity 1 is exogenised and 
set equal to one, this is in effect a normalisation of the system of equations, where all 
price movements are now gauged as relative to an exogenously fixed numeraire 
variable. 
 
The availability of a numeraire is a direct consequence of Walrasian theory which states 
that a unique vector of prices will ensure the solution to a general system of equations 
such that all commodity and factor markets clear. Walras demonstrated that if N-1 
markets in the system clear, then the Nth market will clear. This therefore allows the 
modeller to omit one equation from the model system, and in having a numeraire, one is 
left with N-1 endogenous variables and N-1 equations.11 Another possible alternative 
(Hertel, 1997) is to specify a walras “slack” variable which can be added to any 
equation in the model. If all of the markets in the model clear, an endogenous slack 
variable, which is endogenised and swapped with the numeraire, will assume a value of 
zero. This serves as a useful check on model implementation.12
 
2.3 Closure   
A further issue of model structure is one of closure which was briefly mentioned in sub-
section 2.2.3. For a model to be solvable, the number of endogenous variables must be 
equal to the number of equations. Closure is the process by which the model variables 
are partitioned into exogenous and endogenous categories. Exogenous variables may 
then be shocked and the resultant effects on the endogenous variables ascertained. 
Moreover, different partitions of the exogenous and endogenous variables entails 
making some maintained hypothesis beyond the core mechanisms of the model 
equations.  
 
For example, single country models may have some form of external closure based on 
the small country assumption. This maintained hypothesis states that the country does 
not have the necessary market power to affect world prices. Thus, world commodity 
                                                          
11 The numeraire does not have to be in the omitted equation. 
12 This approach is employed in the final model structure. 
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prices are typically assumed exogenous, and the transmission mechanism between 
world and domestic prices is via an exchange rate which adjusts to ensure equilibrium 
in the balance of payments (Shoven and Whalley, 1992, ch.9).  In other words, import- 
and export-demands are determined by a balance of payments market clearing equation. 
For large country single region models, the import- and export- demand equations may 
be characterised explicitly using a specific functional form, although simultaneous 
changes in these demands and the exchange rate must still satisfy the balance of 
payments constraint (Shoven and Whalley, 1992).        
 
For CGE trade models consisting of two or more regions, external closure is not needed 
because the interactions of export supply and import demand functions allow an 
endogenous treatment of trade prices and quantities along bilateral routes. In the case of 
multi-region models, it is often convenient to think of closure at both the regional and 
global level. 
 
At the regional level, one can characterise two categories of income flows in CGE trade 
models. Expenditure flows are characterised by; savings (S); government expenditures 
(G); consumption expenditure (C); and imports (M). Similarly, revenues are split up 
into; investment goods (I); government incomes (G); consumption goods sales (C); and 
exports (X).13 In equilibrium, expenditures equate revenues such that: 
 
 XCGIMCGS +++=+++     (CL.1) 
 
Since government and consumption markets clear, this implies: 
 
 MXIS −=−       (CL.2) 
 
Thus, if deviations occur between regional savings and investment, then this must be 
matched by changes on the current account balance. Alternatively, fixing the trade 
balance, X-M, means that movements in the level of savings must be shadowed by 
changes in investment expenditures.  
 
                                                          
13 The designation of consumption and government expenditures and incomes is the same since in 
equilibrium the two concepts must be equal 
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There are several closure solutions to the fundamental indeterminacy of investment in 
comparative static models, although the model application used in this thesis holds the 
balance of payments at zero such that external leakages (savings and imports) are equal 
to injections (investment and exports) and regional closure is satisfied.   
 
Investment may be specified as being savings driven, where ‘household’ utility accrues 
through the consumption of a savings good, which is met by production of investment. 
Thus, the sum of regional savings determines global investment. Since regional 
incomes, and thus regional and global savings typically change very little, global 
investment also changes very little, although reallocations of regional investment shares 
may be considerable.14  
 
At the global level, if all n-1 markets are in equilibrium, if producers are earning zero 
profits and if consumers are on their budget constraints then Walras' law will apply such 
that the nth market or global savings will equal global investment. In other words, 
Walras law implies the global closure identity: 
 
       (CL.3) ∑∑
∈∈
=
regionsr
r
regionsr
r IS
 
Thus, regional closure is required such that the nth savings-investment market also clears 
via Walras law. 
 
2.4 Calibration of CGE Models 
This section discusses the advantages/disadvantages of calibration vis-à-vis the 
econometric approach. The simple calibration example provided is intended to be 
general, since the final CGE model representation used in this study is in linear form, 
which reduces the difficulty of calibration in the model structure (see section 2.5.3). 
Nevertheless, this is still regarded as a significant issue of debate in CGE model 
structure and deserves attention in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                          
14 If one uses a rate of return mechanism to allocate regional investment, this may lead to large 
discrepancies between regional savings and investment, which must be picked up in the trade balance for 
regional closure to be satisfied (equation CL.2). 
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2.4.1 Econometric estimation 
Given the dimensions of most CGE model structures, any attempt to estimate 
simultaneously all model parameters from time series data would require prohibitively 
long runs of data observations to estimate model parameters, which in turn depends on 
functional form used, the quality of the data and the size of the system one is attempting 
to estimate.15 Given that all but the simplest of general equilibrium models have large 
numbers of parameters to estimate, this typically leads to complications, whereby the 
number of parameter estimates exceeds the number of data observations which leads to 
degrees of freedom problems.  
 
Another problem of econometric estimation is that of non-independent error terms. 
Consider, for example the factor market clearing equations in figure 2.3. Clearly, these 
equations link the CES demands for factors to the exogenously specified endowments 
of capital and labour in the economy. Econometrically, this would imply that 
successively estimated input demand functions (i.e. through time) would not be 
independent of one another and gives rise to the problem of non-independently 
distributed error terms. 
  
Attempts to overcome problems of degrees of freedom and autocorrelation led some 
researchers (Jorgensen, Lau and Stoker 1982; Jorgensen, 1984) to estimate 'subsystems' 
which avoid the inclusion of equations with autocorrelated error terms and impose cross 
equation restrictions to lessen degrees of freedom problems. There is a related problem 
here in that,  
 
'estimates determined from the subsystems (with their implicit exogeneity 
assumptions) are then put into a model which explicitly recognises the 
endogeneity of all the variables' (Roberts, 1992, pp91). 
 
Whilst there are numerous difficulties that arise when attempting to estimate a general 
equilibrium system of equations, econometricians may argue that the lack of any 
stochastic element in the calibration procedure is untenable, particularly when one has 
to accept deterministic parameter findings which in themselves are not statistically 
                                                          
15 This is of course assuming that time series data are available to the level of aggregation required by 
most CGE models, whereas usually they are not. 
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justifiable. Within the econometric approach, there are numerous sample goodness-of- 
fit tests to verify the reliability of the parameter estimates. Conversely, if a calibrated 
approach is used then no such tests exist. Hence the modeller is merely left with the 
subjective art of choosing parameters, calibrating, and employing sensitivity analysis to 
validate model results.16 Finally, inherent determinism in the calibration procedure 
implies that the modeller has to assume the choice of functional form, rather than 
having the opportunity to fit a series of functions to observed data. 
 
2.4.2 Calibration and Functional Form 
For the reasons above, the alternative of ‘calibration’ is favoured by CGE modellers, 
defined by Greenaway et al. (1993) as a: 
 
‘ deterministic procedure which computes values for unknown parameters of the 
functional forms used in an applied general equilibrium model from an observed 
data set. It is assumed that the data set represents an equilibrium for the general 
equilibrium model under consideration (benchmark equilibrium data set). The 
model is then solved for its unknown parameters as functions of the observed 
data. Typically calibration uses only one period (or an average over periods) 
data'.(pp109)   
 
In other words, calibration ‘maps’ parameters from the chosen functions onto the 
existing static data set, rather than attempting to estimate a system of parameters from 
scratch using data observations and econometric techniques. The desired end result of 
model calibration is that the initial data set be perfectly replicated as an initial 
benchmark solution of the model. Depending on the choice of functional form, a unique 
solution of parameters as a function of the observed data set may not be obtained. For 
example, unless a Cobb-Douglas representation is specified, then parameterised values, 
such as elasticity estimates must be obtained, (if possible from the literature), before 
determination of other model parameters.  
 
                                                          
 
16 Preferably parameters come from the same time period as the benchmark year, or where available by 
‘borrowing’ estimates from other periods or countries.; Sensitivity analysis involves systematically 
employing different values of key parameters and running multiple simulations to attain central tendency 
figures. This improves the level of confidence in the expected results. 
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More complex, flexible functional forms may sometimes be employed in CGE 
applications, but they significantly enhance the complexity of the model, increase 
execution times for model solution calculations and require a much larger number of 
extraneous (pre-specified) substitution parameters. Moreover, since the value of 
extraneous parameter values affects the magnitude of the model results, this implies 
greater subjectivity of model results.  
 
Consequently, the main criteria in the choice of functional form for CGE calibrations 
tend to be 'consistency' and 'tractability'. Thus, there must be consistency with the 
theoretical assumptions, however, the function must also easily allow the computation 
of equilibrium solutions to household and producer constrained optimisation problems. 
Such requirements typically lead to the use of 'convenient functional forms' such as the 
Cobb-Douglas (CD) and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES). 
 
This reduction in the number of parameters has a cost, in that it inhibits the degree of 
flexibility inherent within producer/consumer behaviour. A common response to this 
problem is to break the 'convenient' function into nests. This allows the modeller to 
calibrate model parameters with relative ease whilst breaking up a single stage 
optimisation process into multiple stages. Allowing, for example, an 'appropriate' 
elasticity of substitution value for each nest, enables the modeller to employ several 
behavioural parameters within the nest whilst not significantly increasing the degree of 
complexity in the calibration process. Further discussion of nesting is given in section 
2.6. 
 
This type of remedial action does not, however, detract from the fact that many of the 
family of convenient functions still have restrictions. For example, Cobb-Douglas 
functions imply unitary uncompensated own-price and income elasticities. The CES 
relaxes the former restriction, although income elasticities are unitary. This latter 
assumption is rather more difficult to justify given the large body of evidence 
suggesting that food expenditure declines with increases in expenditures.          
 
2.4.3 A Simple Numerical Example of Calibration 
Before calibrating the model, the first task is to separate the 'value' observations in the 
benchmark data into price and quantity observations. A commonly used technique, 
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originally adopted by Harberger (1959, 1962), is to adopt the convention that one unit 
of each factor (or commodity) is worth 1 currency unit. 
 
To illustrate the process of calibration, a simple numerical example is based on the 
stylised model presented in section 2.2. The derived values of each of the unknown 
parameters are based on the hypothetical input-output data set presented in table 2.1 
above. In the data set, the total value of production of each commodity is equal to the 
value of sales of each commodity to the household. Similarly, total primary factor 
returns are equal to household income. In sum, the general equilibrium restrictions 
apply, where household income and expenditure are equal, which in turn is equal to the 
total value of production. Further discussion of input-output tables and their larger 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) counterparts is provided in chapter 4. 
 
Industry Households Total Sales  
1 2  
- - 3 3 Commodity:      1 
                            2 - - 5 5 
 
2 2 - 4 
Primary Factors: 
Labour 
Capital 1 3 - 4 
Production 3 5 8 16 
Table 2.1: Hypothetical Input-Output Value Data  
 
Starting with the Cobb-Douglas commodity demands in the model, it is possible to 
rearrange equations (CGE.3) and (CGE.4) to yield: 
 
 
Y
PX 11=α        (CAL.1) 
  
 
Y
PX 22=β        (CAL.2) 
 
Given that Y is equal to total expenditure, the parameters α and β in the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function are expenditure shares for commodity 1 and 2 respectively, which sum 
to one. Hence, it is a simple procedure to calibrate these parameters from table 2.1 as: 
 44
  625.0
8
5375.0
8
3 ==== βα    (CAL.3) 
 
The calibration of the unknown parameters of the CES production function is slightly 
more complicated. Firstly, it is necessary to impose an extraneous value for the 
elasticity of substitution (σi) between capital and labour within each industry ‘i’ (i=1,2) 
in the model. Assume for simplicity that these values are 2 and 0.5 for industry 1 and 2 
respectively. Given that: 
 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+= ii ρσ 1
1         (CAL.4) 
 
where ρi is assumed to have a value of –0.5 and 1 for industry 1 and 2 respectively. The 
other unknowns in the CES functions are the distribution parameters (δi), and the scale 
parameters (Ai), which are calibrated below. 
 
Taking the first order conditions from a two input cost minimisation procedure and 
dividing, yields:  
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δ
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⎡
−=      (CAL.5) 
 
Hence, calibration of δi (i=1,2) involves substituting in the value flows and the 
parameterised values of ρi into expression (CAL.5) for both industries 1 and 2. Noting 
that the price of factors are worth one currency unit, and employing the subsequent 
quantities of labour and capital from table 2.1, for i=1:  
  
 
5.0
1
1
1
2
)1(1
1 −
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−= δ
δ       (CAL.6) 
 
Rearranging in terms of δ1: 
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 7071067.1/11 =δ       (CAL.7) 
 
gives a value of 0.586 (3dp). A similar procedure can be employed for δ2 which gives a 
value of 0.308 (3dp).  
  
To find scale parameter Ai (for i=1,2) simply substitute the value and parameter values 
obtained in table 2.1 into the CES production function (CGE.5). Thus, for i=1, 
 
 ( ) ( ) )5.0( 1)5.0()5.0(1 ]14142136.025857864.0[3 −−−−−− ×+×= A  (CAL.8) 
 
Simplifying and rearranging in terms of A1 gives a value of 1.943. Conducting the same 
procedure for A2 gives the value 1.923. 
  
The numerical example above highlights the importance of extraneous parameter values 
for the success of the calibration procedure. Moreover, the choice of these values will 
also have implications for subsequent counterfactual results. However, the difficulty in 
choosing parameterised values is the uncertainty as to what the value of the parameter 
should be. For example, there is no consensus on the 'true' elasticity of substitution 
between factors (capital and labour) within different industries. Caddy (1976) 
reconciled this debate to an extent with a comprehensive econometric estimation of 
substitution elasticities from which he constructs 'central tendency' tables. These and 
many tables like them are often used in the applied literature.  
 
2.5 Model Representation and Solution Methods 
An important part of CGE analysis is deeply rooted in computational facility and 
solution methods and this has often sparked furious debate amongst applied economists 
on CGE model structure. More specifically, this debate is examined by Hertel et al. 
(1992), who classify model representation into two schools of thought, namely, the 
‘North American levels schools’ and the 'Norwegian-Australian school of linearisers'.  
 
The 'levels school', which represents the model equations in the format of the stylised 
closed economy model in section 2.2, attempts to find a solution through the derivation 
of a series of excess demand functions of the model system. Much of the work in the 
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literature stems from Scarf (1967a, 1967b), and is based on the proof of an 'existence' of 
fixed equilibrium points in which his non-linear algorithm guarantees convergence to 
the approximate fixed point within a few steps. Computationally, however, Scarf's 
algorithm was expensive and has since been modified in terms of efficiency and 
applicability by inter alia Merril (1972) and Van der Laan and Talman (1979). 
 
The ‘linear school’ approach was pioneered by Johansen (1960), in forecasting growth 
levels in the Norweigan economy. Using a single country, 22 sector model, Johansen 
proceeds in the words of Taylor (1975) by,  
 
'logarithmically differentiating the equations....with respect to time in order to 
get a simultaneous system of equations which are linear in all growth rates' 
(p.100).  
 
Once the equations are linearised and the endogenous/exogenous split has been 
established, the model is solved as a linear approximation to the structural equations of 
the model. Hence, solutions may be found by 'shocking' the exogenous variables and 
then recalculating the model solution.  
 
According to Hertel et al. (1992), there has been considerable confusion in the past due 
to the tendency to classify models according to the solution method employed. Thus, 
linear models are not necessarily Johansen models and have only been so designated 
because the solution method used to solve them has traditionally been a single step 
Johansen procedure. Indeed, the linear representation of the model serves as a platform 
from which a plethora of solution methods can be used. In subsequent chapters, a 
Johansen-based non-linear solution method (Gragg) is employed to solve a linear 
representation of a model system. Thus, the remainder of this section is given to linear 
based solution techniques and linearisation procedures.  
 
2.5.1 Solution Methods For Linearised Representations 
It is possible to illustrate schematically how a linearised representation can be used to 
obtain accurate solutions. At the simplest level, assume a model consisting of two 
variables X and Y, where the former is exogenous and the latter endogenous. Further, 
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assume the model function may be represented by the single function, g(X,Y), which is 
presented in figure 2.4.  
 
Taking the initial (or benchmark) solution of the model as point (X,Y), an exogenous 
shock from X to X1 creates an actual change of Y to Y1 (or A to B) in the function 
g(X,Y). The Johansen procedure involves calculating the derivative (dY/dX) at point A, 
and then passing between X and X1, one moves along the tangent to the function g(X,Y) 
at A, bringing us to the point B1. This represents the linearised approximation to the 
non-linear solution at point B. Intuitively, the bigger the initial shock on X, the poorer 
the quality of the estimation as the tangent gets further from the 'true' solution (see 
section 2.5.3).  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
       
Y2
 
 
Y* 
 
Y1
 
 
 
 
Y 
BB1
B* g(X,Y) 
C B 
 A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Johansen and Euler Solution Procedures 
   X   X1 
Source: Pearson (1991) 
 
 
One way of reducing the linearisation error is to follow the function g(X,Y) = 0 more 
closely by breaking the shock into a number of equi-proportional steps - this is known 
as an Euler Solution Method. Thus, in the 2-step Euler solution (i.e. the Johansen is 
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equivalent to a single step Euler solution), one proceeds half way along the tangent to 
point C in the figure. At this point, an update procedure of the endogenous variable Y 
occurs to ascertain the position of the endogenous variable, Y, half way along the 
tangent. Then from this point, the remaining part of the shock is implemented, where 
one ends up at point B*, giving a solution Y*. 
 
Following this logic, a higher step solution procedure would yield a much closer 
approximation to the function, g(X,Y). Hertel et al (1992) argue that a solution 
procedure such as the Euler n-step method takes the model into a non-linear dimension 
because,  
 
'like many other non-linear solutions, (Euler's solution) can be used to obtain 
solutions of any desired accuracy......the way Euler's method relies on 
calculations of derivatives and partial derivatives has a great deal in common 
with many other non-linear algorithms' (p.397).   
 
One potential drawback of Euler’s method relates to computational expense in terms of 
the solution time required to achieve convergence to a true solution for larger classes of 
models. This problem can be remedied by extrapolation, which relies on being able to 
identify a pattern connecting successive elements in a sequence of steps. To ascertain 
this pattern, extrapolation uses the mathematical principle of the limit theorem, where 
the point at which the exogenous variable (X) is near to the end of the shock (i.e. 
approaches zero), the endogenous variable (Y) approaches it’s true value (which is Y1 in 
the figure). Algebraically, this is expressed as: 
 
        (SM.1) 1
0
)(lim YXY
X
=
→
 
Thus, taking three Euler simulations (e.g., 5-step, 10-step and 20-step) as points of 
reference along this domain, the model software estimates using a polynomial function 
of sufficient degree to estimate, with a high degree of accuracy the final ‘true’ value of 
the endogenous variable. The Euler solution method represents just one possible 
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alternative which can be applied once the derivatives are known via a linear 
representation of the model.17
 
2.5.2 Summary of Solution Methods 
The reason why, for many years, modellers have preferred the non-linear algorithm to 
the Johansen method, has been attributed to the greater accuracy of non-linear 
algorithmic solutions (see Hertel et al., 1992). Moreover, since the linearised method 
has traditionally been solved by a Johansen approach, the definitions of model solution 
and model representation (i.e., levels or linear equations) have been inextricably linked 
over the decades. Consequently, the effect of the relatively poor approximation obtained 
from the Johansen approach has caused much opinion to be biased against the linearised 
representation as well.  
 
With the development of advanced computer software, there is now a reconciliation 
between the two schools. In the view of Hertel et al. (1992), multi-step procedures give 
credence to the linear representation, which was much criticised by proponents of the 
levels school on the grounds that such models were impossible to solve accurately. 
Equally, supporters of the linearised school are forced to accept the error of margin in 
the Johansen method and move to a multi-step extrapolation method for better quality 
results.  
 
One can, therefore, conclude that improvements in computer technology now permits 
the use of several solution procedures to solve large scale CGE model structures to an 
equally high degree, rendering the 'importance' and 'classification' of the solution 
procedure (and thus representation) of trivial interest.          
 
2.5.3 Linearisation 
In section 2.2, a stylised closed economy model is represented in levels form. The use 
of a single step linear approximation by Johansen (1960) and more advanced non-linear 
derivatives (Euler, Gragg) has given prominence to a linearised representation of the 
CGE model structure. This section shows how to derive a linear representation of a 
levels function, which will be employed in the final model structure in later chapters. A 
                                                          
17 For further discussion see Pearson (1988). 
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more complex linearisation example can be found in the appendix which provides the 
derivations of a nested linearised structure.   
 
With multivariate functions, the total differential calculates the change in the dependent 
variable dz at a point brought about by an infinitesimal change in each of the 
independent variables denoted as dx and dy. Thus, if a multivariate function is given as: 
 
        (LIN.1) ),( yxzz =
        
then the total differential is: 
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∂=      (LIN.2) 
 
Equation (LIN.2) measures the change of z with respect to infinitesimal changes in x 
and y.  
 
More specifically, the total differentiatial of each of the structural (or levels) 
expressions makes use of three rules of differentials:18  
  
The product rule qprPQR +=⇒=  
 The power rule    (LIN.3) prPR αα =⇒=
 The sum rule  qp qSpSrQPR +=⇒+=  
 
where r, p and q are percentage changes (or they may be interpreted as changes in 
logarithms) in R, P and Q, α and β are parameters and Sp and Sq are the shares of P and 
Q in P+Q     
 
Single step Johansen simulations produce linearisation errors when the data are updated 
by the percentage change variables. For example, using the linearised product rule 
above, if levels variables P and Q are originally valued at 10 and 5, their product is 50.  
                                                          
 
18 For further discussion see Chiang (1984) p.196 and Horridge et al. (1993) Appendices A and E. 
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Changing both  variables by +10%, gives P and Q values of 11 and 5.5 respectively 
which is a product increase of 21%, compared to the product rule result of 20%. 
Similarly, larger shocks of +20%, give P and Q values of 12 and 6 respectively and a 
product increase of 44%, compared to the product rule result of 40%. These results 
occur because the total differential only looks at infinitesimal changes along the curve, 
so the bigger the change in a single step, the poorer is the linear approximation. 
Conversely, multi-step procedures enable the data flows to be updated after each step, 
which reduces the linearisation error. 
 
Thus, as an example, the total differential of the Marshallian Cobb-Douglas demand for 
commodity one (CD.29) in the stylised closed economy model is given as: 
 
 )     (LIN.4) ()( 21
1
11 αα −− −= YPdPPdYdX
 
To convert from differential changes to linearised percentage changes multiply and 
divide by respective variables and simplify which gives: 
 
 αα 11
1
11
11
1
1 −− −= YP
P
dPYP
Y
dYX
X
dX     (LIN.5) 
 
Dividing by X1 and simplifying gives: 
  
11 pyx −=        (LIN.6) 
 
1
1
1
1
1
1 P
dPp
Y
dYy
X
dXx ===     (LIN.7) 
 
Equations (LIN.6) and (LIN.7) are in percentage form, where the lower case letters are 
the percentage changes in their respective upper case variables. Owing to the use of the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form, the linearised Marshallian CD function has an income 
elasticity of one, and own- and cross- price elasticities of minus one and zero 
respectively.  
 
 52
An important advantage of the linear approach is that the parameters (constants) of the 
function ‘drop out’ of the expression in the linearisation process, which precludes the 
need for their calibration. In the words of Hertel et al. (1992), 
 
‘Linearisation in proportional or percentage changes takes advantage of the 
invariance to units implicit in rational economic behaviour. Those parameters 
deduced in the levels calibration process are not required, since their values 
merely reflect arbitrary price assumptions. Thus, no such calibration step is 
needed’ (pp394). 
 
Finally, percentage-change or log-change forms are not appropriate for variables which 
have initial values of zero. If the levels value at the start of the simulation is zero, the 
percentage change would be incalculable. To overcome this problem it can be 
convenient to work with transformed variables. A common example of this occurs 
where the initial value of a tariff is zero and the power of the tariff is represented as one 
plus the ad valorem rate. Thus it is possible to calculate percentage changes or changes 
in the logarithm of the power of the tariff but not in the ad valorem rate. 
   
2.6 Nesting 
As mentioned briefly in section 2.4.2, the choice of function under conditions of model 
calibration favours the use of simpler 'convenient functional forms'. The drawback, 
however, is that simpler functional forms greatly restrict the number of parameters 
within the function, which in turn inhibits the degree of flexibility when characterising 
producer/consumer behaviour. 
 
A common response to this problem is to employ a separable nested (or hierarchical) 
structure, whereby an assumption is made about the partitioning of the elements of the 
underlying production/utility function into different groups and aggregations. Hence, 
the assumption of separability implies that constrained optimisation is undertaken in 
several stages. Nested structures then allow a greater number of elasticity parameters at 
each stage of the production/utility function. This increases the flexibility of the model, 
without burdening computational facility.  
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2.6.1 Separability and Aggregation 
In order to undertake a two-stage nested optimisation procedure, two conditions must be 
met. First, to permit a partitioning of the inputs, Strotz (1957) devised the concept of 
weak separability. A precise definition of separability is given by Chambers (1988) who 
notes,  
 
'separability hinges on how the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) 
between two inputs responds to changes in another input' (pp.42).  
 
To illustrate the relationship between separability and multi-stage optimisation, a 
theoretical example is employed. Assume a 3 factor (xi i=1,2,3) production function 
which is of the form:19
 
        (N.1)  
  
),( 3xXfY =
where input X is represented as an aggregator function consisting of inputs x1 and x2: 
 
),( 21 xxgX =        (N.2) 
 
A schematic representation of this two-level nested structure is presented in figure 2.5. 
 
      Y 
 
       σ1 
 
 
 
        
 
                                            σ2
 
 
 x1          x2
    X   x3
 
                      Figure 2.5: A Two-level nested production structure 
 
 
                                                          
19 This theory is equally applicable to the utility function in consumer theory. 
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It is assumed that the underlying production function (N.1) is weakly separable 
implying (using Chambers’ (1988) notation): 
 
 0
/
/
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In words, this expression states that the ratio of marginal products (MRTS) of inputs x1 
and x2, belonging to the same input nest X, is not affected by changes in the level of 
input usage of x3 which is not in that nest. The family of convenient functions such as 
CD and CES exhibit weak seperability, where in the case of a two-level nested CD 
production example: 
 
   (N.4) δγβα 2111121 xAxXandXAXY ==
 
The MRTS11,21 can be shown to be: 
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Clearly, changes in the level of X2 in the upper CD nest, has no effect on the MRTS 
between inputs x11 and x21 in the lower nest. Mathematically: 
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The second condition is that the aggregator function (N.2) must be linear homogeneous 
with respect to each of its inputs. In section 2.1.3, it was shown that the output price 
composite of a linearly homogeneous function is linearly homogeneous in input prices. 
Thus, the aggregate quantity and price indices are equal to the sum of the prices and 
quantities of the inputs derived in each nest: 
 
        (N.7) i
n
i
i xrRX ∑
=
=
1
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 A basic property of linear homogeneous functions outlined in section 2.1.3 (see 
equation CD.20), is that first order derivatives (i.e. marginal products/utilities) are 
homogeneous of degree zero (see pp26). To demonstrate this property, take the case of a 
linearly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function. Hence for a two input 
production function, MP1 is given as: 
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Multiplying each of the inputs by a scalar, λ, yields: 
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Thus, multiplying both inputs by λ, leaves the marginal product of x1 unchanged. In 
other words the marginal products are zero degree homogeneous in inputs. The same 
outcome can be proved for input x2. Since the MRTS is the ratio of MPs, then 
proportional increases in both inputs by the scalar value λ (implying higher isoquant 
levels) have no affect on the MRS.  Thus, a ray from the origin must cut all isoquants 
(indifference) curves at points of equal slope. Green (1971) states that the isoquants 
(indifference) curves are therefore ‘homothetic with respect to the origin’ (pp141).  
 
 As a result of this property, Allanson (1989) notes that,  
 
‘optimal factor (commodity) allocations are independent of the level of 
(aggregate) output (income)’ (pp.1). 
 
Increases in the level of aggregate output (utility) with relative input (commodity) price 
ratios fixed has no affect on factor intensity since the expansion path is a straight line 
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from the origin.20 Moreover, the assumption of weak separability ensures that the 
introduction of other inputs (commodities) not in the aggregator function also has no 
consequence for factor (commodity) usage ratios. Hence, changes in input (commodity) 
intensities xi will only be a function of the relative prices of various types of input xi in 
that part of the nest.  
 
Allanson (1989) also notes that relative price changes in one nest can have indirect 
effects on input (commodity) allocations elsewhere in the nest. Referring to the nested 
structure in figure 2.5, if the price of input x2 increases, this will affect the optimal 
combination of x1 and x2 in the aggregate nest, but due to the separability restriction, it 
will not directly affect the optimal use of x3. There will, however, be an indirect effect 
on the use of x3 due to a rise in the composite price of aggregate input X. This implies 
that the firm will substitute x3 for aggregate X in the top nest. Moreover, if x3 was an 
aggregate input, then as a consequence of linear homogeneity, its increased use would 
be translated proportionally to all inputs in that nest.  
 
Thus, if expression (N.1) satisfies both weak separability and linear homogeneity, then 
the underlying production function is said to be weakly homothetically separable  (or 
'homogenously separable' Green 1971, pp.152-156) and ensures consistent 
aggregation.21 Consistent aggregation makes it possible to index correctly over prices 
and quantities when forming composites such that multi-stage nested optimisation 
procedures give equivalent results to single stage optimisation problems (Ozanne, 
1992). 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter provides a summary of the key issues in CGE model design and 
implementation. The first section examines the properties of the family of ‘convenient’ 
functional forms which are typically employed in CGE model structures. The chapter 
then proceeds to illustrate the usage of such functions in a simple stylised CGE closed 
                                                          
20 Increases in aggregate output (utility) are movements onto higher isoquants (indifference) curves; 
Expansion paths join points of cost minimising equilibria. 
 
21 It is important to note that weak homothetic separability does not imply that the production function 
itself is homothetic. 
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economy model structure. Related issues of closure and calibration are discussed, where 
in the latter case, a simple numerical example is provided.  
 
The chapter also discusses the concepts of model representation and solution 
methodology in CGE modelling. According to Hertel et al., (1992), a link between these 
issues has incorrectly been forged, particularly where traditional linear approximated 
Johansen type solution procedures have been associated with linear equation CGE 
model structures. This myth has, at least partially, been dispelled by the advent of non-
linear type solution algorithms (Euler, Gragg) based on the Johansen procedure, which 
can equally be applied to linear model structures (Hertel et al., 1992). Some discussion 
is also given to the interpretation and implementation of linearised model equations, 
where the final model used in later chapters is linear in form. 
 
The final section of the chapter discusses the use of nesting structures as a remedial 
measure against the lack of functional flexibility in CGE model structures. To help the 
reader interpret the mechanisms of linear model representation and nesting, which play 
an important role in subsequent chapters, a nested linear production function is 
presented in appendix A, which subsumes all of the types of convenient functional 
forms (i.e., CD, CES, Leontief). One popular application of the (two-stage) separable 
nested production structure in CGE multi-country trade modelling is the Armington 
assumption, which differentiates products by region of origin. A detailed exposition and 
critique of this mechanism is given in the next chapter, which serves as a platform for 
introducing other theories of product differentiation. 
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Appendix A: A Linearised representation of a nested production function  
 
Consider a 2-stage nested production function (this approach can also be applied to a 
utility function), where final output is a Leontief function of a ‘composite’ intermediate 
input and composite primary factor. In the lower portion of the nest, the composite 
input/primary factor is subdivided into specific types ‘i’. The intermediate input nest is 
characterised using CD substitution possibilities, and the value added nest is specified 
as CES. 
 
The aim of the exercise is to present a range of possible linearised functional forms 
typically used in nested CGE model structures. Moreover, it will provide some insight 
into the interpretation of linearised functions which will be employed freely in the 
discussion in subsequent chapters.  
 
A.2.1 Notation 
 
⇒kZ Output in industry ‘k’. 
⇒kP The output price in industry ‘k’. 
⇒kjY , Demand for the composite intermediate input, ‘j’ in industry ‘k’. 
⇒kjW , The input price of  composite intermediate input, ‘j’ in industry ‘k’. 
⇒kjX ,  Demand for value added composite, ‘j’ in industry ‘k’. 
⇒kjU ,  The input price of  composite primary factor, ‘j’ in industry ‘k’. 
⇒kjiT ,, Input demand for intermediate input of type ‘i’, in composite intermediate 
input nest ‘j’ in industry ‘k’. 
⇒kjiF ,, The price of intermediate input ‘i’.  
⇒kjiV ,,  Input demand for primary factor of type ‘i’, in composite value added nest ‘j’, 
in industry ‘k’. 
⇒kjiR ,,  The price of primary factor ‘i’. 
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Lower case letters are the percentage change equivalent of the upper case ‘levels’ 
variable. 
 
A.2.2 Schematic Representation of the Production ‘Tree’ 
 
 
 
 
Zk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CES 
Xj,k Yj,k
σ 
σ σ 
Leontief (σ=0) 
Cobb-Douglas 
(σ=1) 
 
                                                                           
Figure A1: Schematic representation of the production nest. 
V1,j,k………………. Vn,j,k T1,j,k………………. Tn,j,k
 
A.2.3 Mathematical derivations of linearised nested demand functions  
A.2.3.1 Composite Input Nest 
This appendix is based on the mathematical techniques provided in Dixon et al., (1992). 
The top nest in the tree is by definition a single production process Leontief structure. 
Hence, assuming rationality on the part of producers, levels demands for composite 
inputs are restricted by a fixed share coefficient. Composite intermediate and primary 
factor demands are given in equation A1: 
 
 kkjkjkkjkj ZXZY ,,,, γγ ==      (A1) 
 
where γj,k are the fixed input-output coefficients. Following the approach in section 
2.5.3, linearised Leontief demands are given as: 
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        (A2) kkjkkj zxzy == ,,
 
Note that the absence of any price effects is due to the zero value of the elasticity of 
substitution. Hence, increases in output are translated as equiproportional changes in 
demands for each composite intermediate input which implies CRS.  
 
Assuming zero profit: 
 
      (A3) kjkjkjkjkk XUYWZP ,,,, +=
 
Substituting demands in (A1) into (A3) and simplifying: 
 
 kjkjkjkjk UWP ,,,, γγ +=      (A4) 
 
Linearising gives a composite price of: 
 
      (A5) kkkjkk uSwSp ,2,2,,1 +=
 
where Sj,k is an output share weighted by price, where for the composite intermediate 
input: 
 
 
kkkk
kk
k UW
W
S
,2,2,1,1
,1,1
,1 γγ
γ
+=      (A6) 
 
A.2.3.2 Primary Factor Nest 
In the primary factor nest, production is characterised by a CRS CES function: 
 
 
ρρδ
1
1
,,,,,,
−
=
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑n
i
kjikjikjkj VAX      (A7) 
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where Aj,k is a scale parameter, δi,j,k is a distribution share parameter and ρ is an 
elasticity parameter. Minimising cost subject to (A7) gives first order conditions: 
 )1(,,,,
1
1
,,,,,,,
ρρ
ρ
ρ δδ +−
+−
=
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡Λ= ∑ kjikjin
i
kjikjikjkji VVAR     (A8) 
 
 
ρρδ
1
1
,,,,,,
−
=
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑n
i
kjikjikjkj VAX      (A9) 
 
Substituting (A9) into (A8) simplifies the latter: 
 
      (A10) )1(,,,,
)1(
,,,,
ρρρ δ +−+−Λ= kjikjikjkjkji VXAR
 
where (A9) and (A10) are the levels first order conditions. This approach follows the 
treatment in Dixon et al. (1992) (pp124) by linearising the first order conditions and 
solving and is simpler than the alternative of deriving levels demand functions and 
linearising. 
 
Thus linearisation of (A9) gives: 
 
       (A11) kji
n
i
kjikj vSx ,,
1
,,, ∑
=
=
 
where 
 
 
ρ
ρ
δ
δ
−
=
−
∑
=
kji
n
i
kji
kjlkjl
kjl
V
V
S
,,
1
,,
,,,,
,,       (A12) 
 
Substituting (A10) into the input expenditure share formula (A13) in the intermediate 
nest: 
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∑
=
n
i
kjikji
kjkj
VR
VR
1
,,,,
,,1,,1        (A13) 
 
and cancelling terms shows the equivalence of expressions (A12) and (A13). This 
alternative form of the share Si,j,k avoids the process of calibration since it eliminates 
distribution parameter δi,j,k where the shares are merely updated by the percentage 
changes in prices and quantities. 
 
Linearisation of (A10) gives: 
 
 kjikjkji vxr ,,,,, )1()1( ρρλ +−++=     (A14) 
  
Thus, equations (A11) and (A14) are linearised first order conditions, where r, x, v and 
λ are percentage changes in R, X, V and Λ.  
 
Rearrange (A14) in terms of vi,j,k gives: 
 
 kjkjikji xrv ,,,,, ++−= σλσ      (A15) 
 
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between all pairwise types of primary factors 
(i.e. labour, capital) in the value added nest: 
 
 ρσ += 1
1        (A16) 
 
substituting (A15) into (A11) and rearranging in terms of σλ yields: 
 
       (A17) ∑
=
=
n
i
kjikji rS
1
,,,,σσλ
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Substituting (A17) into (A15) eliminates the percentage change Lagrangian variable λ. 
Factorising the resulting expression gives linearised CES Hicksian primary factor 
demands: 
 
     (A18) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−= ∑
=
n
i
kjikjikjikjkji rSrxv
1
,,,,,,,,, σ
 
 
For consistent aggregation expression (A19) must hold: 
 
kji
n
i
kjikjkj VRXU ,,
1
,,,, ∑
=
=      (A19) 
 
By linearising (A19), substituting (A11) and rearranging, it is possible to derive the 
percentage change in the composite price in the value added nest as: 
 
       (A20) kji
n
i
kjikj rSu ,,
1
,,, ∑
=
=
 
Further substitution of (A20) into (A18) gives a simplified version of the linearised 
Hicksian demand function: 
 
 [ ]kjkjikjkji urxv ,,,,,, −−= σ      (A21) 
 
Hence, equation (A21) shows how the demand for primary input ‘i’ can be broken into 
an expansion (or output) effect (xj,k) and a price effect, the size of which is governed by 
the extraneous elasticity of substitution parameter, σ. The proportionality of changes in 
aggregated primary factor usage on each type ‘i’ is a reflection of constant returns to 
scale in the aggregator function. Moreover, any increase in the price of factor ‘i’ (ri,j,k), 
relative to the composite price index (uj,k), leads to reduced usage of primary factor ‘i’ 
relative to other primary factors in the nest. The size of this price substitution effect is 
dependent on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution.  
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A.2.3.3 Intermediate Input Nest 
The choice of functional form for the characterisation of intermediate input demands is 
a generalised Cobb-Douglas: 
 
       (A22) ∏
=
=
n
i
kjikjkj
kjiTBY
1
,,,,
,,α
 
where minimisation of cost subject to the production function (A22) gives the 
Lagrangian: 
 
    (A23) )(
1
,,,,,,
1
,,
,,∏∑
==
−Λ+=
n
i
kjikjkjkji
n
i
kji
kjiTBYTFZ α
 
Using the same principles as in section A.33.2, gives first order linearised conditions: 
 
 kjnkjkjn tyf ,,,,, −+= λ       (A24) 
 
       (A25) kji
n
i
kjikj ty ,,
1
,,, ∑
=
= α
 
where the α parameters are cost shares (summing to one), in the same way that the 
α and β parameters in the 2 commodity stylised model utility function were expenditure 
shares.  
 
Using the same methodology to solve first order linearised conditions gives Hicksian 
linearised Cobb-Douglas intermediate input demands: 
 
     (A26) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−= ∑
=
n
i
kjikjikjnkjkjn ffyt
1
,,,,,,,,, α
 
Given consistent aggregation in the nest, the following accounting identity must hold: 
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      (A27) kji
n
i
kjikjikji TFYW ,,.
1
,,,,,, ∑
=
=
 
Linearising (A27), substituting (A25) and rearranging in terms of wj,k gives the 
linearised composite intermediate input price in the nest: 
 
       (A28) kji
n
i
kjikj fw ,,
1
,,, ∑
=
= α
 
Substituting (A28) into (A26) gives a simplified version of the Cobb-Douglas Hicksian 
demands for intermediate input ‘i’: 
 
  [ ]kjkjnkjkjn wfyt ,,,,,, −−=      (A29) 
 
This linearised demand function has exactly the same interpretation as the CES primary 
factor demands in section A.33.2. The unitary value of the elasticity of substitution 
parameter is implicitly recognised within the price effect component of the demand 
function. 
 
A.2.3.4 Summary of Production Nest Input Demands 
Composite Input/Factor Demands (Leontief)  
        (A2)  kkj zy =,
         (A2) kkj zx =,
 
Composite price in the nest: 
      (A5) kkkjkk uSwSp ,2,2,,1 +=
 
Primary Factor Demands (CES):  
 [ ]kjkjikjkji urxv ,,,,,, −−= σ      (A21) 
 
Composite price in the nest 
       (A20) ∑
=
=
n
i
kjikjikj rSu
1
,,,,,
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Intermediate Input Demands (Cobb-Douglas): 
 [ ]kjkjnkjkjn wfyt ,,,,,, −−=      (A29) 
 
Composite price in the nest: 
       (A28)  ∑
=
=
n
i
kjikjikj fw
1
,,,,, α
 
Appendix B: Strict and Quasi Concavity  
 
Following Beattie and Taylor (1985), strict concavity can be shown diagrammatically: 
 
  
      y1 
                       ym
  
 
 
           λyo + (1-λ)y1 
  y0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where xm is a weighted average (0<λ<1) of x0 and x1: 
       x0  xm               x1 
 
 10 )1( xxxm λλ −+=  
 
Strict concavity implies that ym must always be greater than a weighted value of y from 
a linear line connecting two points x0 and x1 in the domain. Thus, in the figure, the value 
of y corresponding to an arbitrary value xm is: 
   
 10 )1( yy λλ −+  
where  
 10 )1( yyym λλ −+>  
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Strict quasi-concavity states that all values of ym will always be above the minimum 
value of the function in the domain. Algebraically: 
 
  ),min( 10 yyym >
 
Thus, if the minimum value of the function was y0, then a strictly quasi-concave 
function would be represented as: 
 
 
  
 
  
 y1
  
 
              
 
ym
 
 
 
  y0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
where the value of ym will never fall below the minimum value (in this case y0), 
although the shape of the curve does not have to be everywhere concave (for example 
between x0 and x1). Strict quasi- concavity is a more general form of concavity which is 
inclusive of strict concavity (i.e. all strict quasi-concave functions are strictly concave 
but not the other way round).  
 x0           xm      x1 
 
 
For CD and CES, the restrictions for both forms of concavity are: 
 
           Strict Concavity.      Strict quasi-concavity. 
βα
21 XAXY =     0 < α < 1  α > 0 
     0 < β < 1  β > 0 
     0 < (α+β) < 1  A > 0 
     A > 0 
ρρρ δδ
v
XXAY
−−− −+= ])1([ 2111  0 < δ1 < 1  0 < δ1 < 1 
     A > 0   A > 0 
     ρ > -1   ρ > -1 
     0 < v ≤ 1  v > 0 
  
Under constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas parameters α+β must sum to one, which 
effectively rules out strict concavity. 
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 Appendix C: Stages of Production. 
Under neo-classical assumptions of diminishing marginal returns (short run) and returns 
to scale (long run) a production function (total product (TP) curve) may exhibit an ‘s’ 
shape which in turn has implications for marginal (MP) and average product (AP) 
curves. Schematically, the three stages are represented: 
 
 
 
   
   
    
     I             II               III 
TP
AP 
MP 
Output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 m  
 
Source: Beattie and Taylor (1985) 
 
 
where in the short-run ‘m’ is a single input and in the long-run, ‘m’ would be a 
proportional change in all inputs. Thus, stage I is characterised by increases in average 
productivity up to the point where MP cuts the AP curve at the highest point. Stage II is 
where MP is positive but everywhere below the AP curve. Stage III characterises 
negative productivity (i.e., MP is negative). Clearly, it is not sensible for rational 
producers to be in the third stage of production. Under profit maximising criteria in 
perfectly competitive input and output markets, equating Marginal Value Product (MVP 
= MP*Poutput) with the Marginal Factor Cost (MFC = Average Factor Cost (AFC)) in 
stage I, will lead to losses where AFC is everywhere above Average Value Product 
(AVP = AP*Poutput). Hence, according to the theory, stage II (MP<AP) is the only 
rational range within which to produce. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Product Differentiation and Market Structure in CGE Modelling 
 
The CGE trade literature is characterised by the use of multi- and single-country 
models. Multi-country models have a production and demand specification for each of 
the countries in question, whereas single-country models treat the 'rest of the world' 
with a cruder representation, as highlighted in section 2.3. The focus of many single 
country trade models is to simulate with degrees of complexity the effects of 
reductions/increases in a country's protective structure on the balance of trade, 
employment levels and the price level, etc. A typical application by Dixon, Parmenter, 
Sutton & Vincent (1982) examines the effects of a 25% increase in all Australian import 
tariffs, with results showing falls in employment, a worsening balance of trade deficit 
and increases in capital goods and consumer prices. These results, and many other 
single region treatments of trade, (see Feltenstein 1989, Hertel et al. 1989, Robinson et 
al. 1989) support the conventional wisdom that unilateral liberalisation leads to welfare 
gains.      
 
Many early multi-country trade models (e.g., Brown & Whalley, 1980; Deardorff & 
Stern, 1981;Whalley, 1982, 1985), were employed to investigate the welfare and terms 
of trade effects from possible 'global liberalisation' scenarios related to the GATT 
Tokyo Round agreement.1 Numerous studies have also been conducted for the 
subsequent Uruguay Round (Nguyen, Perroni and Wigle, 1991; Brown et al., 1995; and 
Harrison et al., 1995a, 1995b), which suggest that global liberalisation leads, with 
varying degrees of magnitude, to net global benefits (at least in the long run).  
 
Another major policy issue in the multi-country trade policy modelling literature has 
been that of 'regional integration', for example the enlargement of the EU and the 
formation of trading blocs such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). One 
of the earliest CGE models dealing with EU enlargement is by Miller & Spencer (1977) 
who look at UK accession to the EU based on the installation of the common external 
                                                          
1 The terms of trade is defined as the ratio of the export price to the import price. 
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tariff (CET) in the UK and the subsequent dispersion scenarios of UK tariff revenues to 
the EU. The results of this study show a net loss since the terms of trade effects are 
outweighed by budgetary contributions by the UK on membership.  
 
Harrison, Rutherford and Wooton (1989) contradict these results when looking at the 
various possibilities of member states leaving the EU with and without the CAP in 
place. Their results suggest that all eight countries are found to have a small welfare loss 
on leaving the EU. Hamilton and Whalley (1985) examine free trade areas (FTAs) 
showing that welfare gains always accrue to developed countries and welfare losses fall 
on less developed countries. 
 
From this brief resume, it is readily observable that CGE models are suitably tailored to 
handle hypothetical policy and  trade scenarios and provide prescriptive conclusions. 
Almost all of the studies mentioned follow the traditional assumptions of constant 
returns to scale and perfect competition in productive sectors.  
 
For multi-region models, there is an extra dimension which pertains to the 
characterisation of cross-hauling, or the simultaneous import and export of similar 
(differentiated) products. This phenomenon, recognised as intra-industry trade (IIT), is 
not treated in neo-classical trade theory, although it is supported by trade data. The 
problem is usually solved using the Armington (1969) assumption, although this 
treatment has not escaped criticism. These issues are discussed further in section 3.1.      
 
An alternative characterisation of IIT centres around the explicit incorporation of 
imperfect competition in CGE models. This work has its origins in much of the ‘new’ 
trade literature discussed in section 3.2. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the CGE 
literature pertaining to the use of imperfect competition in trade applications and section 
3.4 concludes. 
 
3.1 Product Differentiation in CGE Models 
3.1.1 Classical and Neo-Classical Trade Theories 
The origins of classical trade theory lie in the Ricardian principle of the law of 
comparative advantage. This law sought to explain the existence and pattern of 
international trade based on the relative cost advantages between different countries 
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producing different commodities, although the law says nothing about how or why a 
comparative advantage exists. Neo-classical trade theory, based on the work of  
Heckscher (1949) and Ohlin (1933), addresses the latter issue by postulating that 
comparative advantage arises from the different relative factor endowments of trading 
countries. A country will export those commodities that are intensive in the factor in 
which it is relatively most well endowed.2  
Good B  
 
SIC 
Good A 
 
  B 
 
 
B’ 
 
Exports 
 
 
 
 
 
O                             A                      A’ 
 
 Imports 
Figure 3.1: Trade in Homogeneous Commodities 
 
Referring to figure 3.1, a two commodity economy is represented by a production 
possibility frontier, where the equilibrium point of production is the tangency between 
the slope of the international terms of trade (given by relative commodity prices) and 
the production possibility frontier. Thus, the economy will produce OA of good A and 
OB of good B. If consumer preferences are represented by the social indifference curve 
(SIC), then the net trade effects suggest that the economy will export good B, which 
according to the terms of trade price ratio, will be traded for imports of good A.  
 
3.1.2 ‘Exogenous’ Product Differentiation in CGE Models 
In the forum of CGE modelling (and indeed other empirical trade applications), a large 
degree of contention surrounds the neo-classical assumption that domestic products and 
                                                          
2 A full discussion of Heckscher-Ohlin theory is given in Winters (1991) chapter 4. 
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imports are perfect substitutes, which necessitates that products are either imported OR 
exported. Such an assumption is not supported by actual trade data which show 
evidence of cross-hauling or Intra-Industry Trade (IIT).  
 
The standard CGE treatment to this problem is to employ the Armington (1969) 
assumption. This approach links product differentiation with exogenous considerations 
which are somehow related to region of origin, without the need to alter the perfectly 
competitive market structure within the model. For example, in the context of food 
markets, agricultural produce (e.g., arable crops) may be differentiated due to 
differences in climate and soil. Another possibility is that the aggregation of types of, 
say, wheat (soft, hard) into a homogeneous commodity in the database, implies that the 
composition of the commodity may vary by region.  
 
Qi,s  
 
σd  
 
 
Di,s Mi,s 
 
σm 
mi,1,s…………… mi,r,s
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Armington Structure 
In modelling terms, the Armington approach is based on a two stage nested function 
presented in figure 3.2.3 In the first stage, demands for good ‘i’ are based on a weakly 
separable production function which aggregates the import composite (Mi,s) and the 
domestic substitute (Di,s), in importing region ‘s’ into a composite tradable (Qi,s). The 
second stage function exogenously differentiates imports of (otherwise homogeneous) 
commodities by region of origin ‘r’ using an elasticity of substitution parameter, σm (= 
                                                          
3 Some CGE models employ an alternative specification of exogenously differentiating exports by region 
of destination using a CET function. 
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1/(1+ρm)), where the lower is the value of σm, the more differentiated are the products 
in the nest.  
 
Thus, the Armington structure may be characterised by a weak homogeneously 
separable nested CES function.4 In levels terms, the upper nest is written as: 
 
 [ ] ddd sisisisisisi MDBQ ρρρ δδ 1,,,,,, )1( −−− −+=     (AR.1) 
 
where: 
siQ , - Composite tradable good; - Composite imported tradable siM ,
siD , - Domestic tradable;  - Scale parameter siB ,
si ,δ - Share parameter; dρ - Elasticity parameter 
 
The variables Mi,s and Di,s are treated as 'inputs' producing the 'aggregate tradeable 
output', Qi,s. Composite import and domestic demands in region ‘s’ may be derived 
through Lagrangian maximisation procedures.5 The lower level nest is a CES aggregate 
of imports by region of origin, ‘r’: 
 
  
m
m
regr
srisrisisi mZM
ρρδ
1
,,,,,,
−
∈
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑     (AR.2) 
where: 
siZ ,  - Scale parameter; sri ,,δ - Share parameter 
srim ,, - Imports by region of origin ‘r’; mρ - Elasticity parameter 
 
CES bilateral import demands are derived in a similar manner. 
 
The magnitude of σm determines the 'responsiveness' of  domestic demand to a change 
in the price of imported goods (relative to domestic goods) brought about by trade and 
                                                          
4 CES is favoured because it is possible to specify any chosen value for the elasticity of substitution 
parameter (vis-à-vis Cobb-Douglas where σ=1). 
5 Armington import demands may either be utility maximising Marshallian (Q=Q(P,Y)) or cost 
minimising Hicksian (Q=Q(P,U)). 
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exchange rate policy or exogenous events. For this reason, σm is known as the trade 
substitution elasticity. If σm is high (inifinite), then small (infinitesimal) changes in the 
price ratio create large (total specialisation) changes in bilateral import demand 
allocations. If σm is very low, then the allocation of import demands will remain fairly 
static. At the extreme, where σm is equal to zero, imports would be treated as perfect 
complements where relative price movements in imports from certain regions will not 
affect the demand allocations for imports. 
 
3.1.3 Critique of the Armington Assumption 
One advantage of the Armington approach is that it is parsimonious in terms of 
parameter estimates. The only data required are the elasticities of substitution and trade 
share data for each import supplier. The drawback is that the modeller is restricted by 
the assumption that all pair-wise substitution elasticities in the lower nest are identical. 
However, the Armington structure still offers analytical simplicity and computational 
ease.   
 
Armington structures usually employ CES functions, which imply that when the budget 
shares of each of the import demands are small, the compensated own-price elasticity of 
demand is close or equal to the elasticity of substitution (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). 
Thus, modellers often try to relate estimates of the elasticity of substitution in the 
Armington structure to actual estimates of import- and export-demand elasticities. Some 
authors (e.g., Stern, Francis & Schumacher, 1976) have attempted to provide full lists of 
econometrically estimated 'trade' elasticities by region and good.  
 
Sensitivity analysis experiments show that changes in the Armington upper and lower 
nest elasticities have significant impacts on model results. This has led critics to 
question the employment of the Armington structure which they feel leads to excessive 
terms of trade effects (Brown, 1987) where changes in import demands have a 
significant influence on trade prices. Francois and Panagariya (1995), note that, contrary 
to economic theory, Armington based structures often support gains to all countries 
participating in regional trading arrangements. Similarly, Boadway and Treddenick 
(1978) find that tariff reductions in a ‘small country’, like Canada, lead to terms of trade 
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deteriorations leaving the economy worse off. Both studies suggest that this may be an 
artefact of the Armington parameterisation.  
 
Morkre and Tarr (1993) also note that the Armington assumption may have limitations 
in certain situations which may bias results. In particular, what may not be apparent is 
that under the Armington assumption, in response to a change in trade policy (e.g., tariff 
or quota reductions) in a given sector, absolute resource movement and the welfare 
impact will be extremely muted in sectors with a small initial import share. Thus, with 
an elasticity of substitution of 2, a 50% decrease in the import price for sector i, which 
itself has imports less than 0.5% of overall consumption, would still leave the import 
share under 1% of overall consumption. If the initial import share of overall 
consumption were large, then identical reductions in import prices would lead to 
significantly larger absolute increases in imports as a percentage of total consumption in 
the sector.  
 
Alston et al. (1990) question the validity of the Armington assumption by testing the 
structural restriction of homogeneous separability in the nest. Using a non-parametric 
approach the authors reject these pivotal restrictions. An earlier study by Winters (1984) 
also supports these findings. Moreover, Winters notes that for a linear homogeneous 
function, import demand intensities are independent of the level of income (see section 
2.6.1), which implies that import demand budget share allocations (i.e., with price ratios 
fixed) are independent of the level of income. This assumption hardly seems viable if the 
modeller is interested in variable import quality, since in reality it is likely that increases 
in income will have an effect on the budget share of those import sources with higher 
quality. Equally unrealistic is that the usual choice of functional form (CES) restricts the 
income elasticity of Marshallian import demands to unity.  
 
To conclude, it is widely recognised that the Armington assumption is a useful tool in 
characterising IIT which lends itself well to simplicity and calibration efficiency. What 
has also become clear, however, is that certain criticisms of the Armington assumption 
leave its validity open to question. Problems such as calibration bias, rejection of the 
structural assumptions of homogeneous separability, and results bias suggest that a 
better approach may be to model IIT trade flows more explicitly using some form of 
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imperfectly competitive structure. This is reflected by a burgeoning literature of 
imperfectly competitive CGE trade models and is examined in detail in the next section.  
 
3.2 ‘New’ Trade Theories  
International economics/trade theory up until the 1960s was dominated by the assertion 
that the production of commodities was subject to constant returns to scale in a perfectly 
competitive framework. Moreover, the 'traditional' CGE trade models tended to 
emphasise production aspects of the economy such as differences in factor endowments 
or technology, which was used to determine comparative advantage and the gains from 
trade. By contrast, the role of consumer preferences played a minor role in such models. 
 
Recognising the existence of IIT (Verdoorn, 1960; Balassa, 1975), the CGE trade 
literature adopted the use of the Armington assumption, although subsequent criticisms 
drove many to search for alternative theories. This led to an increased use of 'new' trade 
theories incorporating forms of imperfect competition and product differentiation. An 
important deviation from the traditional theories has been the treatment of consumer 
preferences. In the 'new' trade literature, consumer preferences have more attention by 
incorporating types of preference structure which have been instrumental in explaining 
the proliferation in IIT, which traditional theories such as Heckscher-Ohlin have failed 
to capture.  
 
At the same time, a proliferation in the number of studies in the trade literature showing 
evidence of scale economies (Chipman, 1965; Caves, 1960) has penetrated the 
mainstream doctrine behind much of the recent CGE trade literature. What follows is a 
summary of the more widely accepted imperfectly competitive trade theories which 
have appeared in the CGE literature. 
 
3.2.1 Oligopolistic Models 
This form of imperfect competition is usually characterised by a small number of firms 
producing a homogeneous product in an industry without entry or exit. One of the most 
commonly represented forms of oligopoly in CGE modelling comes from the work of 
Cournot (1838). The Cournot model is a non co-operative oligopoly model, where firms 
act independently of one another (i.e. no collusion), although the maximisation of profit 
does take account of rivals’ reactions.  More specifically, Cournot conjecture postulates 
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that in maximising profits, firm 'k' expects other firms 'j' (k≠j) in the industry to leave 
their output unchanged as firm 'k' changes its output. In a CGE multi-regional context, 
Cournot producers in each region hypothesise about the output responses of firms both 
at home and abroad.  
 
Following a similar approach to Sodersten and Reed (1994), assume two countries, each 
with one firm producing an identical commodity, facing identical cost and linear 
demand curves and exhibiting Cournot behaviour. Moreover, it is implicitly assumed 
that the number of firms is fixed (i.e., barriers to entry). The inverse demand function in 
each country 'i' (i=1 domestic; i=2 foreign) is expressed as: 
 
 )       (OL.1) ( 21
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where subscripts and superscripts refer to the country of production and consumption 
respectively. The home producers total revenue function in the home market is thus: 
 
 [ ] 11121111 )( QQQbaTR +−=       (OL.2) 
 
and the foreign producer’s total revenue function in the home market is: 
 
 [ ] 12121112 )( QQQbaTR +−=      (OL.3) 
 
Taking the partial derivative of the total revenue functions with respect to quantity gives 
the marginal revenue functions for both domestic and foreign producers in the domestic 
market: 
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The reaction function gives all the profit maximising output levels for a given firm as a 
function of the other firm's output level. Setting equation (OL.4) equal to marginal cost, 
given by a constant 'c', yields the profit maximising condition: 
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which can be re-expressed as: 
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In the same way the foreign firm's reaction curve in the domestic market is given as: 
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Having derived the reaction functions, it is possible to represent them graphically for 
each market in figure 3.3. Taking the home market as an example, and  are the 
home and foreign producer's reaction functions respectively. Intersection of  and  
determines equilibrium in the market. 
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Figure 3.3: Cournot Competition 
 
 
To show this progression to the equilibrium point ‘e’, assume the foreign firm produces 
 in the home market (i=1). The domestic producer believes that if the foreign 
producer produces  then he is able to maximise profits by producing at point . 
1
2Q
1
2Q
1
1Q
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Thus, in taking this action, the domestic producer is assuming that the foreign producer 
is not going to change its output level. In response to this output level of  the foreign 
firm increases output from  to ' , believing that the domestic firm will remain at 
. Conceptually, this process continues until equilibrium point ‘e’ is reached where 
both firms are maximising profits at output level Q*. 
1
1Q
1
2Q
1
2Q
1
1Q
 
Typically, the concentration level in oligopolistic industries is high. Thus, each firm is 
capable of influencing other firms’ decision variables and this leads to a vast array of 
complex strategies. The Cournot case can be thought of as the outcome of a game in 
which countries (firms) choose quantities simultaneously and independently at a single 
instant. This is very seldom a realistic story insofar as it ignores strategic 
interdependence, but it is internally consistent and grounded in maximisation.  
 
In applied CGE models, this form of the basic Cournot structure is often modified to 
account for some form of conjectural variation (CV) which is a hypothesis by a given 
firm of the effect of a change in its strategy on other firms' decision variables. This is a 
scenario which must involve a sequence of decisions taken over time and implies some 
form of dynamic component. Thus, it has been argued that attempts to incorporate what 
is essentially a dynamic concept into a comparative static CGE approach leads to a 
situation where one does not know what is supposed to be happening, such that the 
grounding in maximisation is lost (Helpman and Krugman, 1989). Nevertheless, the CV 
approach is one which has gained momentum in the CGE trade literature.  
  
3.2.2 Monopolistic Models  
Another class of imperfectly competitive model structure is that of monopolistic 
competition. Monopolistically competitive structures assume large numbers of firms. 
Moreover, each firm sells a differentiated product which it monopolises, although it is 
assumed that these products are close substitutes to one another such that each firm has 
very little market power. Finally, entry and exit of firms in the long run ensures zero 
profits.  
 
Two permutations of monopolistic competition which have penetrated much of the 
mainstream CGE literature are the Neo-Hotelling and Neo-Chamberlinian model 
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structures, although the latter has received far more attention from CGE modellers in 
recent years. 
 
3.2.2.1 Neo-Hotelling Models 
These type of models go back to the work of Hotelling (1929), who was one of the first 
to recognise the importance of individual consumer preferences between horizontally 
differentiated products. Hotelling notes:  
 
‘There is a tendency (for producers) to make only slight deviations in order to 
have for the new commodity as many buyers of the old as possible, to get, so to 
speak, between one's competitors and a mass of customers' (pp54, Hotelling, 
1929). 
 
Thus, it is in the sellers’ interest to produce goods which are not identical to what is 
already on the market in order to avoid the type of price wars characteristic in much of 
the oligopolistic literature.  
  
Subsequent extensions of this early work have been employed in simple stylised CGE 
trade models by Helpman (1981) and Economides (1981, 1984). However, perhaps the 
most intuitive and influential approach to modelling neo-Hotelling type preferences has 
come from the work of Lancaster (1979, 1980) to which the majority of this discussion 
is now devoted.  
 
Lancaster creates the concept of a varietal spectrum where products are differentiated 
explicitly in terms of the characteristics or attributes that they possess and firms produce 
varieties with different commodity combinations in response to the broad diversity of 
consumer preferences for different varietal attributes. At the simplest level, consider a 
good differentiated in terms of two characteristics A and B, and that the individual 
variety of each good is based on different ratios of these characteristics. This varietal 
spectrum is represented in figure 3.4.  
 
Lancaster's approach assumes that for any given consumer, there is an ideal variety (V*) 
which combines each of the attributes A and B. As there is only a finite number of 
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goods produced, consumers are unable to obtain a good which offers the exact preferred 
specification and are thus forced to consume an available good which comes closest to 
their ideal.  
         
Attribute A                 Attribute B 
 
 
      Vo           V1    V* V2          V3              V4         V5                           V6
 
Figure 3.4. A Varietal Spectrum 
Source: Vousden (1990) 
 
 
The available varieties which come closest to the ideal (V*) are V1 and V2. Moreover, 
the degree of substitution has implications on the quantity that is required to maintain a 
given level of utility when consuming a variety which is not the ideal. In other words, to 
keep utility unchanged, the price that the consumer pays for a given variety is inversely 
related to the distance of this variety from the ideal variety. Thus, each consumer's 
demand for any variety V on the spectrum is a function of its own price (p), the price of 
other varieties (p’) and the distance (d) of the chosen variety V from the consumer’s 
ideal which yields the demand function D(p, p', d). In contrast to the Spence (1976) 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) (SDS – see next section) specification, preferences are said to 
be asymmetric, where two varieties with equal price can still be ranked differently to 
one another. 
 
The ideal variety V* also represents the cut off point for the two adjacent markets 
corresponding to the available varieties V1 and V2. For example, at given prices any 
other consumer's ideal which lies to the left of ideal variety V* consumes V1 and vice 
versa for V2. Thus, the distance between V* and the two available goods represents a 
half-market for these available varieties. The market demand for each variety is 
therefore the horizontal summation of consumers demands over both adjacent half-
markets for a given available variety. 
 
On the production side, to meet the diverse tastes of consumers, firms differentiate their 
products through research and development and advertising. In the same specification as 
the SDS approach, scale economies are realised by reductions in average fixed costs 
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with increases in firm output, (discussed in detail in chapter 6). Combining this 
assumption with the assumption of uniformity of distribution for consumer’s ideal 
preferences along the varietal spectrum (i.e. for each ideal variety there are an equal 
number of consumers), Lancaster (1979) shows that in autarky all varieties will sell at 
the same price implying that D and S for varieties will also be identical.  
 
Vousden shows how opening up the economy to trade can result in varietal and pro-
competitive gains for both countries. In figure 3.5, marginal costs are constant and equal 
to average variable costs, and increasing returns to scale occur with reductions in 
average fixed costs. Under autarky, the demand for each representative variety along the 
spectrum is given by D and under profit maximising criteria (MC=MR) equilibrium is at 
output level Qo and price Po. Assuming freedom of entry and exit, this is the long run 
zero profit point.  
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Figure 3.5. Varietal and Pro-competitive Effects 
                  Q0     Q1 
Source: Vousden (1990) 
 
Given the autarkic result that the same varieties are produced in either country A or B, 
then opening up the domestic economy to free trade does not initially change the range 
of available products, although only one firm in either country produces each variety. 
This implies that each firm faces its existing domestic market and a new export market 
which effectively doubles the demand at each and every price. This is given as demand 
curve 2D in figure 3.5. Firms will now make abnormal profit which in turn will attract 
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other firms (which may be ‘old’ firms which have now changed the specification of 
their products) into the industry who will in turn produce their own product variants.  
 
This proliferation has two further effects. Firstly, the gaps along the varietal spectrum 
between consumers' ideal varieties and available varieties narrow, allowing most 
consumers to attain a closer variant to their ideal. This effectively characterises the 
Hotelling variety effect. This implies that varieties become closer substitutes with trade, 
in contrast to the SDS specification  
 
Secondly, the higher substitution elasticity implies that the producers’ perceived price 
elasticity of demand for varieties will also rise. In figure 3.5, this has the effect of 
flattening the demand curve to D’, such that the long run zero profit equilibrium 
becomes P1 and Q1. This is known as the pro-competitive effect whereby the distortion 
of the output price over the marginal cost is reduced due to increased competition in the 
industry.  
 
3.2.2.2 Neo-Chamberlinian Models 
This form of horizontal product differentiation was first developed by Spence (1976) 
and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) (SDS). The underlying assumption of the SDS 
Chamberlinian model structure is that consumers do not have a preference for any one 
given variety and seek to consume as many varieties as possible. To illustrate SDS type 
preferences, the discussion draws on the work of Krugman (1979). Thus, assume the 
consumption side of the economy is characterised by consumers who have identical 
sub-utility functions of the form: 
 
         (CH.1) ∑
=
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where the underlying demands, ci are the representative consumer's consumption of 
variety 'i', 'n' is the number of varieties produced and ϑ is a consumption parameter. 
Typically, these sub-utility functions are aggregated into the utility function at the top of 
the consumption tree.  
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Each variety (i=1....n) has the same characterisation in the sub-utility function (ciϑ) 
suggesting that preferences for all varieties are equal. Moreover the sub-utility function 
imposes concavity, (i.e. diminishing marginal utility for each variety since 0 < ϑ < 1) so 
at the margin the consumer is better off moving to a position of consuming smaller 
amounts of more varieties. This effectively is Krugman's characterisation of what has 
come to be widely recognised as the ‘love of variety’ effect. 
 
Two further points should be noted. First, in CGE applications, SDS type preferences 
are often employed at the aggregate consumer level, where it is assumed that individual 
(micro) consumers have different tastes which in the aggregate amounts to more 
varieties. Thus, more varieties demanded by the economy (aggregate consumer) leads to 
greater levels of consumer satisfaction at the micro level.  
 
Secondly, the elasticity of substitution of the sub-utility function is a constant, (1/1-ϑ), 
which does not change with the number of varieties. Thus, all pairwise combinations of 
varieties have identical substitution elasticities and consumer preferences are said to be 
symmetric. In other words, rankings between varieties are based on price alone. This 
assumption is also used to rationalise the observation that cross price elasticities of 
demand approach zero (rather than infinity) as ‘n’ increases. This implies that all 
varieties are equally good substitutes for each other no matter what the level of product 
variety. Vousden (1990) argues that zero cross price elasticities are possible if the 
number of varieties on offer is sufficiently large for no variety to represent a significant 
proportion of the consumer's budget.  
 
‘Thus, for example an avid reader who buys a lot of books may regard a large 
number of books as equally good substitutes for each other, and a sudden 
doubling of the range of choice may not affect the elasticity of substitution 
between any available pair. In such a case, it is quite plausible that the cross-
price elasticities of demand for different books are low, given that over time the 
individual buys them all anyway.’ (pp.154, Vousden, 1990) 
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As a direct consequence of negligible cross price effects firms follow no form of 
strategic interaction patterns, so this form of product differentiation given in the utility 
function actually favours large group monopolistic structures. 
 
Turning to the production side of the economy, Krugman (1979) assumes that firms 
have a single labour factor of production which is fixed in overall supply. The labour 
requirement to produce xi units of variety i is given as: 
 
 ii xl βα +=        (CH.2) 
 
where α is a fixed requirement of units for producing variety ‘i’, and β is a constant 
labour per unit ratio for all output units of xi. Thus, at a given wage rate, α and β 
represent fixed and constant marginal costs respectively. This implies that : 
 
(i) MC equals AVC and;  
(ii) ATC falls as production increases  
 
Thus, production costs for each variety are equal for each firm and there are internal 
economies of scale to each firm6. This ensures that each variety is produced by a single 
firm and each firm will profit maximise in its own segment of the market. Moreover, 
given fixed labour supply and freedom of entry and exit to/from the industry, the 
number of firms and hence varieties produced is determinate.  
 
Zero long run profits are established by freedom of entry and exit, where each firm 
marks up their price over marginal cost sufficiently to cover fixed costs. In Krugman’s 
model, the industry zero profit condition is: 
 
wlxp iii =        (CH.3) 
 
substituting (CH.2)  
                                                          
6 By contrast, external economies are beyond the control of the industry. For example, external economies 
of scale in input markets leads all firms in the output market to enjoy lower per unit costs. This is what is 
popularly characterised as a decreasing cost industry. 
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 ( )wxxp iii βα +=        (CH.4) 
 
where pi and w are output and input prices respectively. Using the product rule it is 
possible to derive the profit maximising MC=MR point of production:  
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where the output price of each variety ‘i’ is:  
 
 
1
11
−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=
i
i wp εβ       (CH.6) 
 
where εi is the own price elasticity of demand which is a function of the individual's 
level of consumption of variety 'i'.  
 
Assuming that the labour force is fixed in supply, L, then product market clearing is 
given as: 
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where ci is the level of variety demand. The factor market clearing mechanism specifies 
that the number of labour units used to produce a given variety of xi multiplied by the 
number of varieties (n), is equal to the exogenous supply of labour (L). Using this rule, 
substitution of (CH.7) into (CH.2) gives: 
 
 LLcn i =+ )( βα       (CH.8) 
 
where the number of firms, n (and hence product varieties) is: 
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Vousden (1990) presents a schematic interpretation of the equilibrium determination of 
varietal demand levels (ci) and price vectors (Pi, w) when two countries trade. The PP 
curve shows profit maximising combinations of ‘ci’, ‘Pi’ and ‘w’. On the left hand side 
of figure 3.6, PP slopes upwards since the higher is ‘ci’ the lower is the demand 
elasticity.8 This increases the firm's monopoly power for variety 'i' and thus enables the 
firm to charge a higher mark-up (Pi/w). If price elasticity of demand is (assumed) 
constant, as presented in the right hand side of figure 3.6, then changes in ‘ci’ will not 
affect monopoly power so the PP curve is perfectly horizontal (i.e., the mark-up stays 
the same).  
 
The curve ZZ shows the zero profit combinations of Pi, w and ci and is negatively 
sloped since higher varietal demand (ci) implies higher supply (xi), so lower per unit 
costs occur. Due to internal economies of scale, higher output translates into lower long 
run zero profit prices as the firm moves down the long run average cost curve.  
 
 
                                                          
8 The greater is the level of demand for a variety, the further one is along the slope of the demand curve 
and the lower is the own-price elasticity. 
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Figure 3.6 
Source: Vousden (1990) 
 
Assuming domestic and foreign regions with respective labour populations L and L* 
where the foreign economy has identical cost and utility functions to the domestic 
economy, the solutions will be identical to those equilibrium conditions derived above if 
the domestic economy opens up to trade. Moreover, the size of the market for each 
variety has increased since the number of consumers, has increased to L + L*.  
 
The curve PP is not a function of L so is unaffected by increases in L. However, ZZ 
shifts to the left since output (xi = ci.L) has increased for each value of c which, under 
economies of scale, implies lower unit costs and prices. Thus, if demand elasticity is a 
decreasing function of ci, price and quantity consumed of each variety falls whereas if 
price elasticity of demand is held fixed then only quantity consumed of each variety 
falls (see right side of figure 3.6).  
 
The total number of varieties available to consumers in both countries is higher in both 
cases under free trade since n+n* > n where n+n* is given as: 
 
 *)(/** LLcLLnn +++=+ βα     (CH.10) 
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Thus, when free trade occurs, consumers gain access to other varieties. Moreover, 
welfare gains will also result if increases in output result in scale economies and 
therefore reductions in unit costs. As already mentioned, welfare gains such as these are 
quite different from the typical terms of trade and specialisation effects which dominate 
much of the earlier CGE trade literature. However, although intra-industry trade is 
explained, the direction of trade is indeterminate because one may not know which 
varieties are produced in which country. 
 
To conclude this section, both neo-Hotelling and neo-Chamberlinian models both 
exhibit a variety effect, albeit for different reasons. In the former, the proliferation of 
varieties allows the consumer to chose a variety closer to his/her ideal thereby 
increasing utility. In the latter, the increased consumption of all  varieties increases 
utility due to the ‘love of variety’ effect. Both approaches also demonstrate how trade 
increases available product variety to consumers in both countries. Moreover, the 
demand price is also reduced due to the reduction in monopoly power as firms move 
down the average cost curve.  
 
3.3 CGE Applications Incorporating Imperfectly Competitive Structures 
Perhaps the earliest and most influential work conducted on the incorporation of 
imperfect competition into a CGE trade model is that of Harris (1984). This is typical of 
many early studies of imperfect competition (Dixit and Norman, 1980; Venables, 1984; 
Lawrence and Spiller, 1986; Gros 1987) which seek  to extend the monopolistic neo-
Chamberlinian framework using SDS preferences, highlighted by Krugman (1979).  
 
Harris (1984) examines the interaction of trade policy and market structure in the case 
of a single country CGE trade model of Canada. The model uses SDS product 
differentiation and 20 of the 29 sectors modelled exhibit scale economies internal to the 
firm. It is assumed that Canada is a price-taker in its import markets (small country 
assumption) and a price-maker in its export markets (large country assumption). 
 
Harris simulates the effects of a removal of all unilateral and multiple bilateral (or 
reciprocated i.e. all countries reduce their trade barriers with Canada ONLY) trade 
restrictions affecting Canada. In the initial case for perfectly competitive industries and 
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constant returns to scale, unilateral and multiple bilateral free trade in Canada results in 
0% and 2.4% respective increases in Canadian GNP.  
 
When the same experiment is undertaken incorporating scale economies, welfare gains 
for the two respective categories are 4.1% and 8.6% of GNP. These results are 
accompanied by an increase in average output per firm of 37.2% for unilateral free trade 
and 67.7% for multiple bilateral free trade. Thus, the reduction of protective barriers has 
opened up trade which in turn has led to a rationalisation of the industry. In other words, 
previously protected inefficient firms have exited the industry, with remaining firms 
expanding output and moving down the long run average cost curve due to the decline 
in fixed costs. This aspect of the result is characterised as the scale effect.  
 
A criticism of the this study is the modelling of foreign product differentiation. As the 
study is a single country framework, Harris uses an ad hoc treatment to model the 
number of foreign product varieties before and after liberalisation where,  
 
“importers match in proportional terms any changes in domestic product 
differentiation” (pp1023, Harris, 1984).  
 
This assumption is referred to as competitive foreign product differentiation which fixes 
the domestic to foreign variety ratio n/n*.  
 
Although this assumption may keep domestic and foriegn market shares constant at 
fixed terms of trade, it also prevents the displacement of some domestic varieties by 
foreign varieties if the domestic country unilaterally reduces trade restrictions. Instead 
of experiencing an influx of cheaper foreign varieties, unilateral liberalisation leads to a 
reduction of foreign varieties in ratio to the reduction in domestic varieties which 
implies a reduction in consumer utility (negative varietal effects).  
 
This restriction is highlighted in the policy experiments incorporating both SDS 
preferences and scale economies. Under the same scenarios, the model reports welfare 
gains relative to the perfectly competitive case of 2.7% and 6.2% of GNP for unilateral 
free trade and multiple bilateral free trade respectively, where smaller gains suggest that 
falls in consumer utility dampen model results.  
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 Wigle (1988) conducted a follow up study to Harris, questioning the size of the welfare 
gains as a result of preferential market gains given to Canada under the model structure. 
Wigle argues that Harris' welfare gains are too large because the multi-bilateral 
simulation makes the assumption that Canada has preferential market access with all of 
its partners on a bilateral basis, whereas third countries' trade barriers with each other 
remain intact. This, Wigle argues, is not a likely scenario, so Canada's welfare gains 
would be reduced accordingly, which is reflected in his model results. 
 
Other approaches employing monopolistic market behaviour have been structured 
within the neo-Hotelling framework highlighted in section 3.2.2.1. Lancaster (1984) has 
examined the welfare effects of the imposition of a tariff in the context of two trading 
partners in a manner similar to Harris (1984). It is assumed that the country imposing 
the tariff is 'small' such that imposition of the tariff does not affect the world price and 
therefore the export earnings of the partner.    
 
The results depend heavily on the type of preference structure employed. For example, 
the split arrangement of varieties assumes that the varietal spectrum is partitioned with 
domestic varieties on one side and imported varieties on the other side of the spectrum. 
Thus, domestic and imported varieties are poor substitutes (except at the boundary of 
the partition) implying that price movements will have little effect on substitution 
possibilities. The interleaved case assumes that for every domestic variety there is an 
adjacent foreign variety on the varietal spectrum. This implies that domestic and 
imported varieties are close substitutes.  
 
In Lancaster's model, the imposition by the home country of an import tariff in the split 
case unambiguously reduces domestic net welfare. The marginal cost to foreign firms 
supplying to the domestic economy increases leading to a price increase in foreign 
varieties. Due to the lack of substitution possibilities between domestic and foreign 
variants, this leaves those consumers who prefer foreign varieties worse off, with 
domestic consumers and producers facing no change. 
 
The interleaved case presents a broader range of outcomes since domestic and foreign 
markets cannot be separated as in the split case. Thus, the increase in the price of 
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foreign variants, due to the imposition of the tariff, leads to a substitution in favour of 
adjacent domestic varieties which in turn gives domestic firms additional monopoly 
power (lower price elasticity). In the short run, this pushes up domestic variety prices 
and the resulting profit signal allows new firms (both domestic AND foreign, to 
preserve the interleaving structure) to enter the market decreasing the distance between 
existing varieties, restoring long run zero profits and increasing the elasticity of demand 
which in turn lowers prices in the domestic industry.  
 
With interleaved preferences, Lancaster (1984) predicts a gain to domestic consumers of 
new varieties (i.e. proliferation of new varieties gives positive neo-Hotelling variety 
effect) and gains to domestic consumers favouring the original domestic varieties at 
lower prices (as varietal proliferation increases price elasticity which forces prices 
lower). Both of these effects offset the losses to domestic consumers favouring foreign 
varieties (higher prices).  
 
This is a surprising as well as important result, since contrary to the neo-classical trade 
literature, a small country can gain by imposing a unilateral tariff in a world 
characterised by differentiated products. It must, however, be stressed that the 
importance of this result relies heavily on Lancaster's assumption that existing foreign 
firms remain in the domestic market after the imposition of the tariff to preserve the 
high substitution possibilities of the interleaved structure. If foreign firms totally 
withdraw, product variety actually falls, and the degree of monopoly power of domestic 
firms increases long run prices above the pre-tariff situation.  
 
Greenaway (1985) reflects that if a tariff leads to greater welfare than the free trade 
position, as postulated by Lancaster, then the tariff may be correcting a distortion in the 
form of 'insufficient product variety'. This being the case, Greenaway postulates that 
even greater welfare improvements can prevail if a production subsidy is used since 
unlike the tariff, this does not push up the price of foreign varieties in the domestic 
economy. Taking this one step further, Greenaway hypothesises the existence of an 
optimal degree of product diversity. Increased product variety may only be Pareto 
improving if the benefit (consumer surplus) at the margin exceeds the cost. This, 
however, is a question not considered in the Lancaster (1984) study as there is no social 
cost attached to the introduction of new varieties.  
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 Eaton and Kierzkowski (1984) develop a neo-Hotelling model where firms first decide 
on entry and variety to produce before taking decisions on prices and output. This 
sequential process is starkly contrasted to the simultaneous entry, price and output 
decisions dictated by zero profits alluded to in most models of industrial organisation. 
The authors derive a similar result to Lancaster (1984) and show that an import-tariff is 
a Pareto superior position to free trade although this is due to ‘profit stealing’ from the 
foreign producer as opposed to sub-optimal varietal choice as proposed by Lancaster. 
 
In comparing the neo-Hotelling and SDS approaches, both applications predict the 
presence of trade between otherwise identical economies in similar products (i.e IIT) 
due to consumer access to a broader range of goods. However, Lancaster’s findings 
show that the variance of outcomes on product variety, overall output and welfare can 
differ significantly depending on the set of assumptions pertaining to the preference 
structure in the model. 
 
One other development which has occurred in more recent years in the trade literature 
has been the characterisation of scale effects. Monopolistically competitive studies 
mostly follow the SDS type preference structure where the mark-up of price above 
marginal cost is determined by the elasticity of substitution between differentiated 
varieties. In much of the neo-Hotelling based literature provision is made for the 
existence of mark-up effects, although these studies place greater emphasis on how 
trade policy affects variety levels and consumer welfare.  
 
An early attempt to examine the effect of the mark-up distortion of price above marginal 
cost on welfare was conducted by Harris (1984) for Canada. The mark-up price was a 
weighted average of the Krugman zero profit price and the Eastman and Skykolt (1967) 
price. Increased weightings of the latter increased the benchmark mark-up price and led 
to significantly greater welfare gains in both the unilateral and multiple bilateral cases. 
Since freer trade provides increased competition, it reduces the discrepancy between 
domestic price and marginal cost. Thus the higher is the monopoly power, the higher is 
the domestic price, so the bigger the potential gains from trade liberalisation and thus 
pro-competitive effects.  
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More recently, there has been a body of literature which attempts to bridge the gap 
between monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures. Typically, these studies use 
standard assumptions of product differentiation and freedom of entry/exit specific to the 
former structure, and combine them with oligopolistic strategic conjecture.  
 
Studies such as Horn (1984), Flam and Helpman (1987), Brown (1991) and Hertel 
(1994) all have similar model structures characterised by two countries, two sectors and 
two factors of production (Horn only uses a single country treatment with a single 
factor, labour). In each case, one sector is imperfectly competitive and the other 
perfectly competitive, moreover SDS type preferences are employed and the mark-up 
varies in response to changes in prices and the number of varieties. In the Hertel (1994) 
study, a more general representation of the mark-up is employed, enabling the modeller 
to characterise both Bertrand and Cournot conjectures.  
 
In each case, these models look at the effect of a tariff on imports of the differentiated 
commodity, although Flam and Helpman also examine the impact of other distortive 
policies such as export, output and R+D subsidies. The results of the models reflect 
crucial assumptions about the model structure, particularly with respect to entry and exit 
behaviour.  
 
In Hertel (1994) the imposition of a tariff on imports of the differentiated commodity, 
where there is no entry or exit of firms, reduces the degree of foreign competition which 
in turn increases domestic firm monopoly power in the imperfectly competitive 
industry. In the absence of increases in the number of firms, output per firm increases 
which results in an increase in welfare. 
 
In the case where domestic entry and exit is permitted and the number of foreign 
varieties is fixed, Hertel (1994) finds that the number of domestic firms increases with 
the tariff on the imported differentiated good due to the profit signal. The effects of this 
scenario on output per firm and welfare is, however, inconclusive, a result which is 
echoed in a similar study by Brown (1991). Flam and Helpman (1987) find that welfare 
actually increases in both of the above cases. The authors, however, maintain that the 
inclusion of more increasing returns to scale imperfectly competitive industries would 
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lead to further sectoral expansion resulting in increased competition for finite resources. 
Thus, factor price rises may, in this instance, reverse the domestic welfare result. 
 
Hertel (1994) examines a further case where the total number of firms/varieties is fixed 
although domestic firms may still enter/exit the industry. The result here is that entry of 
domestic firms results in the displacement of foreign varieties from the domestic 
market. The tariff on imports of the differentiated product leads to increased monopoly 
power by domestic firms (increased mark-ups and output prices) although the increase 
in the number of domestic firms results in a fall in output per firm in the imperfectly 
competitive sector and thus a reduction in welfare.  
 
Improvements in computational facility have enabled CGE modellers to incorporate 
product differentiation and complex conjectural variation strategic behaviour into larger 
multi-region CGE applications. One typical example of this is by Harrison, Rutherford 
and Tarr (1994), who examine full integration of the EU's internal market. This model 
includes SDS monopolistic product differentiation and freedom of entry and exit, as 
well as Cournot conjectural variation behaviour. Harrison et al. (1994) show that the 
removal of border costs and supply side standards, results in welfare improving gains of 
around 0.5% of EU GDP. Inclusion of the additional gains of pro-competitive effects 
discussed above leads to an overall rise in welfare of around 1.2% of the EU's GDP. 
 
Francois et al. (1995b) investigate the implications on model results of incorporating the 
Armington specification into a monopolistically competitive (MC) model. This study 
employs two model types: Armington based MC models are referred to as 'nested 
regional' models and non-Armington MC models are referred to as 'non-nested' global 
MC models.  
 
In the former specification, firms within a region may be specified as monopolistically 
competitive but the Armington assumption combines differentiated good imports into a 
composite. Thus, although the nature of the differentiation in the Armington structure is 
endogenous (instead of exogenous – see section 3.1.2), it is still a composite 
differentiated good. In the non-nested specification, the lower level of the Armington 
nest is removed such that foreign and domestic variants/firms compete directly. 
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Francois et al. (1995b) show that global MC models yield higher welfare gains since the 
latter specification allows domestic and foreign firms to compete directly which 
enlarges the size of the market. Thus, if liberalisation occurs, efficiency and 
specialisation effects are large and monopolistic competition is referred to as being 
global. The Armington structure effectively severs the monopolistically competitive tie 
between regions leading to smaller welfare effects. In other words, firms only compete 
through composite goods such that variety and scale effects are limited to the regional 
level.  
 
To conclude, since 1980, there has been a substantial proliferation in imperfectly 
competitive CGE applications in the trade literature. In the absence of any uniform 
theory, this has led to a wide spectrum of CGE trade model variants employing different 
types of imperfectly competitive structure (oligopolistic vs monopolistic), product 
preferences (neo-Chamberlinian vs. neo-Hotelling) and structural differences 
(Armington vs. Non-nested).  
 
Finally, there is a large body of work in the agri-business/marketing literature which 
examines the relationship between consumer preferences and region of origin. In the 
context of agricultural trade research, this work is particularly significant given that the 
exchange of food products is becoming more important in what are now termed global 
markets. Indeed the volume of trade in food has grown at an annual rate of almost 10% 
per year, from $27 billion in 1972 to $118 billion in 1990 (Henderson and Handy, 
1993). Such an increase in trade is strongly associated with the globalisation of food 
markets, where consumers are faced with an unprecedented level of variety.  
 
In response to this, food manufacturers and academics have sought to isolate ways in 
which products can be differentiated from competitors. A number of studies undertaken 
assessing the influence of country of origin on consumers’ perceptions of product 
quality  (Anderson and Cunningham, 1972; Bannister and Saunders, 1978; White, 1979) 
converge on the opinion that, 
 
both empirical observations and experiments indicate that country of origin has 
a considerable influence on the quality perceptions of a product’ (pp.89, Bilkey 
and Nes, 1982).  
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 Moreover, market research has been undertaken on the influence of country of origin on 
food product preferences (Kaynak et al. 1983, Howard 1989, Morris and Hallaq 1990, 
Juric et al. 1996). Consumers were asked to evaluate both domestic and foreign food 
and beverage products over a range of attributes (i.e. nutritional safety, quality, taste 
etc.). In each case respondents favoured the home variety vis-à-vis the foreign 
substitute.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter opens with a brief review of the single- and multi-country CGE trade 
literature. Moreover, attention is given to the role of product differentiation and its 
characterisation in most standard CGE trade models (i.e., Armington assumption). 
However, certain criticisms of the Armington assumption leave its validity open to 
question. Hence, the discussion turns to ‘new’ trade theories which have emerged and 
their characterisation of ‘endogenous’ product differentiation in CGE model structures 
in the literature.  
 
The focus of this thesis will be to employ the findings pertaining to the influence of 
region of origin effects on product differentiation in global food markets and 
incorporate them into a stylised neo-Hotelling CGE application. In other words, ‘region 
of origin’ (which is exogenously employed in the Armington specification) is now 
endogenously incorporated into a stylised model as the central criteria in ascertaining 
preference for variety with respect to an ‘ideal’. Employing these notions of variety, as 
well as endogenous mark-up and pro-competitive effects in imperfectly competitive 
sectors, this study adds a new dimension to the notion of CAP costs. A full discussion 
of the technical aspects of this stylised approach is presented in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 
 
A Multi Region CGE Trade Model and Database 
 
This chapter is in two parts. The first part gives an overview of the mechanisms behind 
a standard CGE multi-sector global model, which is tailored for use with the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (for a fuller discussion of the model structure 
see Hertel, 1997). In the second part of the chapter, attention is given to the sources, 
construction and accounting conventions held within a multi-region database. 
 
Thus, the structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.1 gives a full description of 
the behavioural equations inherent within a standard multi-region CGE model 
implementation. Section 4.2 discusses some of the welfare measures in the model. 
Section 4.3 gives an introduction to the concept of CGE model data. Section 4.4 
examines the structure of a SAM, emphasising the equilibrium constraints that it 
imposes. Section 4.5 briefly presents the relationship between a SAM and an I-O table. 
Section 4.6 gives coverage of some of the issues pertaining to data construction and 
reconciliation which is followed by an outline of both the sets and parameter estimates 
supplied with the GTAP data in section 4.7. Section 4.8 discusses the accounting 
conventions within the GTAP data and section 4.9 concludes the chapter To help 
identify the large number of variables in the standard GTAP model structure which 
appear throughout this chapter, a glossary of terms has been constructed to aid model 
interpretation and appears at the end of the thesis. 
 
PART I – The Model Framework 
4.1 Behavioural Equations 
The sections that follow describe the behavioural patterns of consumers and producers 
within the economy. Moreover, a description of the global institutions in the model is 
presented. The equations follow the terminology of the GTAP, where lower case letters 
are percentage change variables which update the levels database.  
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4.1.1 Armington Structure 
The structure of regional intermediate and final import demands follows the Armington 
(1969) specification discussed in section 3.1.2. Thus, the quantity of exports of good ‘i’ 
from region ‘r’ to ‘s’ (qxsi,r,s) are derived from changes in relative import prices and 
composite import demand in the nest at the region of destination, ‘s’. Schematically, the 
lower Armington nest is presented in figure 4.1. 
 
 
qimi,s  
 
 
                                                                miσ
 
 
qxsi,1,s……………………..qxsi,n,s 
r=1,…n 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The lower Armington Nest in the standard GTAP model. 
 
At the border, linearised CES Hicksian import demands for good ‘i’ (both intermediate 
and final) from exporting region ‘r’ to importing region ‘s’ are given as: 
 
 [ ]sisrimisisri pimpmsqimqxs ,,,,,, −−= σ    (B.1) 
 
where  
sripms ,,  - The bilateral import price  
sipim ,  - The composite price in the lower nest  
siqim ,  - The composite import good in the lower nest  
 
The elasticity of substitution in the lower Armington nest, , allows imperfect 
substitution possibilities between each of these ‘export demands’ by importing region 
's', where all pair-wise combinations of imports have identical substitution possibilities.  
m
iσ
 
The composite price of imports from all foreign (r≠s) regions is given as: 
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      (B.2) ∑
∈
=
regr
srisrisi pmsMSHRSpim ,,,,,
 
where the share, MSHRSi,r,s, shows the market value of imports of tradable commodity 
'i' in region 's' from export region 'r' as a proportion of import demands of ‘i’ from all 
regions ‘r’.  
  
The sourcing of regional composite imports (qimi,s) in the lower nest to each of the 
agents within the importing economy ‘s’ is given by the linearised border market 
clearing expression (B.3). Thus, a general solution is characterised by a vector of prices 
which leads to market clearing quantity changes:   
 
 
sisisisisji
prodj
sjisisi qgmVIGMqpmVIPMqfmVIFMqimVIM ,,,,,,,,,, ++= ∑
∈
   (B.3) 
 
siVIM ,  - The value of aggregate imports of tradable commodity ‘i’ in region ‘r’ at 
market prices. 
rjiVIFM ,,  - The value of purchases of composite imported tradable commodity ‘i’ by 
firms in sector ‘j’ of region ‘r’ evaluated at market prices. 
riVIPM ,  - The value of expenditure on composite imported tradable commodity ‘i’ by 
the private household in region ‘r’ evaluated at market prices. 
riVIGM ,  - The value of expenditure on composite imported tradable commodity ‘i’ by 
the government household in region ‘r’ evaluated at market prices. 
 
where the percentage change variables are the respective quantity indices for each of 
the value terms defined. These composite import quantity indices appear in the upper 
part of the Armington nest for both intermediate and final demands (see figures 4.2 and 
4.7 respectively).    
 
Once the composite import is sourced to each agent, the upper level of the Armington 
specification separates agents’ (final or intermediate) composite import demands for 
commodity ‘i’ from the domestic substitute. Once again, a CES specification is 
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employed, where a single elasticity parameter dictates the  degree of substitutability of 
the import composite and the domestic substitute in the upper nest. Moreover, each of 
the Armington substitution elasticities specified in the GTAP data for each commodity 
are the same in all regions.  
 
4.1.2 Production nest 
The nest for each productive sector ‘j’ in the model is presented in figure 4.2, where 
each sectoral production function produces a single output in a perfectly competitive 
market structure and is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. Linear behavioural 
equations in the upper and lower parts of the production nest are derived from a weakly 
separable cost minimisation problem which yields conditional Hicksian demands and 
composite prices. These expressions are presented in figure 4.3. 
 
Sectoral Production Quantity  - qoj,r 
  LEONTIEF     
           0 
 
 
           Composite Value added            Composite intermediate inputs (i=1…n) 
    qvaj,r                                            qf1,j,r……………….. qfn,j,r
 CES     CES 
   σVA     σD 
 
     Land      Skilled       Unskilled     Capital     Natural      Domestic       Foreign 
                   Labour        Labour                     Resources    Intermediate    Composite 
                       Intermediate 
           qfei,j,r        qfdi,j,r      qfmi,j,r
(j=production; r=region) 
Figure 4.2: The Production Nest 
 
In the lower level of the production nest, CES aggregator functions are used to collect 
primary inputs and intermediate inputs (domestic and foreign imported 'composites') 
into aggregate value added and composite intermediates respectively. As specified by 
the single parameterised value of the elasticity of substitution, the input components of 
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both of these aggregator functions are imperfectly substitutable for one another within 
each separable group.  
 
Upper Nest – Composite Value added/intermediate input demands 
 
rjrj qoqva ,, =                (composite value added demand) 
rjrji qoqf ,,, =        (composite intermediate input demand) 
∑∑
∈∈
+=
tradi
rjirji
endwi
rjirjirjrj pfVFApfeVFApsVOA ,,,,,,,,,, ...  
      (composite price/zero profit) 
 
Lower Nest - Composite Intermediate Inputs: 
 
[ ] rjirjirjirjirji pfdFMSHRpfmFMSHRpf ,,,,,,,,,, .1. −+=  (composite price) 
 [ ]rjirjiDirjirji pfpfmqfqfm ,,,,,,,, . −−= σ         (composite import demand) 
 [ ]rjirjiDirjirji pfpfdqfqfd ,,,,,,,, . −−= σ         (domestic tradable demand) 
where FMSHR is the share of the import composite or domestic good in the total 
purchases of ‘i’ by sector ‘j’ in the nest. 
 
Value Added Nest: 
 
      (composite price) rji
endwi
rjirj pfeSVApva ,,,,, .∑
∈
=
 [ ]rjrjivairjrji pvapfeqvaqfe ,,,,,, −−= σ       (endowment demands) 
where SVA is the share of a given endowment ‘i’ in the total endowment purchases by 
sector ‘j’ in the nest. 
Figure 4.3:Linearised Equations of the Production Nest 
 
Moreover, the intermediate input part of the lower nest, is effectively the upper level of 
the Armington nest discussed in section 4.1.1 above. The top nest demands are Leontief 
and separable with respect to composite intermediate and value added inputs, where the 
composite price, in this part of the nest, is also the industry zero profit condition (see 
A3-A5 in Appendix A).  
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 4.1.3 (Sluggish) Factor Mobility 
In each economy, primary factors, 'i',  are distinguished by the degree of mobility 
between the using sectors 'j', where those factors which are restricted from moving 
freely are deemed as ‘sluggish’. To model imperfect (or sluggish) factor mobility, the 
model employs a single nested Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function, 
which is the corollary  of the CES function. The CET function is presented in figure 
4.4. 
 
 qoesi,1,r………………… qoesI,n,r 
 
 
 
 
                  Tiσ
 
 
 
j=1,…n 
 
 qoi,r 
Figure 4.4 CET Factor Supply Function 
 
 
Maximising factor returns (revenue) subject to the CET function gives the optimal 
supply allocations (qoesi,j,r) of a sluggish factor ‘i’ between using sectors 'j' in response 
to changes in sluggish factor sectoral prices (pmesi,j,r) and the (exogenous) regional 
quantity (qoi,r), with the composite sluggish primary factor price given by pmi,r. 
 
 [ ]rjiriTirirji pmespmqoqoes ,,,,,, −+= σ    (B.4) 
  
rji
prodj
rjiri pmesREVSHRpm ,,,,, .∑
∈
=     (B.5) 
 
where REVSHRi,j,r is the value of market demands, (i.e., the cost to the using sector 
inclusive of taxes/subsidies) for sluggish factor 'i' by sector 'j' in region 'r' as a share of 
the demand for sluggish factor 'i' by all using sectors 'j' in region 'r'.  
 
 104 
The elasticity parameter, is the elasticity of transformation (the corollary of the 
elasticity of substitution in CES functions). In the model, the degree of factor mobility 
of the sluggish factor 'i' between using sectors ‘j’ is controlled by the elasticity of 
transformation parameter, where the closer the value of is to zero, the more 
immobile the factor. The direct implication of rigidities in factor markets (vis-à-vis 
mobile factor markets) is that it allows differences in sectoral factor returns to persist. 
For example, in sector 1 the demand for the sluggish factor, say land, may be higher 
than in sector 2, hence returns to land are greater in sector 1. Since land has a high 
degree of sector specificity, factors can only move sluggishly into sectors with higher 
returns (i.e., from sector 2 to sector 1) so differentials in sectoral factor returns 
(pmes
T
iσ
T
iσ
i,j,r) remain intact. 
 
 
 
P’ 
P 
i=sluggish endowment 
 
0<Tiσ  (Leontief) 
j=1 
 
qoesi,1,r 
 
 
qoesi,1,r’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
qoesi,2,r               qoesi,2,r’                   j=2  
 
Figure 4.5:  CET Transformation Frontier 
 
  
Thus, an example of factor immobility is presented in figure 4.5, where optimal supply 
allocations of sluggish endowment 'i' respond sluggishly to changes in factor returns 
(pmesi,j,r) (P - P' in figure 4.5) between using sectors ‘j’. At the extreme, one could 
specify zero factor mobility between using sectors for factor ‘i’.  
 
For example, in figure 4.6, the elasticity of transformation between uses of the sluggish 
factor is zero, so the transformation frontier is effectively Leontief in form. This 
implies that optimal supply allocations of sluggish endowment 'i' no longer respond to 
changes in factor returns (pmesi,j,r) (P - P' in figure 4.6) between using sectors. In this 
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case, sluggish factor ‘i’ is sectorally fixed in supply in each sector, leading to zero 
factor mobility.1
 
      j=1 
 
 
 
qoesi,1,r 
 
i=sluggish endowment 
 
0=Tiσ  (Leontief) 
P’ 
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Leontief Transformation Frontier for Sluggish Factor ‘i’ 
qoesi,2,r                        j=2 
 
Where primary factors are perfectly sectorally mobile, factor returns are equalised 
across all sectors. Hence, the presence of a common factor price permits the market 
clearing relationship for mobile factors in the model to be expressed in terms of 
domestic market values. In the case of the sluggish factor, no one price clears aggregate 
sluggish markets. Thus, market clearing in each region 'r' is expressed on a sectoral 
basis in terms of quantities (i.e., supply = demand) only. Linearised equations (B.6) and 
(B.7) show the market clearing conditions for both mobile and sluggish factors 
respectively:  
 
     (B.6) ∑
∈
=
prodj
rjirjiriri qfeVFMqoVOM ,,,,,, ..
       (B.7) rjirji qfeqoes ,,,, =
 
rjiqfe ,,  – Quantity demanded of factor 'i' (sluggish or mobile) by sector 'j' in region 'r'  
riVOM ,  - Total market value of mobile endowment 'i' in region 'r'. 
                                                 
 
1 This technique is often employed to characterise the land constraint in the agriculture sector. 
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rjiVFM ,, - Sectoral market demand value for mobile endowment 'i' by sector ‘j’ in 
region 'r'.  
 
Finally, in the GTAP database (for further discussion of the data see part II), the land 
factor is only purchased by primary agricultural sectors, where for each of the 
remaining sectors there exists a zero entry in the data set. To avoid the potential 
problem of forcing the model to calculate percentage changes of zero entries in the 
data, a dummy variable is used to record zero expenditures by sectors on the land input. 
Thus, if land expenditure by a sector (non-agricultural) is zero in the data, the dummy 
variable, D_EVFA(i,j,r), is zero, and the quantity of land purchased is zero. Conversely, 
non-zero expenditures have a dummy value of one. In a similar manner, dummy 
variables are also employed for identifying zero expenditures in the data (for all 
aggregations) for intermediate input demands by firms, zero expenditures on exports of 
tradables of 'i' from 'r' to 's' and zero supplies of transport services (by non-service 
sectors) to the global transport sector. 
    
4.1.4 Consumption Nest 
Final demands in the model are based on a three stage nested structure. A full schematic 
representation of the utility tree in the model is presented in figure 4.7. The linearised 
behavioural equations pertaining to each part of the nest are presented in figure 4.8. 
Final demands are by the 'regional- household', which collects all incomes in the 
economy from endowments (mobile and sluggish) and taxes, and pays out subsidies. 
Thus, in the top level of the nest Cobb-Douglas regional household utility is maximised 
 
[ rrrr QSAVEUPUGCDMaxU ,,= ]            (B.8) 
 
subject to the regional budget constraint: 
 
rrrrrrr QSAVEPSAVEUGPGOVUPPPRIVINCOME ... ++=      (B.9) 
 
rrr
rrrrrr
QSAVEPSAVESAVE
UGPGOVGOVEXPUPPPRIVPRIVEXP
.
..
=
==
       (B.10) 
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which yields Cobb-Douglas regional Marshallian demands by each agent (upr, ugr, 
qsaver), with regional savings demands going directly to the global bank (see section 
4.1.6).  
Regional Utility - ur 
  COBB-DOUGLAS     
      σ=1 
 
         Govt. Utility– ugr    Savings – qsaver          Private Utility – upr
            COBB-DOUGLAS      
            σ=1               σ=1 
 
                 Composite Tradables         Composite Tradables 
qg1,r………………………….. qgn,r       qp1,r …………………….. qpn,r
 
 CES   σD       CES     σD   
     
   Domestic Tradable        Composite Imported      Domestic Tradable     Composite Imported 
Tradable                 Tradable              
qgdn,r                                        qgmn,r                           qpdn,r                                        qpmn,r
Figure 4.7: The Utility Tree for Final Demands 
 
The equations in the second level of the nest are derived using a cost minimisation 
procedure. For example, minimising government expenditure  
 
 ∑
∈
=
Tradi
ririr QGPGGOVEXPMin ,, .    (B.11) 
 
subject to a Cobb-Douglas utility function  
 
 
Top Nest – Regional Utility 
 
rrrrrrrr qsaveSAVEugGOVEXPupPRIVEXPuINCOME .... ++=  
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             (aggregate utility)  
rrr psaveyqsave −=            (regional savings) 
                        (government purchases) rrr pgovyug −=
               (private household purchases) rrr pprivyup −=
Second level – Agents’ demands for composite tradables. 
 
 [ ]rrirri pgovpgugqg −−= ,,                    (Govt. demand for ‘i’) 
     (composite government price) rir
Tradi
rir pgGOVEXPVGApgov ,, ./ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑
∈
 [ ]rrirri pprivppupqp −−= ,,           (private household demand for ‘i’) 
    (composite private household price) rir
Tradi
rir ppPRIVEXPVPAppriv ,, ./ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑
∈
where psave is the market clearing price in the global investment/savings market. 
Third Level – Demand for import composite/domestic tradables. 
 
 [ ] ririririri pgdGMSHRpgmGMSHRpg ,,,,, .1. −+=         (composite price) 
              (composite import demand) [ ririDiriri pgmpgqgqgm ,,,, −+= σ ]
]           (domestic tradable demand) [ ririDiriri pgdpgqgqgd ,,,, −+= σ
 [ ] ririririri ppdPMSHRppmPMSHRpp ,,,,, .1. −+=        (composite price) 
           (composite import demand) [ ririDiriri ppmppqpqpm ,,,, −+= σ ]
]           (domestic tradable demand) [ ririDiriri ppdppqpqpd ,,,, −+= σ
 
where GMSHR and PMSHR represent the share of domestic/import composite ‘i’ in 
total purchases of ‘i’ in the nest.  
Figure 4.8: Linearised Equations in the Utility Tree 
 
     (B.12) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑
∈Tradi
rir QGCDUG ,
 
gives Hicksian government household demands for composite tradable goods, qgi,r. The 
third level of the utility tree in figure 4.7 is the upper level of the Armington structure 
for both private and government household, where final demand quantities for 
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composite import and domestic goods are derived from a CES cost minimisation 
procedure. 
 
4.1.5 Global Transport Sector 
The supply quantities of transport services (qsti,r) are aggregated as Cobb-Douglas 
inputs into the composite global shipping commodity output good ‘qt’.2 Similarly, the 
corresponding global shipping price, ‘pt’, is a composite of regional service sector 
prices, ‘pmi,r’. These expressions are given as: 
 
 [ ]riri pmptqtqst ,, −+=      (B.13) 
 
      (B.14) ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
=
tradi regr
riri pmVSTptVT ,, ..
 
The latter expression is also a zero profit equation for the global shipping sector which 
states that the total value of service exports supplied by all regions (VSTi,r) is equal to 
the global value of transport services (VT). Note that the aggregation of shipping 
exports is valued at market prices because sales of shipping transport services are 
assumed to be free of trade price distortions.  
 
The base value of transportation service demands (VTWRi,r,s) to ship good 'i' from 
region 'r' to 's' is the margin between the free on board (f.o.b.) and cost, insurance 
freight (c.i.f.) values. Changes in the quantity demanded for freight services, qtsi,r,s, are 
assumed to be some fixed proportion of the quantity of the exported good 'i' being 
shipped along a given route, qxsi,r,s. In percentage terms, the two change at the same 
rate: 
 
 srisri qxsqts ,,,, =       (B.15) 
 
For market clearing, global shipping supplies should be equal to the sum of all bilateral 
shipping demands: 
 
                                                 
2 Which come from the services sector of each region . 
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     (B.16) sri
tradi regr regs
sri qxsVTWRqtVT ,,,, .. ∑ ∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ∈
=
 
In percentage terms, the change in qtsi,r,s and qxsi,r,s will be the same since the quantity 
of the shipping good required is a fixed proportion of the export quantity. Hence it is 
possible to substitute qxsi,r,s for qtsi,r,s. 
 
4.1.6 The Global Bank 
The global bank (see figure 6.9) has the role of creating a global investment good 
summed over all regions minus regional depreciation.3 The sum of all regional 
household savings, which is a Cobb-Douglas share of regional income, is interpreted as 
the global demand for investment or capital goods, where a global investment good 
(GLOBINV) made up from capital producing sectors in each region is offered by the 
bank to satisfy this demand (see figure 4.9).4
 
Having established the link between savings and investment via the global bank, the 
model offers the user a choice of two specifications establishing the allocation of 
investment (and thus capital production) between regions. The first theory allocates 
regional investment in capital goods based on changes in rates of return. The second 
mechanism takes the position of assuming that the composition of net regional 
investment shares in the global portfolio are constant (see Hertel, 1997). The model 
structure allows the user to incorporate either investment mechanism into a single set of 
equations.  
 
 
 
INCOMEr
 
PRIVEXPr GOVEXPr SAVEr  
 
                                                 
3 Depreciation expenditure is treated as a withdrawal from regional household income. All expansionary 
investment in new capital comes from regional savings. 
4 These are assumed to be additions to the capital stock and are not related in any way to the existing 
fixed stock of primary factor capital in each region. 
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GLOBINV = ∑
∈regr
rSAVE  
[REGINVr – VDEPr]………… [REGINVs – VDEPs] 
 
Figure 4.9: Global Savings and Investment 
Source: Hertel and Tsigas (1993) 
 
 
Perhaps the key difference between the two investment treatments is with regard to 
welfare effects. Under the second mechanism, changes in global savings (which 
typically change very little in response to small changes in regional incomes) create an 
equal percentage rise in global investment which leads to equal percentage changes in 
each region’s net investment shares. Thus, regional savings and investment are coerced 
to move together, which under regional closure (see section 2.3) implies, ceteris 
paribus, minimal change in the trade balance.  
 
The alternative mechanism allows regional investment shares and thus capital stocks to 
respond to variations in expected rates of return. Thus, if regional (and therefore global) 
savings typically move very little but there are significant reallocations in investment 
shares between regions in response to differing regional rates of return, then to preserve 
general equilibrium the trade balance may be forced to react with dramatic 
consequences on the terms of trade (see section 4.2.1).  
 
In response to regional investment demand for capital goods, each region in the model 
has a capital goods producing sector which combines domestic and imported 
intermediate inputs. Moreover, the primary factor input element is zero as it is assumed 
that value added is already embodied in the production of the intermediate inputs 
assembled to produce the capital good.                
 
Finally, drawing on Walras’ law, the nth market is characterised by savings and 
investment, where the supply of global capital/investment goods (walras_sup) must be 
equal to the sum of all savings demands (walras_dem). This identity is checked in the 
model, where a non-zero value of the endogenous variable, walraslack (which is 
swapped with the numeraire price ‘psave’) implies an incorrect implementation of the 
model (see section 2.2.3, chapter 2):  
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  walraslackdemwalraswalras += _sup_    (B.17) 
 
 
4.2 Welfare (Summary) Indices 
All of the equations which fall into this category do not affect the solution of the model. 
Rather, their role is to report various counterfactual equilibrium results in percentage 
changes which can be calculated from the exogenously and endogenously determined 
variables in the core model solution. A full list of all the summary indices is presented 
in Hertel (1997). This section concentrates on the key welfare measures contained in 
this part of the model, namely, the terms of trade, gross domestic product and the 
equivalent variation in income. 
 
4.2.1 Terms of Trade 
Referring to figure 4.10, the terms of trade is defined as the ratio of the price of exports 
to the price of imports. Assuming the economy is using all its resources efficiently, 
production will take place at the point of tangency between the international rate of 
exchange, Px/Pm, and the transformation function, producing M1 and X1 of the import 
competing and export good respectively. Adding a social welfare  function given by the 
indifference curve, IC, determines exchange of exports (X1-Xd) for imports (M1-Md).  
 
If the terms of trade improve, then the price of exports increases relative to the price of 
imports. This is illustrated in the diagram as a pivot in the international rate of 
exchange to Px/Pm’, where the higher price of the export good encourages increased 
specialisation at the new point P'. Thus, export good production increases to X2 and 
import competing good production declines to M2. At the new terms of trade, more 
imports (M2-Md') can be bought per pound of exports (X2-Xd') sold which, ceteris 
paribus,  increases the level of social welfare to the aggregate consumer from IC to IC'. 
Hence the terms of trade effect also leads to increased specialisation (i.e., a factor 
allocation effect) in the export good, where domestic resources are redistributed in 
response to changes in relative price signals. 
 
 
Imports 
 
 
 
        Md’
IC              IC’ 
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Figure 4.10: An Improvement in the Terms of Trade 
                   Xd       Xd’ X1           X2               Exports 
 
 
In the model, the terms of trade is calculated as the ratio of the price indices PSWr and 
PDWr for tradables. The expression PSWr is the price index received for all tradables 
produced in region 'r' including ‘sales’ of savings to the global bank. The price index 
PDWr reflects prices paid for tradables by region 'r', including investment from the 
global bank. In linear form, the terms of trade are given as: 
 
 
        (W.1) rrr pdwpswtot −=
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Gross Domestic Product 
In the model, gross domestic product (GDP) or output in the economy is calculated 
using the expenditure approach, (i.e., C+I+G+[X-M]). Calculation of GDP is broken 
down into value (vgdpr), price (pgdpr) and real quantity (qgdpr) indices: 
 
 rrr qgdppgdpvgdp +=      (W.2) 
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 If primary factor endowments are fixed within an economy, then changes in vgdpr will 
typically be dominated by changes in the price index of GDP (pgdpr), which can be 
thought of as a measure of general prices in each region (inflation). Moreover, with 
fixed endowments, any change in qgdpr determines the ability of the economy to 
reallocate its primary resources efficiently. Thus, increases (which will typically be 
very small) in qgdpr are a direct measure of the efficiency gains to a particular region.  
 
4.2.3 Equivalent Variation 
The value of equivalent variation (EV) is defined by Varian (1990), who asks the 
question,  
 
“how much money would have to be (given) taken away (to) from the consumer before 
the price change to have him as well off as he would be after the price change”, 
(pp.249).  
 
In the model, the EV is calculated as: 
 
 rrr u
INCEV ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
100
      (W.3) 
 
where INCr is the level of income (=expenditure) in benchmark period (pre-shock) 
prices, and regional utility (ur) is a linearly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas aggregate of 
private (upr) and government (ugr) household utilities and savings demands (qsaver). 
Thus, the percentage change in regional utility (real income) from the benchmark 
position is converted into a monetary value from (W.3). The key difference here from 
Varian’s (1990) interpretation of EV is that the welfare gain is actually realised in pre-
change prices in the model structure vis-à-vis the case where it is merely a 
compensatory amount to leave the consumer on the same level of welfare. For example, 
a positive EV figure is the real income gain, in pre-shock (benchmark) prices, which 
allows an economy to attain a higher level of regional utility. The model calculates 
world EV (WEV) as the summation of each of the regions' EV values: 
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∈
=
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rEVWEV
 
PART II - The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Database 
4.3 Introduction 
As shown in part I of the chapter, CGE models use neo-classical behavioural concepts 
such as utility maximisation and cost minimisation to characterise the workings of the 
economy. Subsequent questions posed are answered by the interaction of economic 
agents within each market, whereby an outcome of the model is characterised by a new 
set of interdependent (counterfactual) equilibria. To ensure that the model obeys the 
Walrasian laws of general equilibrium, a large system of accounting identities (see 
Hertel, 1997) are required to guarantee that households and producers remain on their 
budget and cost constraints respectively and that zero profits prevail in the product, 
investment and transport sectors in the model. The concept of a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) enters the discussion since a SAM,  
 
“represent(s) in numerical form all of the constraints inherent to a general 
equilibrium model, including the budget constraints of the actors in the 
economy and the physical and financial constraints of the system” (pp.78, 
Roberts, 1992).  
 
 
A SAM represents the perfect data set upon which to base a CGE model application, 
although, in practice, the data requirements for the construction of a detailed SAM for 
each of many trading countries/regions, as well as the accompanying inter-linking trade 
data are simply not available. It is for this reason that many multi-region CGE 
applications favour the use of input-output (I-O) data, where most of the important 
elements in the economy are present without much loss of accounting detail. 
 
One alternative to building a consistent database is to resort to using an existing 
database. One such example is the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) which was 
established in 1992. The GTAP is dedicated to the development and support of a global 
research network, data base, and modelling framework for the analysis of international 
trade, environment and resource issues. In its entirety, the GTAP consists of several 
components: 1) a fully documented, publicly available, global data base; 2) software for 
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manipulating the data; 3) a global network of researchers with a common interest of 
multi-region trade analysis and related issues and; 4) a consortium of national and 
international agencies providing leadership and a base level of support for the project 
(Hertel, 1997). 
 
The GTAP database is a global data-set which combines detailed bilateral trade, 
transport and protection data characterising economic linkages between regions, 
together with individual country I-O databases which account for intersectoral linkages 
within regions. In their most recent incarnation (version 4), the GTAP data represent the 
world economy for the year 1995 and cover 45 regions/countries and 50 
commodities/sectors. 
 
This application follows the latter approach by adopting an existing global dataset; 
however, before turning attention to data construction, reconciliation and accounting 
conventions within the GTAP database, some attention is given to the usage and 
conventions of SAMs and their relationship with the input-output table which forms an 
important data source for many multi-region CGE data sets. 
 
4.4 A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
The SAM gives a complete, consistent and comprehensive picture of how the various 
actors in the economy interact at a certain point in time – the base year. King (1981), 
defines a SAM as,  
 
“a series of accounts in each of which incomings and outgoings (or revenue and 
expenditure) must balance. Furthermore, what is incoming into one account 
must be outgoing from another account” (p.1).  
 
The rows and columns in a SAM designate revenues and expenditures respectively. For 
example an entry in row ‘i’ and column ‘j’ is an expenditure by account ‘j’ which is 
simultaneously a receipt by account ‘i’, where row and column totals for each 
corresponding account must balance such that incomes equal expenditures.  
 
Given that the number of rows and columns are identical, a SAM is a square matrix. 
The size of this matrix can theoretically be adjusted by further (dis)aggregation to cover 
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whatever level of economic detail is required although, in practice, highly disaggregate 
levels require extreme amounts of time, raw data and effort.  
 
An illustrative example of a SAM framework (for Thailand, Drud et al., 1980) is 
provided below in table 4.1. Typically, it is possible to aggregate the rows and columns 
into 5 separate account types:  
(1) factor accounts; 
(2) institution accounts; 
(3) production activity accounts; 
(4) commodity accounts; 
(5) Rest of the World (ROW) accounts.  
 
Thus, in table 4.1, row (i) shows that the aggregate factor receives payments of 176 
from agriculture, 153 from manufacturing and 273 from services. From the total of 602, 
15 units are factors owned abroad, (the negative sign in row (i) shows outflows from 
the domestic economy paid to the ROW account) giving net total domestic factor 
payments of 587.  
 
The domestic factors of production are assumed to be owned by 'institutions'. 
Institutions are split into one public account for government (iv) and two private sector 
accounts for households (ii) and companies (iii). Account (v) is a 'combined' capital 
account which shows the collective investments and savings for each of the three 
institutions.  
 
In column 1, households receive 520 units in wages and 'unincorporated business 
profits', manufacturing receives 'private-sector corporate profits' of 63 and the 
remaining 4 units go to government owned 'state enterprises'. All the elements in the 
intersection of rows and columns 2 to 4 are payments between institutions and are 
classed as 'transfers' or incomes not directly received through production. For example, 
payments to government may include direct taxes on households and companies as well 
as social security and pension fund payments and dividend payments by firms.  
 
Outlays or Expenditures  
 Institutions Production   
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Factors Current a/c Capital Activities Commodities row  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  
Incomes/receipts  HH C G  A M S A M S  total 
Factors i      176 153 273    -15 587 
520  4 1        5 530 
63 6  10         79 
Current a/c: HH ii 
                    C  iii 
                    G  iv 4 9 10      6 48 17 3 97 
Capital a/c       v  72 65 3        49 189 
        301    301 
         521   521 
Activities:  A   vi 
                  M  vii 
                  S   viii           448  448 
 132   19 22 47 12    77 309 
 193  8 170 40 232 49    59 751 
Commod:  A   ix 
                  M   x 
                   S   xi  118  75  63 89 114    32 491 
row                 xii         2 182 26  210 
total 587 530 79 97 189 301 521 448 309 751 491 210  
HH=Household;C=Companies;G=Government;                                                  
A=Agriculture; M=Manufacturing; S=Services. 
  Table 4.1. A SAM for Thailand in 1980 (Units: billions of baht) 
     Source: Drud et al. (1986) 
 
In return, the government may pay out pensions or social security payments, interest 
service payments on the public debt and a range of subsidies to private firms. Payments 
are also made from firms to households in the form of capital returns (it is assumed that 
households own factors) and private corporate pensions. Finally, both households and 
government may also receive (non-factor) transfer income from abroad (column 12). 
These incomes are recorded as 5 units and 3 units respectively in rows ii and iv in table 
4.1.  
 
Total institutional income is distributed as expenditures in columns 2 to 4. As well as 
expenditures on transfers between sectors, income also goes on commodity 
consumption as recorded in rows ix, x and xi. Any income which is not used on 
transfers or commodity expenditure is saved (row v). Thus, total domestic savings are 
140 (72+65+3). Finally, added to domestic savings are foreign savings (which are a 
deficit to the external balance of payments) of 49.  
 
Thus, total savings are 189 which in column 5 is distributed between manufacturing 
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sector commodities (e.g. buildings, machinery etc.) and, to a lesser extent, agricultural 
sector commodities (e.g. seeds, trees etc.). These payments are more commonly known 
as investment and by definition must equal the corresponding row total, or total savings.  
 
The next set of accounts pertain to the production activities of each of the 3 institutional 
sectors. The activities (rows vi to viii) deliver their output to the commodity accounts 
(columns 9, 10, 11) in exchange for payments. This is known as the make matrix and 
shows the domestic commodity supplies of 301, 521 and 448 for agriculture, 
manufacturing and services respectively. To produce these outputs, each sector 
requires, from each column, inter-industry inputs (commodities) which are shown in the 
absorption matrix (intersection of rows ix to xi and columns 6 to 8) as well as primary 
factors (intersection in row i and columns 6 to 8) as discussed above.5  
 
The commodity accounts columns (9 to 11) record the disaggregation of commodity 
source values over domestic production, tax revenues to the government, and imports. 
The corresponding commodity row accounts show the composition of each 
commodity’s receipts, made up of final and intermediate demands, investment and 
exports. Clearly, the value of receipts on each commodity must equal the corresponding 
supply value. 
 
The final account in this matrix is the external sector or ROW account. The in-goings 
to this account are the imports in row xii paid by the commodity accounts totalling 210 
billion baht. The out-goings, recorded in column 12, are the payments made by the 
external sector for exports of each commodity, (77, 59 and 32), which means that the 
balance of payments is in deficit by 42 billion baht. This deficit is increased with net 
factor payments abroad of 15 units and offset slightly by 'net non-factor income 
receipts' of 8. Thus, the overall deficit is 49 billion baht which is entered into the 
combined capital account row v as foreign savings. 
 
The level of commodity/activity/institutional detail within a SAM may be increased 
considerably. For example, institutional accounts could be further disaggregated to 
                                                 
5 It is assumed that when a sector uses its own output as an input in the absorption matrix, it is included 
in the output figure (i.e. “gross output” vis-à-vis net output) in the accounts. This convention is also 
followed in the GTAP database. 
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include separate households and firms, production factors may be disaggregated into 
land, labour and capital and, if possible, labour may be presented by type (e.g. 
skilled/unskilled). There is also the possibility of specifying the ROW account into 
different regions, or even countries, each with 6 account types, as specified here, in an 
attempt to make more explicit the transactions between the domestic economy and the 
ROW. Many of these improvements are, however, subject to data availability and 
resource constraints on the part of the SAM modeller.  
 
4.5 Input-Output Data 
The input-output (I-O) matrix shows the source of each industry's inputs (the column 
elements) and the dispersion of industry output (the row elements). The I-O matrix 
contained within the SAM in table 4.1 is presented in table 4.2. In practice, the I-O 
matrix is formed by supplementing the ‘absorption’ and ‘final demands’ matrices of the 
SAM with primary factor payments (row 1), indirect taxes (row 4) and imports (row 
12). Thus, an I-O matrix is subsumed within a SAM, whereas a SAM expands on the I-
O accounts to include a complete specification of the circular flow of income in the 
economy.  
 
 
 Absorption Matrix Final Demands Matrix 
Activities 
Commodities 
A M S Sub-Total C I G X Total 
A 22 47 12 81 132 19 0 77 309 
M 40 232 49 321 193 170 8 59 751 
S 63 89 114 266 118 0 75 32 491 
Sub-Total 125 368 175 668 443 189 83 168 1551 
Factors 176 153 273 602      
Indirect Taxes 6 48 17 71      
Imports 2 182 26 210      
Total 309 751 491 1551      
Table 4.2. An Input-Output Matrix for Thailand in 1980 
Drud et al., (1986) 
 
 
Multi-country, multi-sector CGE models characterise many regions/countries at the cost 
of some degree of individual economy detail. Since the data required for the 
development of SAMs for many trading partners are simply not available, this forces 
the researcher to work with a lesser degree of detail, which favours the use of I-O 
tables. For example, the GTAP data has global coverage and therefore relies heavily on 
the use of I-O accounts as well as statistics on bilateral gross trade flows and trade 
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protection data.6 Thus, it is easy to imagine how the degree of effort required to build a 
data-set of this size may only be feasible in cases where large teams of modellers are 
involved, perhaps backed up by consortium support from organisations such as the 
World Bank.  
 
The next section briefly discusses some of the issues involved in reconciling these data 
sources within the benchmark GTAP data framework. Section 4.7 examines some of the 
extra data supplied in the GTAP package pertaining to commodity/region groupings 
(sets data) as well as the behavioural parameters (elasticities) used in this study.   
 
4.6 Building the GTAP Database 
Version 4 of the GTAP database consists of 45 regions/countries and 50 producing 
sectors. Each region is based on an I-O table and these are connected by a set of 
bilateral trade data flows (including transport margins) and protection data matrices. 
The sections that follow briefly discuss each of these data sources in turn. Much of the 
discussion in this section follows Hertel (1997). 
 
4.6.1 The GTAP I-O Data 
The starting point is a set of I-O tables for the various countries (if available), which 
will be recorded in different currencies and for different years. Each I-O table needs to 
be based on a consistent structure and sectoral classification, ready to be updated to a 
given base year (1995). The production structure assumes that all inputs are positive 
which disallows the existence of negative flows.7 The sectoral balance restriction on 
costs and sales implies that the I-O data (and the GTAP database) must have the same 
sectoral classification for industries and commodities.  
 
The GTAP data base tracks the value usage of each import commodity by each using 
sector/household for both intermediate and final demands. While there are those I-O 
tables which supply such information, other source tables provide less than full 
information, providing perhaps only imports by user or by commodity, but not both. 
                                                 
6 That is, records of both imports and exports along a given bilateral trade route, as opposed to net trade 
flows more commonly employed in partial equilibrium data – This is better suited to intra-industry CGE 
trade models. 
7 An example of a negative flow is the sale of scrap by households to industry, which in the I-O table 
may be treated as ‘negative’ sales by industry to households. 
 
 122 
Thus, if sufficient information on the breakdown of users of commodity ‘i’ is not 
provided, it is assumed that the expenditure share of each commodity ‘i’ imported to a 
given region is shared out in proportion to the size of the sector. If the source I-O table 
only provides total imports by user (i.e., sector/household), but no decomposition of 
each user’s imports by commodity, then the GTAP trade data shares are used for each 
agent. Thus, one would use the by-commodity trade shares for a region and map them 
identically to each agent within the region. Finally, to match by-category and by-use 
import data requires the use of a Row And Sum (RAS) adjustment technique such that 
the data row and column accounts of the I-O table become mutually consistent.  
 
Another issue is that some I-O tables provide imports at tax inclusive prices, which is 
compatible to the GTAP import usage data, whereas others do not and have a separate 
data entry for total import taxes by user. The rule used for dealing with this is to divide 
the total duty figure for each user in proportion to the size of the expenditures on each 
commodity by that user to derive a GTAP compatible data entry. Finally, in the case of 
agriculture, many of the source tables do not identify the land factor explicitly, it 
usually being aggregated with capital. In these cases, outside sources are used, where 
possible, to determine the cost shares of capital and land in agriculture. In the absence 
of such data, an arbitrary 50/50 split is imposed between capital and land in agricultural 
sectors. 
 
There are a number of regions in the GTAP data where detailed I-O information is not 
available. Using techniques proposed by Calder et al.(1993), it is possible to base a 
country’s average patterns of production, consumption and savings on a country for 
which I-O data are already available. This comparison is made by observing similarities 
in per capita GDP and, as a subsidiary criterion, the production structure of the 
economy. The former criterion has practical application if one refers to Engel’s Law, 
where countries with lower per capita incomes are expected to spend larger proportions 
of their budget on food. This implies that countries with similar per capita incomes 
have similar budget shares, particularly in food related sectors.  
 
Thus, one first identifies all the countries in each the composite regions where no I-O 
data is available. Then, employing (primarily) per capita data, it is possible to match 
these countries with individual ‘anchor’ countries already in the GTAP database for 
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which I-O data is available (Gehlhar et al. 1996). Thus, within a given composite 
region, each ‘anchor’ may have several individual countries attached to it. Weights are 
then assigned to each anchor based on the GDP share contribution of all the countries 
associated with the anchor in total GDP for the composite region. Anchor countries 
which are not fitted to any countries within a region are given a zero weighting 
 
Having calculated these weights for each of the anchors, it is then possible to use the 
known I-O tables to calculate the I-O parameters for each composite region using 
‘linear approximation’. For example, to calculate the average propensity to save in a 
composite region, the assigned weights of each of the anchor countries are multiplied 
by their respective savings propensities: 
 
        (DAT.1)  ∑=
r
rr sws
*
 
 wr - The share weight of the rth anchor. 
 sr - The savings propensity calculated for the rth anchor. 
 
This weighted average becomes the savings propensity for the composite region.  
 
This procedure is repeated to calculate other parameters for the composite regions. 
Moreover, the nature of the procedure makes newly generated tables consistent with the 
rest of the GTAP data base, although a valid criticism would be the lack of criteria in 
linking countries for which little I-O data are known to their respective anchors. 
Version 4 of the database is a considerable improvement in this respect, insofar that the 
number of individual countries in the GTAP data has been increased (from 18 to 32 
including the UK (Hubbard, 1998) which reduces the size of the composite regions 
while simultaneously enhancing the portfolio of countries with which to approximate 
the remaining countries’ unknown I-O structures. 
 
4.6.2 The GTAP Trade Data 
The GTAP trade data are based on the United Nations D-series trade statistics which 
form a complete data set with a significant level of commodity and country coverage. 
Combining the trade estimates of the USDA and the UN data at an aggregation level of 
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4 SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) digits creates a platform for the 
GTAP trade data.  
 
Reconciliation of the trade data is on a bilateral basis and involves comparing a 
county’s reported exports (imports) with the partner’s reported imports (exports) with a 
view to identifying differences in value. Thus, if equation (DAT.2) below is true for a 
bilateral trade flow from region ‘r’ to region ‘s’: 
 
        (DAT.2) srisri MX ,,,, =
 
where   Xi,r,s - reported exports of commodity ‘i’ by region ‘r’. 
 Mi,r,s - reported imports of commodity ‘i’ by region ‘s’. 
 
then there is a consistency in the trade data.  
 
The GTAP reconciliation method (for a detailed discussion see Hertel 1997) involves 
identifying a subset of the ten most consistent exporters (MCE) and most consistent 
importers (MCI).8 The MCE and MCI criteria is based on those reporters with the least 
percentage of missing values in total transactions. Once these top ten import and export 
reporters are found, they are placed into ‘peer evaluation groups’. A reliability index 
(RI) is then constructed based on the proportion of accuracy of each country’s bilateral 
trade flows with the peer evaluation group. 
 
Each bilateral trade flow used in the GTAP data is then based on the RI through the use 
of accuracy weights. Thus, where a reliable reporter trades with an unreliable reporter, 
unadjusted data from the former is employed. In the case where two unreliable reporters 
are trading with each other, econometrically derived bias estimates are used to adjust 
the data.   
 
Once the data flows are finalised, a matrix balancing technique is used to set the trade 
                                                 
 
8 However, it has been found that countries tend to report import statistics more accurately than export 
statistics, due to the fact that many governments keep stricter records of imports for the purpose of 
levying tariffs, whereas reliable export records may only be apparent in those less frequent cases where 
an export subsidy/tax is employed. 
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data to predefined totals. The objective of this approach is to preserve the most reliable 
reconciled trade data whilst making changes to any unreported trade flows. Moreover, 
weights based on the RI are used to ensure that those trade flows reported by more 
reliable reporters are changed less than the poorer reporting partner’s exports.  
 
4.6.3 GTAP Protection Data 
The data sources for quantifying support policies such as the producer and consumer 
subsidy equivalent (PSE and CSE) estimates provided by the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Economic Research Service (ERS) of 
the US Department of Agriculture, provide most of the data for countries (including 
composite regions) within version 4 of the GTAP database. Thus, estimates of output 
subsidies are based on PSE calculations by the OECD for the year 1995. Moreover, 
declarations on trade protection instruments to the GATT by member countries are also 
included in the derivation of GTAP export subsidies and import tariffs, where in the 
case of the latter, all non-tariff barrier protection is approximated through the ad 
valorem tariff equivalent.  
 
4.6.4 Updating the GTAP Data  
The final tasks are to update the GTAP data base to a common year and to balance the 
data with the trade and protection data sources. The update is achieved using a 
technique developed at the Australian Industry Commission (James and McDougall, 
1993) which shocks key economic variables to match the economic conditions in the 
base year (1995), which are based on a variety of external data sources examining GDP, 
private and government consumption and investment. These shocked economic 
variables are as follows:  
1) exports by commodity; 2) imports by commodity; 3) aggregate household 
consumption expenditures; 4) aggregate government spending; 5) aggregate 
expenditures for gross capital formation; 6) import tariffs; 7) export subsidies and; 8) 
production subsidies/taxes.  
 
All values of other economic variables in the economy are calculated in response to 
these shocks under conditions of market clearing and zero profits.  
 
4.7 Sets and Parameter Data 
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4.7.1 Sets Files 
The function of the sets file is to enumerate the GTAP regions, commodities and other 
sets used in the model framework. Thus, the arrays in the GTAP sets file are as 
presented in table 4.3. 
 
Header Dimension Description 
H1 r Regions (REG) 
H2 t Traded Commodities (TRAD_COMM) 
H3 s+m+t+1 Non-saving commodities (NSAV_COMM) 
H4 s+m+t Demanded commodities (DEMD_COMM) 
H5 t+1 Produced commodities (PROD_COMM) 
H6 s+m Endowment commodities (ENDW_COMM) 
H7 s Sluggish endowment commodities (ENDWS_COMM) 
H8 m Mobile endowment commodities (ENDWM_COMM) 
H9 1 Capital endowment commodity (CGDS_COMM) 
                m – number of primary factors perfectly mobile across industries 
                 r – number of regions 
   s - number of primary factors not perfectly mobile across industries 
   t – number of tradable commodities 
Table 4.3 Arrays in the GTAP Sets File 
 
The first array (H1) gives a list of regions in the model. H2 lists those commodities that 
may be traded across regions (this is in contrast with non-tradable primary factors). 
There are five endowment commodities in version 4 of the GTAP database (land, 
unskilled and skilled labour, capital and natural resources) which are listed in H6. In 
this model, a capital goods produced commodity is indexed in H9 for use in 
implementing the investment theory in the model.  
 
Header arrays split endowment commodities into two groups, classified by sectoral 
mobility. In the standard implementation of the model, the long run approach is taken 
where labour types and capital are classified as mobile (H8), with land and natural 
resources classified as ‘sluggish’ or immobile between sectors (H7). For short run 
simulations, users may want to move capital from H8 to H7. 
 
The remaining arrays are provided to aid implementation of the model. The non-savings 
commodities (H3) comprise all endowments and traded commodities as well as an 
investment good. Demanded commodities are a subset of H3 and contain only 
endowments and traded commodities. Finally, produced commodities are placed in 
header H5, and include all traded commodities and the capital goods producing sector 
which meets investment demand. An example of the set arrays for a three region 
(REG), three tradables (TRAD_COMM) aggregation is provided in figure 4.11, which 
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includes five primary factors (ENDW_COMM), of which two are sluggish 
(ENDWS_COMM) and the remaining three are perfectly mobile (ENDWM_COMM) 
between using sectors. 
 
REG – European Union, United States of America, Rest of the World 
TRAD_COMM – agriculture, manufacturing and services 
NSAV_COMM – land, skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, 
agriculture, manufacturing, services, capital goods. 
DEMD_COMM - land, skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, 
agriculture, manufacturing, services. 
PROD_COMM - agriculture, manufacturing, services, capital goods. 
ENDW_COMM - land, skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital, natural resources 
ENDWS_COMM - land, natural resources 
ENDWM_COMM - skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital  
CGDS_COMM – capital goods. 
Figure 4.11: A 3x3 GTAP Sets Aggregation of Version 4 Data 
 
4.7.2 Behavioural Parameters 
The parameter file contains arrays of invariant behavioural parameters, listed in table 
4.4.  
Header Dimension Description 
ESUBD - σD t Elasticity of substitution between domestic 
product and imports 
ESUBM - σM t Elasticity of substitution between imports from 
different regions 
ESUBVA - σVA t Elasticity of substitution between primary factors 
ETRAE - σT s Elasticity of transformation between industries 
RORFLEX r Elasticity of expected rate of return with respect to 
the capital stock 
RORDELTA 1 Dummy parameter used to choose between 
alternative investment theories 
r – number of regions 
s – number of primary factors not perfectly mobile between primary industries 
t – number of tradable commodities (sectors) 
Table 4.4: GTAP Parameter Arrays 
 
4.7.3 Trade Substitution Elasticities 
The discussion in this sub-section draws on McDougall et al. (1998). The GTAP data 
contain both elasticities of substitution between domestic products and imports, and 
substitution elasticities between imports from different regions.  It is assumed that, for 
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each tradable commodity ‘i’, all agents in all regions display the same substitution 
elasticity. Since the commodity concordance in the GTAP database is identical to that 
of the SALTER (Jomini et al. 1991), and in the absence of any alternative data, the 
most obvious approach has been to adopt the same elasticity of substitution values.9   
 
The values of these elasticity estimates represent a trade off between econometric 
evidence and prior belief. Econometric estimates suggest that these values are quite 
low, although prior belief points to the general notion of weak terms of trade effects 
from changes in commercial policy. If the latter is true, then changes in demand 
patterns for imports will not have significant effects on prices.  
 
Thus, a weak terms of trade effect implies that the source substitution elasticities are 
quite high, where changes in import demands in ‘n’ import space, result in small pivots 
of the budget line (i.e. small relative price changes between import and export 
commodities). The final SALTER settings adopted here represent a trade off between 
econometric estimates and a priori belief, where the elasticities are generally higher 
than the former, but are still low enough to generate significant terms of trade effects. 
 
Another aspect of the SALTER compromise is the divergence between domestic-import 
and import-import elasticity estimates. Much of the econometric evidence relates to 
domestic-import values, whereas low terms of trade effects result from the import-
import substitution parameters (i.e. if these values are high, than region ‘r’ can displace 
other regions in its export markets without large reductions in the export price). Thus, 
by setting the import-import substitution elasticities higher than the domestic-import 
equivalents, it is possible to reconcile the idea of lower econometric estimates, whilst 
maintaining weak terms of trade effects. Having reviewed the sparse literature on 
import-import substitution estimates, the SALTER team concluded that these might 
plausibly be set at double the levels of the domestic-import estimates. 
 
4.7.4 Factor Substitution Elasticities     
The GTAP model’s CES production structure is typical of many CGE multi-region 
production frameworks. The substitution possibilities between composite value added 
                                                 
9 The SALTER project is a complete model and database characterisation of the Australian economy 
funded by the Australian Industry Commission. 
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and intermediate inputs within each sector is Leontief, while primary factors of 
production are assumed to substitute for one another according to a CES elasticity 
parameter - σVA. The size of this parameter effectively determines the supply response 
of each sector to changes in commodity prices, particularly in those cases where certain 
endowments are sluggish (see next section). For example, with land characterised as 
sluggish in primary agricultural sectors, the ability of agriculture to increase output is 
dependent on the substitution possibilities between land and labour types, and land and 
capital. As with the trade elasticities, estimates of primary factor substitution are also 
taken from the SALTER (Jomini et al. 1991) database.  
 
4.7.5 Factor Transformation Elasticities 
As discussed in section 4.1.3, these elasticities characterise the degree of primary factor 
mobility between using sectors. Moreover, the size of the elasticity of transformation, 
σT < 0, determines the size of the disparity between sectoral returns to the sluggish 
factor. Thus, if σT is close to zero, then the allocation of factors between sectors is 
nearly fixed and unresponsive to changes in relative returns. The parameter, σT may 
take on larger negative values until at the limit, σT = - ∞, the factor is perfectly mobile 
and no differential return can be sustained over the simulation period, in which case the 
factor should be reclassified as perfectly mobile. 
 
4.7.6 Investment Parameters 
In the GTAP model, if the user chooses to allow the allocation of global investment to 
be responsive to regional specific rates of return on capital (RORDELTA =1), then this 
requires a suitable specification of the parameter RORFLEX. For example, if the user 
desires a large responsiveness of international investment to a change in the rate of 
return, then the value of RORFLEX is set closer to zero. Moreover, RORFLEX is 
indexed over regions which allows the user to characterise some countries’ investment 
as sensitive to changes in the rate of return and vice versa. 
 
4.8 Accounting Conventions in the GTAP database 
Having discussed the types of data and reconciliation issues pertaining to construction 
of the GTAP database, the following sub-sections turn to the accounting flows within 
each region’s data which,   
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'track(ing) value flows through the data base from production and sales to 
intermediate and final demands' (Hertel and Tsigas, 1993, pp.2).  
 
Attention is paid to the relative prices at which each of these flows is evaluated as well 
as the presence of distortions in the form of taxes and subsidies. Note that in each of 
figures 4.12 to 4.14, the entries to the right hand side of each of the value flows present 
the corresponding price and quantity units within the GTAP data. A full list of terms is 
presented in the glossary at the end of the thesis. 
 
4.8.1 Distribution of Sales  
The first accounting relationship is the distribution of receipts to regional markets. At 
the top of figure 4.12 is the value of output/sales at agents' prices of commodity 'i' 
(produced by industry i) in region 'r', VOAi,r. Adding a production tax (or subsidy), 
PTAXi,r, gives the value of the same output at market prices, VOMi,r. This value is 
distributed as domestic sales, VDMi,r, exports of 'i' from region 'r' to region 's', 
VXMDi,r,s, and transport services, VSTi,r, 'supplied' to a global transport sector which is 
responsible for the delivery of freight between regions. The value of domestic sales of 
commodity 'i', VDMi,r, is split up into the final demands of the private household, 
VDPMi,r, and government, VDGMi,r, and intermediate demands by each sector ‘j’, 
VDFMi,j,r. This relationship is highlighted at the bottom of figure 4.12. 
 
To convert the export component from market price to 'free on board' (fob) values, it is 
necessary to add a destination generic (specific) export tax, XTAXi,r (XTAXi,r,s). 
Adding the cost of shipping freight, VTWRi,r,s, gives the 'cost insurance freight' (cif) 
value of imports of commodity i, VIWSi,r,s. Including the destination generic (specific) 
import tax in region 's', MTAXi,s (MTAXi,r,s), gives the value of imports at market 
prices, VIMSi,r,s. These imports are combined into a composite regional imported value, 
VIMi,s, and are distributed across final (VIPMi,s, VIGMi,s) and intermediate (VIFMi,j,s) 
uses.  
 
 
 
 
‘Domestic’ Market 'r' 
(i=tradables; r,s=regions)     VOAi,r   :PSi,r .QOi,r
(+ PTAXi,r) 
= VOMi,r   :PMi,r.QOi,r
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:PMi,r.QDSi,r        VDMi,r  VSTi,r    :PMi,r.QSTi,r 
 
VXMDi,r,s   :PMi,r.QXSi,r,s
(+XTAX i,r,s/XTAX i,r,) 
= VXMD i,r,s   :PFOB i,r,s.QXS i,r,s
World Market                        + VTWR i,r,s
= VIWS i,r,s   :PCIF i,r,s.QXS i,r,s
(+ MTAX i,r,s /MTAXi,s) 
= VIMS i,r,s   :PMS i,r,s.QXS i,r,s
   VIM i,s   :PIM i,s.QIM i,s
‘Foreign’ Market 's'              = VIPM i,s   :PIM i,s.QPM i,s
+ VIGM i,s   :PIM i,s.QGM i,s
+ ∑
∈ odj Pr
VIFM i,j,s  :PIM i,s.QFM i,j,s
 
where    VDM(i,r)   = VDPM i,r  :PM i,r.QPD i,r
      + VDGM i,r  :PM i,r.QGD i,r
      + ∑
∈ odj Pr
VDFM i,j,r  :PM i,r.QFD i,j,r
 
Figure 4.12: Distribution of Sales 
 Source: Hertel (1997) 
 
 
4.8.2 Agents in the model 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show how various agents interact in each of these markets. In 
figure 4.13, VPAi,r, represents purchases of ‘i’ by the private household in region 'r' at 
agents' prices. This agents’ value is subdivided into domestic purchases, VDPAi,r, and 
imports, VIPAi,r, both at agents prices. Subtracting domestic and foreign private 
household 'commodity taxes' respectively (IPTAXi,r and DPTAXi,r) from these values 
gives the respective market values, VDPMi,r and VIPMi,r which appear in figure 4.13. 
The same structure is employed for government final demands.  
 
 
Private Households  
    VPA i,r  :PP i,r.QP i,r
 
VDPA i,r :PPD i,r.QPD i,r  VIPA i,r :PPM i,r.QPM i,r
-DPTAX i,r    -IPTAX i,r
         = VDPM i,r :PM i,r.QPD i,r          = VIPM i,r :PIM i,r.QPM i,r
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Government Households 
    VGA i,r  :PG i,r.QG i,r
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VDGA i,r :PGD i,r.QGD i,r VIGA i,r :PGM i,r.QGM i,r
-DGTAX i,r              -IGTAX i,r
         = VDGM i,r :PM i,r.QPD i,r          = VIGM i,r :PIM i,r.QGM i,r
 
(i=tradable; r=region) 
 
Figure 4.13: Sources of Private Household and Government Purchases. 
Source: Hertel (1997) 
  
The value of sectoral purchases, shown in figure 4.14, consists of both tradables 
(intermediate input demands) and primary endowment factors, which are non-tradable 
across regions. The value flow, VFAi,j,r represents the value of purchases of tradable 
good 'i' by sector 'j' in region 'r' at agents prices which is subdivided into domestic and 
composite imported value flows, VDFAi,j,r and VIFAi,j,r respectively. Including the 
effects of domestic (DFTAXi,j,r) and import (IFTAXi,j,r) commodity taxes, gives the 
market value of domestic and composite imported intermediate tradables to sectors in 
region ‘r’, VDFMi,j,r and VIFMi,j,r respectively. Purchases of primary factor non-
tradables are assumed to be supplied by the private household. The value of purchases 
of endowment ‘i’ at agents prices is EVFAi,j,r. Including the primary factor (household 
income) tax on factor 'i' used by industry ‘j’, ETAXi,j,r, gives the market value, VFMi,j,r. 
 
To conclude this subsection, the sales revenues of each sector ‘j’ at agents prices, 
VOAj,r, must be equal to the value of expenditures on all intermediate goods and 
primary factors, which is a zero profit condition (AC.1).  
 
 ∑∑
∈∈
+=
endwi
rji
tradi
rjirj EVFAVFAVOA ,,,,,     (AC.1) 
 
 
 
Intermediate Input Purchases  
    VFA i,j,r              :PF i,j,r.QF i,j,r
 
VDFA i,j,r       :PPD i,j,r.QFD i,j,r VIFA i,j,r :PFM i,j,r.QFM i,j,r
          -DFTAX i,j,r            -IFTAX i,j,r
         = VDFM i,j,r :PM i,r.QFD i,j,r          = VIFM i,j,r :PIM i,r.QFM i,j,r
 
(i=tradables; j=sector r=region)   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 133 
Primary Factor Purchases 
             EVFA i,j,r              :PFE i,j,r.QFE i,j,r
        -ETAX i,j,r
                    = VFM i,j,r              :PM i,r.QFE i,j,r   
(i=endowments; j=sector r=region) 
 
Figure 4.14: Sources of Producing Sectors’ Purchases. 
Source: Hertel (1997) 
 
 
4.8.3 Regional Household 
The next stage is to define the role of the 'regional household'. The regional household 
collects incomes in the form of factor endowment returns (net of regional capital 
depreciation - VDEPr) and taxes between agents and market values as well as paying 
subsidies, (AC.2):  
 
 
    (AC.2) 
∑ ∑∑ ∑
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endwi
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,,,
,
 
 
Regional income is exhausted over private household (PRIVEXPr) and government 
(GOVEXPr) expenditures and regional savings (SAVEr). Thus, the regional household 
is a (Cobb-Douglas) aggregate of all the demand activities of the private and 
government households as well as savings demands. 
 
 
rrrr SAVEGOVEXPPRIVEXPEEXPENDITUR ++=  (AC.3) 
where 
 ∑∑
==
==
Tradi
rir
Tradi
rir VGAGOVEXPVPAPRIVEXP ,,   (AC.4) 
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 4.8.4 Global Transport Sector 
The supply values of transport services (VSTi,r) are assumed to come from the services 
sector in each region in the database which are sold to the global transport sector (VT): 
 
       (AC.5) VTVST
servi regr
ri =∑ ∑
∈ ∈
,
 
 
The base value of bilateral transportation service demands (VTWRi,r,s) is the margin 
between the free on board (f.o.b.) and cost insurance freight (c.i.f.) values of 
merchandise trade. Since there is not enough information to link regional transport 
services to particular commodities and routes, all transport service demand is met from 
total freight supply (VT): 
 
       (AC.6) sriVTWRVT ,,=
 
4.8.5 Investment and Savings 
As in the case of international transport services, the GTAP database does not have 
information pertaining to bilateral investment levels. Hence the approach adopted is to 
assume that the sum of each region’s savings is equal to total global investment, net of 
depreciation: 
 
     (AC.7) [∑∑
∈∈
−=
regr
rr
regr
VDEPREGINVSAVE ]
 
Gross regional investment in each region equals the sum total of all inputs (VOAi,r 
under zero profits) in the capital goods (non-tradable) sector: 
 
       (AC.8) 
cgdsi
VOAREGINV rir
∈
= ,
 
where the index ‘i’ pertains to the capital goods producing sector.   
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4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter gives a description of a multi region CGE trade model and database. In 
part I, attention is given to the neo-classical behavioural equations within the 
production and consumption ‘nests’, as well as stylised behavioural characterisations of 
the global bank and global transport sector. Part I concludes with a brief discussion of 
some of the model’s summary indices (e.g., EV, gross domestic product, terms of trade) 
which are reported later in the thesis. 
 
Part II discusses the types of data sources (SAMs, I-O tables) used in the construction 
in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, as well as some discussion on 
GTAP data reconciliation issues and parameter estimates. The final sections of part II 
give a full explanation of the accounting conventions inherent within the GTAP 
database. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Aggregation and Modelling Issues 
 
The first part of this chapter details the chosen aggregation of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) database used in the final model implementation. The important 
criterion when choosing a suitable aggregation is to prevent the model from becoming 
computationally expensive (i.e. execution times for runs, checking and interpreting 
model results) whilst maintaining as much detail within the aggregation as possible. 
Moreover, for the purposes of this thesis, an appropriate aggregation choice must 
subsume the key sectors of the Common Agricultural Policy (cereals, dairy, livestock) 
as well as the major players in world agricultural markets. Part II discusses the 
techniques employed to explicitly incorporate CAP support instruments as well as 
additional modelling issues pertaining to the Uruguay Round constraints and model 
projections. 
 
Thus, the structure of the chapter is as follows: Sections 5.1 and 5.2 provide the 
rationale for the choice of GTAP sectoral and regional aggregation. Section 5.3 
examines some of the data pertaining to the chosen countrys/regions in the aggregation, 
with coverage of net trading positions, protection and support structures. Section 5.4 in 
part II discusses the rationale behind, and implementation of, the model projections. The 
characterisation of the Uruguay Round is discussed in section 5.5. Section 5.6 details 
the changes to the model framework to explicitly incorporate CAP support policies, 
intervention purchases and the community budget. Section 5.7 concludes. 
 
PART I - Aggregation 
5.1 Sectoral Aggregation 
The study focuses on the effects of varietal preference for food products and imperfect 
competition under conditions of liberalisation of CAP policies. For this reason, the 
commodity coverage should have a clear agricultural and food bias. In particular, each 
of the cornerstone “policy regimes” of the CAP where most support is directed should 
be included (i.e., cereals, oilseeds, dairy, livestock and sugar), with other agricultural 
sectors aggregated into ‘other agriculture’. The individual identified agricultural sectors  
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GTAP commodity                                                                Aggregation
 
wht, Wheat                                             1   wheat 
gro, Cereal grains nec                                 2   ograins 
osd, Oil seeds                                         3   oseeds  
c_b, Sugar cane, sugar beet                            4   sugar 
ctl, Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses            5   catshp 
rmk, Raw milk                                          6   milk 
pdr, Paddy rice                                        7   oagric 
v_f, Vegetables, fruit, nuts                           7   oagric 
pfb, Plant-based fibers                                7   oagric 
ocr, Crops nec                                         7   oagric 
oap, Animal products nec                               7   oagric 
wol, Wool silk-worm cocoons                            7   oagric 
for, Forestry                                          8   oprim 
fsh, Fishing                                           8   oprim 
col, Coal                                              8   oprim 
oil, Oil                                               8   oprim 
gas, Gas                                               8   oprim 
omn, Minerals nec                                      8   oprim 
cmt, Bovine cattle, sheep and goat, horse meat prods   9   meatpro 
omt, Meat products nec                                 10  omeatpro 
sgr, Sugar                                             11  sugarpro 
mil, Dairy products                                    12  milkpro 
vol, Vegetable oils and fats                           13  ofoodpro 
pcr, Processed rice                                    13  ofoodpro 
ofd, Food products nec                                 13  ofoodpro 
b_t, Beverages and tobacco products                    13  ofoodpro 
tex, Textiles                                          14  manu 
wap, Wearing apparel                                   14  manu 
lea, Leather products                                  14  manu 
lum, Wood products                                     14  manu  
ppp, Paper products, publishing                        14  manu 
p_c, Petroleum, coal products                          14  manu 
crp, Chemical, rubber, plastic products                14  manu 
nmm, Mineral products nec                              14  manu 
i_s, Ferrous metals                                    14  manu 
nfm, Metals nec                                        14  manu 
fmp, Metal products                                    14  manu 
mvh, Motor vehicles and parts                          14  manu 
otn, Transport equipment nec                           14  manu 
ele, Electronic equipment                              14  manu 
ome, Machinery and equipment nec                       14  manu 
omf, Manufactures nec                                  14  manu 
ely, Electricity                                       15  serv 
gdt, Gas manufacture, distribution                     15  serv 
wtr, Water                                             15  serv 
cns, Construction                                      15  serv  
t_t, Trade, transport                                  15  serv 
osp, Financial, business, recreational services        15  serv 
osg, Public admin and defence, education, health       15  serv  
dwe, Dwellings                                         15  serv 
 
Figure 5.1 Sectoral Aggregation Mapping 
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are used to incorporate explicit modelling of CAP policy mechanisms (e.g. quotas, 
compensation payments, headage payments). 
 
As well as characterising the key primary agricultural sectors of the CAP, it is equally 
important to capture detail on agricultural product users, in particular the food 
processing sectors. Thus, the final aggregation includes coverage of milk and sugar 
processing sectors, as well as ‘other food processing’ which covers much of cereals 
usage. Intermediate purchases of meat are split up into two food processing sectors, 
‘meat processing’ and ‘other meat processing’, with the former predominantly 
concentrating on the usage of cattle and sheep meat, and the latter covering all other 
livestock products.  
 
Aggregate manufacturing and services sectors are included, as well as an ‘other 
primary’ sector which subsumes all fossil fuel and raw mineral sectors, fishing, and 
forestry.  To accurately characterise variety in food products, each of the food 
processing sectors are characterised as imperfectly competitive. Finally, aggregate 
manufacturing and service sectors are also treated as imperfectly competitive. A full 
sectoral aggregation mapping of the 50 sectors into the chosen 15 is provided in figure 
5.1.  
 
5.2 Regional Aggregation (6 chosen regions) 
From the point of view of this study, an important change within version 4 of the 
database, is the inclusion of the United Kingdom as a separate country (Hubbard, 1998). 
Thus, in modelling CAP policies, the welfare effects of varietal preference and 
imperfect competition from the point of view of the UK, as well as the Rest of the EU, 
may now be evaluated. Inclusion of the USA in the aggregation is based on its 
prominent trade links with the EU. Moreover, both the EU-15 and the USA are large 
players in world agricultural markets (in terms of agricultural trade volumes, domestic 
protection and distortionary policies) and thus serve as important inclusions from the 
point of view of the Uruguay Round. 
 
A further composite region is created for agricultural and food net-exporters, where the 
primary agricultural sector plays a significant role in GDP. These countries tend to be 
members of the CAIRNS group, and are thus aggregated into a composite region. For 
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correct implementation of the Uruguay Round reforms, an LDC composite region is 
created, such that application of the GATT reforms pertaining to LDCs may be correctly 
applied. Finally, a Rest of the World (ROW) region subsumes all remaining  
 
 
                       GTAP Region         Aggregation  
 
  GBR    United Kingdom                   1   UK 
 DEU    Germany                          2   RESTEU 
 DNK    Denmark                          2   RESTEU 
 SWE    Sweden                           2   RESTEU 
 FIN    Finland                          2   RESTEU 
 REU    Rest of European Union           2   RESTEU  
  USA    United States of America             3   USA  
 AUS    Australia                        4   CAIRNS  
 NZL    New Zealand                      4   CAIRNS 
 IDN    Indonesia                        4   CAIRNS  
 MYS    Malaysia                         4   CAIRNS  
 PHL    Philippines                      4   CAIRNS   
 THA    Thailand                         4   CAIRNS  
 CAN    Canada                           4   CAIRNS  
 COL    Colombia                         4   CAIRNS 
 ARG    Argentina                        4   CAIRNS 
 BRA    Brazil                           4   CAIRNS  
 CHL    Chile                            4   CAIRNS   
 URY    Uruguay                          4   CAIRNS 
 VNM    Viet Nam                         5   LDC 
 CHN    China                            5   LDC 
 IND    India                            5   LDC 
 LKA    Sri Lanka                        5   LDC 
 RAS    Rest of South Asia               5   LDC  
 MEX    Mexico                           5   LDC  
 CAM    Central America and Caribbean    5   LDC 
 VEN    Venezuela                        5   LDC 
 RAP    Rest of Andean Pact              5   LDC 
 RSM    Rest of South America            5   LDC 
 MAR    Morocco                          5   LDC 
 RNF    Rest of North Africa             5   LDC 
 SAF    South African Customs Union      5   LDC 
 RSA    Rest of Southern Africa          5   LDC 
 RSS    Rest of Sub Saharan Africa       5   LDC  
 ROW    Rest of World                    5   LDC  
 JPN    Japan                            6   ROW  
 KOR    Republic of Korea                6   ROW   
 SGP    Singapore                        6   ROW  
 HKG    Hong Kong                        6   ROW    
 TWN    Taiwan                           6   ROW  
 EFT    European Free Trade Area         6   ROW 
 CEA    Central European Associates      6   ROW 
 FSU    Former Soviet Union              6   ROW 
 TUR    Turkey                           6   ROW 
 RME    Rest of Middle East              6   ROW 
 
Figure 5.2: Regional Aggregation Mapping of 45 regions into 6 regions 
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 countries/regions. Note that the Rest of the World composite region in the fully 
disaggregated GTAP data does not appear in the Rest of the World mapping in this 
study. This is because many of the countries subsumed within this composite are low 
income countries, which favours its placing in the LDC mapping aggregate. A full 
mapping of the GTAP countries/regions in the final aggregation is provided in figure 
5.2. 
 
5.3 Trade Flows and Protection – 15x6 GTAP Aggregation 
Prior to discussion of the chosen aggregation of the GTAP database, two caveats are 
required. Firstly, in constructing version 4 of the GTAP database, it is necessary to 
aggregate over large numbers of tariff/subsidy lines in order to achieve GTAP sectoral 
concordance. In this respect, the support and trade protection data presented for 
individual sectors, (e.g., wheat, sugar, milk) in the GTAP database is still somewhat 
aggregated implying some loss of detail on specific commodity lines (e.g., durum 
wheat). Moreover, this situation is exacerbated further when model aggregations 
involve composite sectors, (e.g., manufacturing, other agriculture). 
 
Secondly, the creation of composite regions, which in some cases contain countries 
which are fairly consistent with one another in terms of agricultural support and trade 
protection (e.g. EU-14, CAIRNS), can also lead to groupings of very disparate 
economic structures (LDCs, ROW). In the latter case, the data reported here contain 
little meaning, and are reported purely for completeness. 
 
Thus, figures 5.3 and 5.4 show data on regional trade balances and GDP shares for the 
six region aggregation. In terms of regional trade balances, the USA has the largest 
trade deficit ($131 billion, 1995 prices), dominated by its large manufacturing sectoral 
trade deficit. The UK also has a trade deficit ($19 billion), where large net outflows in 
the manufacturing sectors are offset to some extent by a service sector surplus. Overall, 
the EU-14 has a net trade surplus ($58 billion), due to surpluses in the manufacturing 
and service sectors. Finally, the CAIRNS region has a slight deficit ($2 billion), and the 
ROW has the largest trade surplus ($74 billion).  
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Figure 5.3 
 
In figure 5.4, the smallest share of global GDP belongs to the UK (4%), with the USA 
accounting for one quarter. The significance of EU (including the UK) and USA regions 
in the aggregation becomes clear if one adds their respective shares, where they account 
for over half of global GDP. The largest single share belongs to the ROW composite 
region (28%) (although the EU-15 remains the largest single market – 29%), with 
CAIRNS and LDCs on a par (9%). 
 
 
Percentage Share of World GDP
UK
4%EU-14
25%
USA
25%
CAIRNS
9%
LDCs
9%
ROW
28%
Figure 5.4 
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 5.3.1 United Kingdom (UK) and EU-14 
As is evident from figure 5.5, the UK trade balance is dominated by non-food related 
sectors, where manufacturing (-$32billion) and service (+$21billion) net balances are 
significant. Moreover, most of the agricultural and food related sectors are fairly close 
to zero balance, where 54% (GTAP data) of all agricultural and food sector trade 
ansactions come from within the EU. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: (1995 Benchmark). 
rpluses, although both have similar trade 
patterns in the primary agricultural sectors.  
tr
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The EU-14 services and manufacturing trade positions are both in surplus ($88billion 
and $67billion respectively) table 5.6. Where the UK has small deficits in the food 
processing sectors, the EU-14 has small su
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EU-14 Trade Balance by Sector
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Figure 5.6: (1995 Benchmark). 
 
The range of support instruments used in the EU regions is threefold – import tariffs, 
export subsidies and output subsidies. Each of these ad valorem measures captures a 
range of trade protection (variable import levies) and support mechanisms (de-coupled 
payments).  
 
Output Subsidy Export Subsidy Import Tariff  
 US$ 
million 
% of 
output at 
mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
exports 
at mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
imports 
at 
mrkt pri. 
OAGRIC 809 4.75 45 2.65 250 3.24 
OPRIMARY - - - - 11 0.08 
WHEAT 1526 58.02 16 2.73 5 2.99 
OGRAINS 841 53.13 56 11.52 22 5.52 
OSEEDS 536 109.51 - - - - 
SUGAR - - 17 42.33 522 43.14 
CATSHP 1812 22.03 161 32.23 100 34.87 
MILK* 727 8.91 - - - - 
MEATPRO 245 2.95 134 8.54 920 39.17 
OMEATPRO 395 3.14 29 3.30 27 1.05 
OFOODPRO - - 7 0.07 335 2.99 
MILKPRO 541 3.78 368 23.31 371 17.04 
SUGARPRO 116 3.56 158 31.04 763 38.23 
MANUFACTURING - - - - 3680 1.71 
SERVICES - - - - - - 
*milk is a non-tradable commodity  
Table 5.1:  Domestic and Trade Protection in the UK (benchmark 1995) 
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Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show each of the three support and trade protection mechanisms 
within the GTAP database for the UK and EU-14 respectively. The ad valorem output 
subsidies expressed as percentages of total values at market prices in both EU regions 
are considerable, and are predominant in crops sectors and cattle and sheep. A large 
proportion of this support is accounted for by de-coupled payments. 
 
 
 
Output Subsidy Export Subsidy Import Tariff  
 US$ 
million 
% of 
output at 
mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
exports 
at mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
imports 
at 
mrkt pri. 
OAGRIC 7881 4.88 353 0.98 1868 3.26 
OPRIMARY 743 0.56 - - 138 0.12 
WHEAT 7999 58.02 204 4.25 67 1.70 
OGRAINS 8343 53.13 367 8.50 453 9.53 
OSEEDS 4640 109.51 - - - - 
SUGAR - - 94 37.04 236 40.94 
CATSHP 6487 22.03 680 18.03 500 14.01 
MILK* 4407 8.91 - - - - 
MEATPRO 238 0.33 1454 14.58 2295 18.25 
OMEATPRO 330 0.34 652 3.90 299 2.30 
OFOODPRO - - - - 1937 2.56 
MILKPRO 749 0.65 5963 21.38 750 3.94 
SUGARPRO 195 0.53 1442 22.87 625 13.94 
MANUFACTURING - - - - 17397 1.30 
SERVICES - - - - 50 0.01 
*milk is a non-tradable commodity 
Table 5.2: Domestic and Trade Protection in the EU-14 (benchmark 1995) 
 
 
Food processing sectors are also supported and protected in both EU regions (in relative 
terms), particularly the meat, milk and sugar processing sectors. Exports of raw sugar, 
sugar processing, cattle and sheep, meat processing and milk processing are heavily 
subsidised within both EU regions. Substantial tariff revenue accrues in the UK sugar 
and sugar processing sectors, where it is larger in absolute terms than total EU-14 tariff 
revenue. In the non-agricultural/food sectors, the main form of support is the import 
tariff, as well as Variable Export Restitutions (VERs) under the Multi-Fibre 
arrangement which are included as ad valorem export tax rates in the GTAP data (this 
applies to all regions in the chosen aggregation).  
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 5.3.2 United States of America (USA) 
The USA is a large net importer of fossil fuel and manufacturing equipment, although 
has minor sectoral trade surpluses in food related sectors and has a large trade surplus in 
service goods (figure 5.7).  
US Trade Balance by Sector
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Figure 5.11: (1995 Benchmark) 
 
 
 
USA support for agriculture is very dependent on output subsidies which are mostly 
targeted at primary agricultural sectors, although very little support is given to food 
processing sectors. Trade protection is clearly biased towards sugar production and 
sugar and milk processing sectors (figure 5.11). As in the EU regions, there are no 
subsidies in the non-agricultural/food sectors, where import tariff revenues are prevalent 
in the primary resource and manufacturing sectors. 
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Output Subsidy Export Subsidy Import Tariff  
 US$ 
million 
% of 
output at 
mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
exports 
at mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
imports 
at 
mrkt pri. 
OAGRIC 1534 1.82 - - 370 2.60 
OPRIMARY - - - - 117 0.18 
WHEAT 2166 17.60 98 1.74 4 1.74 
OGRAINS 4247 8.52 - - - - 
OSEEDS 1269 7.58 - - - - 
SUGAR 213 8.19 8 38.96 413 38.96 
CATSHP 3433 4.91 0 0.01 0 0.01 
MILK* 931 3.99 - - - - 
MEATPRO - - 0 0.01 0 0.01 
OMEATPRO - - 58 1.75 16 1.75 
OFOODPRO - - - - 1196 6.15 
MILKPRO - - 438 34.11 354 34.11 
SUGARPRO - - 226 38.96 654 38.96 
MANUFACTURING - - - - 18013 2.70 
SERVICES - - - - - - 
*milk is a non-tradable commodity  
Table 5.3: Domestic and Trade Protection in the USA (benchmark 1995) 
 
5.3.3 CAIRNS 
The composite CAIRNS region’s net trade balances for food related sectors reflects that 
all countries within this grouping are agricultural net exporters. There are also large net 
imports (-US$101 billion) of manufacturing equipment.  
 
CAIRNS Trade Balance by Sector
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Figure 5.8: (1995 Benchmark). 
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Agricultural sectors where net exports are particularly significant include ‘other 
agriculture’ (US$17billion), ‘other food processing’ (US$23 billion), and the ‘meat’ and 
‘other meat’ processing sectors (US$6billion and US$3billion respectively). 
 
In the CAIRNS region, levels of output support are typically low, with wheat being the 
only exception. Much of the trade protection is targeted at the food processing sectors, 
with import tariffs being the main source of protection for primary agriculture (table 
5.4). In the manufacturing and primary resource sectors, import tariff protection is 
considerable. 
 
 
Output Subsidy Export Subsidy Import Tariff  
 US$ 
million 
% of 
output at 
mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
exports 
at mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
imports 
at 
mrkt pri. 
OAGRIC 550 0.31 - - 679 5.79 
OPRIMARY - - - - 1444 4.91 
WHEAT 929 7.23 - - 493 15.83 
OGRAINS 262 1.73 43 2.75 868 38.94 
OSEEDS 522 2.85 - - 65 5.93 
SUGAR 173 0.83 - - 145 15.17 
CATSHP 733 2.18 - - 20 3.74 
MILK* 401 2.14 - - - - 
MEATPRO - - 83 1.16 287 17.14 
OMEATPRO - - 1258 23.94 159 17.34 
OFOODPRO - - 867 2.13 2143 11.18 
MILKPRO - - 563 13.29 1209 32.68 
SUGARPRO - - - - 64 4.24 
MANUFACTURING - - - - 42055 8.24 
SERVICES - - - - 49 0.05 
*milk is a non-tradable commodity  
Table 5.4: Domestic and Trade Protection CAIRNS (benchmark 1995) 
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5.3.4 LDCs and ROW 
As noted at the beginning of this section, these regions are aggregates of a broad variety 
of economic structures. Hence, the data reported here are of limited use, although the 
size of the net trading positions and relative support and the trade protective structure of 
these composites in the benchmark are useful when examining simulation results.  
 
LDCs Trade Balance by Sector
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Figure 5.13: (1995 Benchmark). 
 
 
The largest surplus and deficit sectors in the LDC composite region are ‘other primary’ 
(+$61billion) and manufacturing’ (-$64billion) respectively. The ROW net trading 
position is dominated by the manufacturing sector (+$125billion), services 
(+$34billion) and ‘other food processing’ (-$37billion) (figures 5.9 and 5.10). 
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ROW Trade Balance by Sector
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Figure 5.10: (1995 Benchmark). 
 
In the composite LDC region, the main source of protection to the food sectors is 
through ad valorem import tariffs. Agricultural support is a very small proportion of 
output (in those sectors where support is apparent), and most sectors’ exports are not 
subsidised (table 5.5). 
 
Output Subsidy Export Subsidy Import Tariff  
 US$ 
million 
% of 
output at 
mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
exports 
at mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
imports 
at 
mrkt pri. 
OAGRIC - - - - 2734 18.75 
OPRIMARY - - - - 2102 7.04 
WHEAT 832 2.42 - - - - 
OGRAINS 1176 3.64 - - 164 4.20 
OSEEDS 588 1.75 - - 70 4.24 
SUGAR 508 1.58 360 12.64 264 10.64 
CATSHP 105 0.30 - - 36 7.71 
MILK* - - - - - - 
MEATPRO 12 0.05 - - 142 7.51 
OMEATPRO - - - - 159 7.38 
OFOODPRO - - - - 8085 25.41 
MILKPRO - - 1 0.54 537 14.00 
SUGARPRO - - 21 0.68 820 18.36 
MANUFACTURING - - - - 99198 19.11 
SERVICES - - - - 527 0.68 
*milk is a non-tradable commodity  
Table 5.5: Domestic and Trade Protection in the LDCs (benchmark 1995) 
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Finally, support and protection in the ROW is over all three forms of agricultural 
support and protection. Import tariff revenue in ‘milk processing’, ‘wheat’ and ‘other 
grains’ is between 50-70% of the value of total imports, and in the milk processing 
sector, export subsidies are 54% of the total value of milk processing exports (Table 
5.6). 
 
 
Output Subsidy Export Subsidy Import Tariff  
 US$ 
million 
% of 
output at 
mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
exports 
at mrkt 
prices 
US$ 
million 
% of 
imports 
at 
mrkt pri. 
OAGRIC 10089 3.01 689 5.46 4000 10.97 
OPRIMARY - - - - 2517 1.86 
WHEAT 1118 8.33 - - 5959 62.29 
OGRAINS 847 5.58 36 7.98 18389 72.52 
OSEEDS 304 7.24 118 14.92 349 7.70 
SUGAR 753 9.62 12 10.85 1109 39.06 
CATSHP 1532 5.16 135 13.60 429 23.27 
MILK* 4446 11.11 - - - - 
MEATPRO 88 0.25 244 38.11 3153 29.80 
OMEATPRO 214 0.28 534 13.51 4589 29.56 
OFOODPRO - - 811 3.52 7720 11.47 
MILKPRO - - 1696 54.16 4905 50.22 
SUGARPRO - - 91 17.42 2094 33.06 
MANUFACTURING - - - - 42373 4.42 
SERVICES - - - - 3946 1.33 
*milk is a non-tradable commodity  
Table 5.6: Domestic and Trade Protection in the ROW (benchmark 1995) 
 
 
PART II – Modelling Issues 
5.4 Model Projections 
The agreement reached at the Uruguay Round (UR) of trade talks includes a time 
horizon for full implementation of each of the agricultural (and non-agricultural) 
reforms, with Developed Countries (DCs) and Less Developed Countries (LDCs) given 
periods of 6 years and 10 years, respectively, to complete all of their policy 
commitments. For this reason, a series of projections on endowment and productivity 
growth are included in the analysis so as to model the structure of the world economy in 
2005, the first year in which the UR agreement will be fully implemented. Thus, the 
GTAP database is projected 10 years beyond the base year of 1995.  
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 In table 5.7, estimates are presented for forecasted annual growth rates in capital, skilled 
and unskilled labour endowments, real GDP growth and agricultural total factor 
productivity (TFP) rates.1 There are no data available on non-agricultural TFP rates at 
the level of regional and sectoral disaggregation presented in this model framework.  
 
    
Factor Endowment Growth TFP Growth  
Unskilled 
Labour 
Skilled 
Labour 
Capital 
 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Crops Livestock 
UK       -0.17 2.60 3.11 2.08 2.00 2.25 
REST-EU       -0.17 2.60 3.11 2.08 2.00 2.25 
USA 0.97 3.33 2.99 2.73 1.60 1.85 
Cairns 1.77 4.10 5.05 5.03 1.98 2.20 
LDCs 1.75 4.04 6.01 5.39 1.69 2.16 
ROW 0.04 3.46 4.19 3.03 1.80 2.19 
Table 5.7: Annual Growth Rates 
Source: calculated from Frandsen, Jensen and Vanzetti (1998)2
 
 
Model projections for factor endowment growth rates are implemented simply by 
shocking each exogenous endowment ‘i’ in region ‘r’, (qoi,r). Changes in the level of 
TFP are characterised by employing an exogenous shift variable, aoj,r. In the standard 
model framework, technological change exhibits Hicks-neutrality where the production 
function is said to be separable with respect to time. In other words, over time, technical 
change may occur but this has no effect on the marginal rate of technical substitution 
between inputs and therefore the slope of the isoquant (Chambers, 1988, pp.207-8). 
Thus, increases in the exogenous variable aoj,r simulate Hicksian TFP technical change 
by uniformly reducing the value added (qvaj,r) and intermediate input (qfi,j,r) 
requirements for a given level of output (qoi,r). This is shown in the linearised Leontief 
expressions below: 
 
 rjrjrj aoqoqva ,,, −=       (MP.1) 
 
 rjrjrji aoqoqf ,,,, −=       (MP.2) 
                                                 
1 Land and natural resource endowments remain unchanged under the projections. 
2 Crops sectors : wheat; other grains; oilseeds; sugar; other agriculture. Livestock sectors : cattle and 
sheep; raw milk. 
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 where ‘i’ are intermediate inputs and ‘j’ represents each sector in region ‘r’.  
 
The productivity shocks require minor adjustments to the model structure. This is 
because a more direct approach of simultaneously applying the agricultural TFP shocks 
alongside the real GDP shocks results in unrealistically small (endogenous) increases in 
non-agricultural TFP. The reason is that most of the projected growth in GDP is met by 
increases in the endowments. To circumvent this problem, a two stage approach is 
employed. 
 
To allow TFP (aoj,r) for the non-agricultural sectors to adjust endogenously requires the 
creation of a new equation: 
 
 
nonagrj
tfpgrowthao rrj
∈
=,       (MP.3) 
 
where the new variable, tfpgrowthr, is the percentage change in composite TFP growth 
in region 'r'. This variable is endogenised and swapped with the real growth variable 
(qgdpr) to maintain correct closure. In an initial run, this closure is used where 
exogenous endowment and real GDP projections are implemented simultaneously, 
yielding endogenous projected TFP growth rates.  
 
In a second run of the model, equation (MP.3) is eliminated, the assumed shocks for 
agricultural TFP and the projected shocks for non-agricultural TFP growth rates from 
the first model run are implemented alongside the assumed endowment shocks, with 
qgdpr adjusting endogenously to meet these target growth rates. 
 
5.5 The Uruguay Round 
The model characterises the most common features of the Uruguay Round (UR) 
package, namely: 
i) - 36% (24% for LDCs) reductions in agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs and         
converted NTBs 
ii) - 36% (24% for LDCs) reductions in agricultural export subsidy expenditures  
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iii) - 20% (13.3% for LDCs) reduction in agricultural output subsidy expenditures. 
 
Some studies (Jensen et al. 1998; Blake 1999) incorporate endogenous behaviour in the 
modelling of the Uruguay Round reforms. For example, compatibility between the 
export subsidy expenditure and volume (minimum 21% reduction) constraints is 
ensured by imposing simultaneous inequality constraints, where it is possible that one, 
or both constraints may be binding according to changing conditions in each export 
market. Our approach follows the more standard treatment (Francois et al., 1995a, 
1995b; Harrison et al., 1995a, 1995b) of exogenously reducing export and output 
subsidy expenditures by 36% (24% for LDCs) and 20% (13.3% for LDCs) respectively, 
as well as reducing all ad valorem import tariff rates by 36% (24% for LDCs). 
 
5.6 Explicit Modelling of the Common Agricultural Policy 
5.6.1 Sugar and dairy quotas 
In CGE data-sets, it is common practice to characterise a quantitative restriction, e.g. an 
output quota, as a sectoral ad valorem tax equivalent. The problem here is that this 
‘equivalence’ only exists in the benchmark, while subsequent endogenous changes in 
supply or demand will render the tax a poor approximation of the quota. It is for this 
reason that quotas in the ‘raw milk’ and ‘sugar beet’ sectors are modelled explicitly. 
 
Raw milk and sugar beet quotas in the EU are introduced using the price link (in levels 
terms): 
 
 riririri PSTQTOPM ,,,, ).1( ++=     (CAP.1) 
 
where PMi,r and PSi,r are the post and pre-tax prices of raw milk (sugar), TOi,r is an 
output tax rate and TQi,r is a quota tax equivalent rate. Multiplying both sides by a 
common quantity (QOi,r) gives the relationship in value terms:  
 
 riririririri TQVOATOVOAVOAVOM ,,,,,, .. ++=   (CAP.2) 
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where VOAi,r.TOi,r is the 1995 benchmark tax/subsidy value, and VOAi,r.TQi,r is the 
benchmark value of quota rent.3 The net value total of the two wedges is calculated and 
inserted into the 1995 benchmark data-set (see section 7.3.13 below). The levels values 
of the output tax/subsidy (TOi,r) and quota rent (TQi,r) rates are calibrated from (CAP.2) 
above.  
 
Rearranging and linearising expression (CAP.1) gives: 
 
 
       
( ) ( )
ri
ri
riri
ri
ri
riri
riri tqTQ
TQTO
to
TO
TQTO
pmps ,
,
,,
,
,
,,
,, .
1
.
1
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ++−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ++−=      (CAP.3) 
 
where lower case variables are percentage changes in the corresponding upper case 
variables. To simulate the effects of the quota, the quantity (qo) of EU ‘raw milk’ and 
‘sugar beet’ is exogenised and swapped with the quota rent variable (tq). Thus, it is 
possible to simulate a further tightening (slackening) of the quota by shocking the 
exogenous variable qoi,r a further -(+)x%, where quota rent adjusts to market 
conditions.4  
 
In the Uruguay Round simulation, the level of quota output is left unchanged at 1995 
levels, whereas in the Agenda 2000 scenario, a 1.5% increase in the raw milk quota is 
modelled. Under the CAP abolition scenario, milk and sugar output is re-endogenised, 
and quota rents are eliminated.  
 
All EU sectors other than ‘sugar beet’ and ‘raw milk’ maintain the standard price link 
given (in percentage terms) as: 
 
 ririri pmtops ,,., +=       (CAP.4) 
 
                                                 
3 Following Jensen et al. (1998) the initial level of quota rent in the EU is assumed to be 20% of the value 
of purchases of domestically produced milk (sugar) in each EU region by EU dairy (sugar) processing  
firms. 
4 A caveat of this approach is that, by definition, one assumes that the quota is always binding (i.e. qo is 
exogenously fixed to the quota level of output), although this is arguably the case in the EU raw milk and 
sugar markets. 
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5.6.2 Sugar Policy  
In the case of sugar beet, we do not know a priori what proportion of sugar output in the 
GTAP database is under quota (‘A’ and ‘B’ sugar) and not under quota (‘C’ sugar). 
Following the conventions of the EU sugar policy, it is assumed that the co-
responsibility levy on sugar output is enough to offset the cost of surplus disposal of ‘C’ 
sugar. Thus, the sugar sector is self-financing in EU budgetary terms and as such does 
not affect the FEOGA budget. To model the self-financing principle, it is assumed that 
quota rent is sufficient to exactly offset the cost of export subsidies and intervention 
stocks in the sugar sector. In other words, it is assumed that the quota rent on sugar is 
equal to the co-responsibility levy which implies that the agricultural household (section 
5.6.11) does not receive any rent from sugar quota.  
 
5.6.3 Arable Policy 
Perhaps the most important development within the 1992 MacSharry reforms of the 
CAP has been the de-coupling of support payments to farmers. The term ‘de-coupled’ is 
used to describe a support payment to the farm sector which has no effect on output and 
therefore on the volume of trade. Hence, being a non-distortionary payment from a trade 
volume point of view, it is not subject to GATT reforms.  
 
The concept of cross-compliance (for example, where land must be set-aside to qualify 
for the payment), however, leaves compensatory payments as more often recognised as 
partially de-coupled, since to qualify for the payment, the farmer is implicitly taking a 
set of decisions (which affect output level) which would be different if the cross-
compliance were not in place. The modelling approach employed here is closer to the 
latter concept of partially de-coupled support.  
 
5.6.4 Area and Set-Aside Compensation Payments 
External data have been collected for both target area payments and set-aside 
compensation payments in 1995 (table 5.8). The data on cereals area payments are 
allocated to ‘wheat’ and ‘other grains’ sectors in direct proportion to the share of EU-15  
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cereal subsidies accounted for by both sectors in the GTAP data.5 This gives total EU 
area payments of 5,986 million ecu and 5,774 million ecu to the ‘wheat’ and ‘other 
grains’ sectors, respectively.  
 
 1995 Value (Million Ecu) 
EU-15 Cereals Area Payments 11,760 
EU-15 Oilseeds Area Payments   2,010 
EU-15 Set-Aside Payments   2,370 
Table 5.8: EU-15 Area and Set-Aside payments 
Source: Blake et al. (1999) 
 
Arable (i.e. wheat, other grains and oilseeds) area payments are then disaggregated by 
each region’s (UK, EU-14) share of EU-15 sectoral GTAP output subsidy. Set-aside 
payments to all three arable sectors are assigned in the same fashion; first by sector for 
the whole of the EU-15, then allocated to each region. The resulting calculated values 
are presented in table 5.9. Moreover, using the July 1995 ($/Ecu) exchange rate of 
1.3311, dollar values of each of the cereals payments are calculated for the 1995 
benchmark database (see section 5.6.13).  
 
Million Ecu (1995) 
 Area Payments Set-Aside Data 
 Wheat Other grains Oilseeds Wheat Other Grains Oilseeds 
UK     958    531    209 151  84  54 
EU-14 5,028 5,243 1,801 794 826 461 
Sub-Total 5,986 5,774  945 910 515 
Total 11,760 2,010 2,370 
Table 5.9: Area and Set-Aside payments by sector and region  
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
To characterise the nature of de-coupled support, set-aside and area compensation 
payments are stripped out of the output subsidy wedge in the cereals and oilseeds 
sectors in the GTAP database. Area-compensation is re-calibrated as an input subsidy to 
the land factor in each of these EU arable sectors, and the land subsidy drives a wedge 
(i.e., rents) between the market price of land, pmi,r, and the price the farmers pay for 
land (pfei,j,r). Hence support is no longer direct, but is partially removed from 
production in the form of the land subsidy.  
 
                                                 
5 ‘Wheat’ and ‘other grains’ sectors account for 50.9% and 49.1% of total cereals output subsidies to the 
EU in the GTAP database. 
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Set-aside compensation payments (i.e., support for reductions in cereals land area) are 
re-introduced as a totally de-coupled lump-sum payment from the FEOGA budget to the 
agricultural household (see sections 5.6.10 and 5.6.11) in each EU region. Under this 
characterisation, it is argued that set-aside compensation payments are given to the land-
owners rather than to the productive sector.  
 
In each case, the total value of the 1995 set-aside and area payments stripped out from 
the output subsidy does not exceed the benchmark GTAP output subsidy values. The 
residual output subsidy now provides a more accurate measure of direct support and 
accounts for disposal and storage costs, food aid and other forms of CAP cereals 
expenditure. Finally, changes to the level of compensation under Agenda 2000 are 
based on percentage changes between 1995 levels and proposed Agenda 2000 
compensation levels (table 5.10). 
 
Crop 1995 base Agenda 2000 Percentage change 
Cereals 262 Ecu/ha 321 Ecu/ha  22.52 
Oilseeds 438 Ecu/ha 321 Ecu/ha -26.71 
Set-aside 334 Ecu/ha 321 Ecu/ha   -3.89 
Table 5.10: 1995 and Proposed Area and Set-Aside Compensation Payments 
Source: Blake et al. (1999) 
 
 
5.6.5 Characterising Cereals and Non-Cereals Land 
To qualify for arable area payments, a base acreage must have been registered. Thus, 
movements of previously unregistered land into arable sectors do not qualify for area 
and set-aside compensation. This effectively deters large movements of ‘new’ land from 
non-arable to arable uses. Moreover, immobility of the non-cereals/cereals land factor is 
further supported by the fact that much of the livestock land area is unsuitable for use in 
cropping.  
 
To model this immobility the land endowment in both EU regions is disaggregated into 
cereals land (Aland) and non-cereals land (Land) factors. Both types of land factor are 
held within Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) functions, where the degree of 
mobility within each is controlled by the elasticity of transformation (set at unity in the 
simulations that follow).  
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 5.6.6 Modelling Land Set-Aside 
Changes to the level of set-aside are modelled by the addition of land in the cereals 
sectors. This is characterised by shocking the endowment of ‘cereals land’. In table 
5.11, data on compulsory set-aside, five year set-aside and total base acreage are 
recorded for 1995. From these data, it is possible to calculate the actual usage of land 
area in 1995, which is assumed equal to the benchmark area (in value terms) in the 1995 
database.  
 
‘000 ha UK EU-14 EU-15 
1995 Land Area 3,827 42,475 46,302 
(+) compulsory set-aside    597  5,814  6,411 
(+) voluntary five year set-aside      37     811     848 
(=) total base area 4,461        49,100 53,561 
Agenda 2000 voluntary set-aside     131  2,869   3,000 
                      Table 5.11: Set-Aside Levels 
Source: Agricultural Situation in the European Union 
 
To model the Agenda 2000 reforms to land set-aside, our approach follows an EU 
projection that total voluntary set-aside will be 3 million hectares (Blake et al., 1999), 
where all compulsory set-aside is abolished.6 The uptake of voluntary set-aside in the 
Agenda 2000 scenario is assigned using the share of voluntary set-aside uptake in 1995.  
Thus, under the proposed Agenda 2000 reforms, set-aside is now only 5.6% of the total 
EU-15 base acreage in 1995 (compared to the actual 1995 set-aside level which is 
13.6% of total EU-15 base acreage).  
 
To implement the Agenda 2000 proposals, the 1995 benchmark cereals land area is 
increased by 13.14% (8.84%) for the UK (EU-14) to characterise the elimination of 
compulsory set-aside. Under the CAP abolition scenario, all set-aside is abolished and 
the 1995 cereals land endowment in both EU regions is increased up to 1995 base area 
levels.   
 
5.6.7 Headage Payments 
In the GTAP database, all of the de-coupled support to the livestock sector is captured 
within the output subsidy wedge. As with area payments, headage premia are re-
                                                 
6 A full description of the Agenda 2000 reforms are provided in the appendix to this chapter. 
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assigned as input subsidies to capital in the livestock sector, where suckler cows are 
considered as part of the productive capital necessary to produce slaughter animals. 
Moreover, for the same reasons as above, modelling headage payments as input 
subsidies more accurately characterises the partially de-coupled nature of livestock 
support. Finally, capital is mobile in the livestock sector, where the projected ten year 
time horizon in the model is assumed sufficient for cattle farmers to change herd size 
(i.e., capital) in response to changes in the level of compensation (i.e. input subsidy). 
 
The data in tables 5.12 and 5.13 show the headage payment rates and aggregate 
payment ceilings in 1995, as well as proposed changes under the Agenda 2000 reforms. 
EU-15 livestock expenditures recorded in column 4 of table 5.13, are disaggregated 
using regional output subsidy share data. Thus, the share of EU livestock subsidy 
expenditure going to the UK (EU-14) is 21.8% (78.2%), such that the UK (EU-14) 
receives $581m ($2,086m) (calculated by 1.3311/1 $/Ecu) of EU headage subsidy in the 
benchmark year (1995). These subsidies are withdrawn from the output subsidy wedge 
and inserted as capital input subsidies on livestock. 
 
 (Ecu/head) 1995 Agenda 2000 % change 
Suckler Cow 145 215  48 
Male Bovine - bull 135 368 173 
                     - steer 109 232 113 
Dairy Cow    0   70 -- 
Table 5.12: Headage Payment Rates 
Source: Blake et al. (1999) 
 
 1995 
(livestock 
millions) 
Ag. 2000 
(livestock 
millions) 
% Change 1995 
(m Ecu) 
1995 
ceiling 
(m Ecu) 
Ag.2000 
Ceiling 
(m Ecu) 
Suckler Cow   9.976 10.285 3.1 1,046.7 1,446.5 2,211.3 
Male Bovine   9.038   9.095 0.6    957.1 1,102.6 2,728.5 
Dairy Cow   0.000 20.250 --        0.0        0.0 1,417.5 
Totals 19.014 39.630 -- 2,003.8 2,549.1 6,357.3 
Table 5.13: Headage Payment Ceilings  
Source: Blake et al. (1999) and author’s own calculations7
 
Under the Agenda 2000 proposals, there is an addition of dairy cow premia payments 
which increases the 1995 base ceiling expenditure level across the whole of the EU. 
Thus, for the Agenda 2000 proposals, the level of input subsidy capital expenditure in 
                                                 
7 Ceiling limits on headage expenditure are calculated by multiplying headage payments in table 7.6 by 
animal head limits in table 7.7. 
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the livestock sector is increased in proportion to the ceiling expenditure increase. In the 
CAP abolition scenario, all headage payments are eliminated.  
 
5.6.8 Stocks and Floor Prices 
Intervention stocks are designed to maintain the commodity support price between pre-
designated limits and promote price stability. Thus, if there is over-supply, stocks are 
purchased to prevent the price from falling below the floor price. In periods of under-
supply, surplus stocks are used to prevent the commodity price rising too high. Recent 
history of the CAP suggests that the latter has never been an issue. Moreover, purchases 
of stocks have created further problems in terms of storage costs. In the absence of any 
dynamic treatment in the model and in relation to the reason given above, it is solely the 
accumulation of stocks which is included in the model specification. In other words, 
stocks may be purchased, but are not re-sold. 
 
In 1995, market prices were high compared to intervention prices, and stock buying 
only occurred for a few products.8 Since those products affected by stock purchases 
form only small components of the aggregated commodity groupings in the model, it is 
assumed that stock purchases initially start at zero in the benchmark. Stock buying 
occurs in ‘wheat’, ‘other grains’, ‘meat’, ‘other meat’ and ‘milk’ processing sectors. 
 
 
1995 Agenda 2000  
UK EU-14 UK EU-14 
Wheat 78.37 79.13 62.70 63.30 
Other grains 89.93 85.70 71.68 68.31 
Meat processing 95.00 95.00 66.64 66.64 
Other Meat processing 95.00 95.00 66.64 66.64 
Milk Processing 95.00 95.00 85.50 85.50 
Table 5.14: Intervention Price / Support Price Ratios 
Source: Blake et al. (1999) 
 
Data presented in table 5.14 shows how far support prices may fall before reaching the 
intervention price. For example, in the case of the wheat sector in the UK in 1995, the 
price may fall 21.63% before triggering stock buying. In the processing sectors, the 
highly aggregate nature of the commodity categories precludes the availability of price 
                                                 
8 In 1995, stock buying occurred in fruit and vegetables, wine and fishery products. Other storage and 
disposal costs were incurred due to the build up of stocks in previous years. 
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ratio data, where instead a 5% difference between the market and intervention price 
levels is assumed. Following Blake et al. (1999), the Agenda 2000 intervention price is 
also calculated as a percentage of the 1995 market price, given the 1995 ratio and the 
proposed Agenda 2000 changes in intervention prices.  
 
5.6.9 Modelling Stock Purchases 
The demand for stocks is based on falls in the support price (pmi,r). If the support price 
falls to intervention price levels, stocks accumulate. In the model, the demand for stocks 
is given as: 
 
riiri pmSTCKstocks ,, *=      (CAP.5) 
 
where STCKi is the responsiveness of stock buying to falls in the support price. The 
change in the value of stock buying is introduced into the market clearing equation for 
only those tradable commodities, ‘i’, where stocks may accumulate. 
 
Thus, to implement these mechanisms into the model solution, two stages are required. 
An initial run is made where the value of STCKi is zero (no stock buying) and 
endogenous percentage changes in the support price (pmi,r) are checked to see if they 
fall below the intervention price. If the support price falls to the intervention price-
trigger, the elasticity parameter STCKi becomes non-zero in the second stage and is 
iteratively increased until the level of stock buying in the market clearing equation is 
such that the support price falls only to intervention price levels.  
 
5.6.10 The Brussels Household  
Calculating the net budgetary contributions of each EU member state to the FEOGA 
budget requires the inclusion of a “Brussels household” within the model. The Brussels 
household collects revenues from each member state by way of resource (i.e., GDP and 
VAT) contributions and EU agricultural import tax contributions. From these revenues, 
the FEOGA budget meets expenditures on export and output subsidies, area, set-aside 
and headage payments and intervention purchases.9
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Reference to table 5.15 shows that in 1995, the biggest net loser to FEOGA was 
Germany (-12bn ecu), with the UK (after rebate) and France as the second and third 
biggest net losers, respectively. The biggest net gainer from the FEOGA budget was 
Spain, which received 7.5bn ecu more than it paid into the budget. Other significant 
gainers were Greece, Portugal, Belgium and Ireland. 
 
Country Ecu (mill) % GNP Country Ecu (mill) %GNP 
AUS    -883.5 -0.50 ITA -317.6 -0.04 
BEL  2,455.2 1.16 LUX  690.5 4.86 
DEN     471.1 0.37 NL -684.5 -0.23 
FIN   -116.0 -0.12 POR      2,542.2 3.21 
FRA      -1,444.3 -0.12 SPA      7,516.4 1.76 
GER    -12,090.9 -0.66 SWE        -754.1 -0.44 
GRE 3,548.2 4.02 UK     -3,005.1 -0.36 
IRE 2,072.3 4.85 Net Total      0.0 - 
Table 5.15: 1995 Budgetary Balance after UK Rebate 
Source: European Commission (1998) 
 
 
The Brussels household equation is calibrated to external data on the net CAP 
contribution (NETCONTr) by the UK (-3,005m. ecu) in 1995.10 Moreover, since the 
budget balances, the EU-14 net contributory position is assumed to be the exact 
opposite to that of the UK (i.e. +3,005m. ecu). Thus, the net contributory position of 
each EU region ‘r’ in the benchmark is given as: 
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         (CAP.6) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
9 Sugar does not enter the FEOGA budget since the GTAP data shows that the production of sugar is 
taxed. Moreover, all export subsidies are paid by the producer co-responsibility levy, not the EU budget. 
10 At the July 1995 exchange rate of $1.3311/Ecu, this is –$4,000m. 
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In order to reconcile the external data on net contributions to the CAP with GTAP data 
on CAP expenditures and import revenues, the regional resource cost is calculated by 
rearranging (CAP.6) in terms of RESOURCEr. Further, to maintain zero FEOGA profits 
in the counterfactual data, each region has a fixed share of the total EU resource 
contribution, such that percentage changes in total resource costs and each EU region’s 
resource costs are equal. 
  
Where there is a regional net contributory deficit (surplus) in the benchmark, regional 
income will be less (greater) than domestic expenditure in the benchmark by the size of 
the net CAP contribution, NETCONTr. The easiest way to accommodate this change is 
to alter the value of regional savings, which is calculated as the residual of regional 
income minus private and government household expenditures. Since the CAP budget is 
in balance, the overall level of EU-15 savings will not change, such that further data 
modifications are not required. 
 
5.6.11 Agricultural Producers and Asset Holders 
To ascertain the welfare effects on agricultural producers and asset holders (i.e., owners 
of quota) in each EU region, it is necessary to include an agricultural producers’ welfare 
function.11 This should include all factor payments going to the agriculture sector net of 
depreciation on capital assets, plus all forms of EU compensation and quota rents.  
 
It is not possible to determine from the base data what proportion of regional factors are 
owned by the agricultural sector, or indeed what proportion of depreciation expenditure 
is incurred by agricultural sectors. For this reason, the disaggregation of endowment 
ownership into agricultural and non-agricultural sectors is based on GTAP expenditure 
data on each primary factor. Thus, the share parameter 'ηi,r' in (CAP.7), is the proportion 
of total (i.e., all sectors) demands for each primary factor accounted for by primary 
agricultural sectors, where the shares for each factor are multiplied by the corresponding 
total value of each endowment. Depreciation expenditure appears in the GTAP data by 
region. Hence, to approximate depreciation expenditure by primary agricultural sectors, 
                                                 
 
11 This is included only as a summary statistic and as such does not affect the model solution. 
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we use the share of regional expenditure on all factors by all primary agricultural 
sectors, multiplied by the regional depreciation value. 
 
It is assumed that quota rent from the sugar sector exactly covers the cost of surplus 
disposal of sugar on export refunds and stock buying (see section 5.6.2). Hence, netting 
these flows out from the agricultural household function leaves quota revenue accruing 
from the milk sector only. In levels terms, the agricultural household welfare function is 
defined as: 
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5.6.12 Agricultural household welfare 
To calculate the equivalent variation (EV) for the agricultural household, it is necessary 
to determine real changes in agricultural household income. Thus, in percentage change 
form, it is possible to determine the change in agricultural income (yagricr) under each 
of the policy scenarios. Using percentage changes in each EU region’s GDP price index 
(pgdpr) to deflate nominal agricultural income changes gives real changes in agricultural 
household income (yragricr). In percentage change form this is represented as: 
 
      (CAP.8) 
euregr
pgdpyagricyragric rrr
∈
−=
 
Thus, changes in EV for agricultural households and asset holders (AGEVr) are given 
by: 
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∈
=− 0.100/
   (CAP.9) 
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 where AGPRr is the initial value of agricultural income in benchmark (pre-shock) 
prices.  
 
5.6.13 Data Manipulations 
In version 4 of the standard GTAP database, there are no input subsidies or taxes in the 
primary arable and livestock sectors. Moreover, it is not possible to simply introduce a 
new input subsidy wedge and leave the rest of the data unchanged as this destroys 
internal consistency. Hence, this study follows that of Malcolm (1998). Thus, input 
subsidy wedges calculated in sections 5.6.4 and 5.6.7 are calibrated into the benchmark 
data by shocking the exogenous input subsidy/tax variables tfi,j,r. A simultaneous shock 
is also applied to the output subsidy/tax variable toj,r to remove that part of the original 
output subsidy wedge now pertaining to the new input subsidy.12  
 
To correctly calculate the wedge one must calculate the desired shocks. Thus, using the 
output subsidy case as an example, the GTAP data ad valorem subsidy (S) is calculated 
as the ratio of agents’ value (A) to market value (M): 
 
 
M
AS =        (CAP.10) 
 
where if S is greater than unity we have a subsidy and if S is less than unity we have a 
negative subsidy (i.e., tax). If A is 25 and M is 15, then the ad valorem subsidy is 1.667. 
Assume that we wanted to reduce the wedge between A and M from 10 down to 5 such 
that A is now 20, this would imply that S would now assume a new value of 1.333 (S’). 
To calculate the percentage reduction in S to achieve this new wedge, employ the 
formula: 
 
 100*' ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −
S
SS        (CAP.11) 
 
                                                 
12 In the arable sector, the output subsidy is calculated after price compensation has been stripped out of 
the wedge. In the sugar and raw milk sectors, output subsidies/taxes are adjusted to include quota rents. 
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which gives a percentage shock of  -20%. This procedure is repeated for each of the 
output and input subsidy shocks simultaneously and forms the 1995 benchmark data set.  
 
As with any simulation, the model calculates how these shocks affect other flows in the 
model (i.e., the resultant effects on the endogenous variables in the model). However, 
the difference between a normal experiment and the data manipulation procedure is that 
in the former case, model structure, closure and parameter values are chosen to 
represent economic reality as accurately as possible, whereas in the latter case, they are 
chosen to minimise disturbances in the database resulting from exogenous shocks, such 
that the adjusted benchmark data are as close as possible to the original data.   
 
Malcolm (1998) addresses this question by conducting a series experiments using an 
array of model variants. Malcolm finds that allowing all factors to be perfectly mobile, 
keeping the trade balance exogenous and characterising all substitution possibilities as 
Cobb-Douglas, minimises the disturbances in the database. Some changes, such as the 
setting of elasticity parameters equal to one, will maintain the value shares (i.e. any 
price change will be offset by a change in quantity) in each nest thus minimising 
disturbances. Other changes, (exogenous trade balance, perfect mobility of all factors) 
are introduced simply on an empirical basis, where sensitivity testing reveals that such 
additions are beneficial to minimising data changes from the original positions. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter gives an overview of the chosen model aggregation which is tailored 
towards our investigation of CAP costs. The choice of sectoral aggregation is biased 
toward inclusion of each of the key cornerstone CAP commodity regimes (i.e., dairy, 
cereals, livestock). Regional aggregation includes correct implementation of the 
Uruguay Round (UR) reforms (i.e., DC/LDC split) and accommodates the large players 
in world agricultural markets (USA, CAIRNS) which have significant trade links with 
the EU regions. An important factor in the choice of both sectoral and regional 
aggregation is the need to constrain model size such that computational expense does 
not become prohibitive. The second part of the chapter builds on the choice of sectoral 
and regional aggregation by detailing the range of modelling techniques employed in 
our stylised characterisation of the CAP, the Uruguay Round constraints and model 
projections. 
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 Appendix A: A full list of reforms pertaining to the Agenda 2000 proposals 
 
The following lists the changes implemented in the model under the Agenda 2000 
proposals: 
 
• Quota – Raw milk quota to be increased; Sugar quota remains unchanged 
• Set-Aside – All set aside is reduced to voluntary set-aside only. 
• Area Compensation – Cereals sectors undergo increases in area compensation, 
with concurrent reductions in the oilseed area payment. 
• Set-Aside Compensation – All set-aside payments are reduced under the proposals. 
• Headage Payments – The addition of dairy cow premium leads to increases in 
headage premia to the cattle and sheep sectors of the EU-15. 
• Intervention Purchases – Intervention prices are reduced further under the scheme 
• Import Tariffs and Export Subsidies – This remains unchanged from the Uruguay 
Round scenario. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Incorporating Imperfect Competition and Hierarchical 
Preferences 
 
 
This chapter gives a detailed discussion of the stylised modifications required to 
incorporate neo-Hotelling hierarchical preferences (section 6.1) , imperfect competition 
and scale economies (section 6.2) into the standard GTAP model framework. Attention 
is also given to changes in the model structure/terminology employed (section 6.3), as 
well as alterations made to the standard GTAP data files (section 6.4). Section 6.5 gives 
a numerical example and section 6.6 concludes. 
 
6.1 Incorporating Neo-Hotelling Preferences into the Model Structure 
6.1.1 Hierarchical Preferences in a CGE Trade Model 
In the context of a multi-region CGE model which emphasises international trade, we 
assume that a single ‘representative variety’ of a given differentiated commodity is 
produced by each region, where the representative variety is made up of product 
variants within a region. For example, within the United Kingdom (UK), there are 
many different cheeses available, which in this model are combined into a composite 
UK cheese. Preferences are treated heterogeneously by assuming a ‘varietal spectrum’ 
of characteristics, where agents’ preferences are based on how such characteristics are 
combined in the representative varieties.1  
 
Figure 6.1 presents a varietal spectrum, where the ‘ideal’ represents the perfect 
combination of attributes for a particular consumer. Employing the result from the SDS 
model specification in chapter 3, that only a finite number of varieties are produced, 
Vousden (1990) argues that, 
 
“consumers are unable to obtain a good which offers their exact preferred 
specification, and they are forced to consume an available good which comes 
closest to their ideal” (pp160). 
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Thus, each of say 3 regions, the European Union (EU), the United States of America 
(US) and the Rest of the World (ROW), produces a representative variety characterised 
by a combination of attributes (e.g., after sale service, quality, taste, packaging) which 
determines its position on the varietal spectrum. It is assumed that these attributes are 
dominated by the region of origin of the product. As there are only a finite number of 
varieties produced, most agents are unable to obtain a variety which offers their ideal 
specification, but consume an available variety which comes closest to their ideal. 
 
Thus, the variable, QDFi,r,s, represents the consumer's demand in region of destination 
's',  for the representative variety ‘i’ produced by exporting region 'r'.2 Suppose that the 
varietal spectrum pertains to the aggregate consumer in the EU (i.e. s=EU). The 
distance 'V' of each representative variety from zero determines the preference ranking; 
those representative varieties with values of V closer to the ideal are more preferred. 
Thus, in Figure 6.1, Vi,EU,EU is larger than Vi,US,EU, implying that the EU consumer 
prefers the domestic representative variety to the US representative variety. As the 
discussion in chapter 3 indicates, such patriotic purchasing behaviour for food products 
is readily observable (i.e., “Buy British” campaigns).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Zero                                           Ideal 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Hierarchical Preferences 
Vi,ROW,s 
Vi,US,s 
Vi,EU,s 
s=EU 
    QDFi,ROW,s       QDFi,US,s           QDFi,EU,s
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
1 Varietal preferences apply to intermediate demands as well as private household and government final 
demands. 
2 This variable does not appear the final model structure, it is just a general aggregate agent differentiated 
demand variable. Each agent’s demands for differentiated commodities are presented in the modified 
final and intermediate demand nesting structures. 
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Thus, our approach is a variant of the ‘interleaved’ type of preference structure 
(Lancaster, 1984; see chapter 3), where the domestic representative variety (i,EU,EU) is 
substitutable with imported varieties (i,US,EU) and (i,ROW,EU) through the nesting 
structure.3 Our approach also assumes that each firm in those sectors which are 
classified as imperfectly competitive produces a ‘product variant’ of the representative 
variety, i.e., there is a one-to-one mapping between firms and product variants. There 
are two reasons for this approach. First, from an economic point of view, a new firm is 
more likely to succeed in the industry by producing a new product variant instead of 
duplicating an existing one (i.e., firms are trying to capture a niche in the product 
space). Secondly, a firm producing more than one product variant would imply a 
different mark-up pricing rule for each of its products, which would significantly 
enhance model complexity. 
 
 
 
 
        Zero                              Ideal 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Proliferation of Product Variants in the US 
Vi,US,s 
V’i,US,s s=EU 
    QDFi,US,s       QDF’i,US,s      
 
 
The neo-Hotelling approach predicts that proliferation in the number of available 
varieties narrows the gaps between the closest available variety and the consumer’s 
ideal (Vousden, 1990, pp162). In the same way, we assume that product variant/firm 
proliferations within each region improve the position (and possibly the ranking) of the 
representative variety in the hierarchical preference structure since that region now 
offers more variety (within a composite) to the consumer. Thus, in Figure 6.2, a 
proliferation of the US domestic product variants of the US representative variety 
                                                 
 
3 In this model, the term variety refers to the representative variety, not the product variants 
manufactured within a region as is the case in Lancaster. Thus, in this application, the demand 
specification by consumers (i.e., by household and sector) is for the representative variety only. 
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implies that the preference value of Vi,US,EU on the EU consumer’s varietal spectrum 
increases to V’i,US,EU. It is this process that characterises the ‘variety effect’.  
 
In a general equilibrium context, each representative variety of commodity 'i' produced 
by each exporting region 'r' (r=EU, US, ROW) is demanded by aggregate agents in 
importing region ‘s’ (s=EU, US, ROW), albeit with a different preference value across 
each market (i.e. Vi,US,EU ≠ Vi,US,US ≠ Vi,US,ROW). An equal percentage increase 
(decrease) in US varieties/firms will therefore improve (reduce), although in different 
degrees, the standing of this representative variety on each of the varietal spectrums of 
the aggregate consumers in the EU, US and ROW. 
 
6.1.2 Aggregate Preferences 
Consumers of final/intermediate goods may only be disaggregated to a certain level, 
(one for each sector ‘j’, private and government household agents), where further 
disaggregation would involve large numbers of micro-consumers within each market 
(as in the Lancaster (1979, 1980, 1984) approach), and would significantly enhance 
model size and computational expense. For this reason, it is assumed that the preference 
rankings and behaviour exhibited by the final/intermediate consumers reflect the 
preference hierarchies of micro consumers within each market/sector.  
 
6.1.3 Modelling Hierarchical Preferences 
To model such a preference structure, we take our motivation from the Lancaster 
(1984) approach. In general form, utility from the consumption of a representative 
(regional) variety, Zi,r,s, is given as: 
 
 ][ ,,,,,, srisrisri VZZ =         (H.1) 
 
where: 
Zi,r,s - Hierarchical cardinal utility function, 
Vi,r,s – Preference ranking of a representative variety 'i' produced by region 'r' along the 
varietal spectrum of each agent in region 's'. 
 
Our specification employs a levels specific form for the utility function: 
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       (Η.2) [ sisrisri VZ ,,,,, 1 γ+= ]
 
where: 
si ,γ  - Preference heterogeneity parameter for differentiated representative variety ‘i’ in 
region ‘s’.  
 
Note that hierarchical preferences for intermediate demands are indexed by each sector 
‘j’. Correspondingly, levels hierarchical cardinal utilities for the three agents are given 
as ZPSi,r,s, ZGSi,r,s and ZFSi,j,r,s. In the model structure, each of the regional agents in ‘s’ 
have levels preference rankings for each representative variety ‘r’, given as VPi,r,s, 
VGi,r,s and VFi,j,r,s for private household, government and sectoral differentiated 
intermediate good preferences respectively.  
 
Following a similar structure to Lancaster (1991) function (H.2) exhibits two 
characteristics. Firstly, it is strictly increasing in Vi,r,s and secondly, to quote Lancaster, 
 
‘the effect of distance increases as products differ more and more from the 
ideal’ (pp3) 
 
where, in this framework, preferred varieties with higher values of benchmark 
preference (Vi,r,s) give higher amounts of hierarchical utility (Zi,r,s) compared to less 
favoured varieties, although at a decreasing rate. 
 
For agents in each region, the specific levels form of the cardinal hierarchical utility 
function linearises to: 
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     (H.3) 
 
where lowercase letters are percentage changes in the corresponding uppercase 
variables. Following Vousden (1990), increases (decreases) in the number of regional 
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firms/product variants (ni,r) proxy for improvements (deteriorations) in each region’s 
preference ranking (Vi,r,s) representative variety on the varietal spectrum.    
 
The parameter si ,γ  characterises the degree of preference heterogeneity of each agent. 
In other words, how sensitive are final/intermediate consumers to 
proliferations/reductions in the number of product variants and their effect on the 
position of the representative variety on the varietal spectrum. This implies two 
characteristics inherent within the hierarchical utility function.  
 
Firstly, larger values of si ,γ   result in bigger differences in benchmark preference 
utilities between higher and lower ranked representative varieties. This implies that 
consumers have a more strongly defined ranking structure. On the other hand, where 
si ,γ = 0, all representative varieties have the same hierarchical utility value (Zi,r,s = 1) 
which implies preference homogeneity.  
 
 
0                                                       Ideal     Vi,r,s 
Zi,r,s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     1 
 
 
10 , << siγ 
 
 
 
0, =siγ  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Concavity of the Hierarchical Utility Function 
 
 
In this study, we assume that the level of marginal hierarchical utility from the 
consumption of a representative variety diminishes as we move closer to the ideal (i.e., 
incremental proliferations in product variants within representative varieties yield 
smaller improvements in utility). Thus, the preference heterogeneity parameter assumes 
a value between zero and one, which implies that the shape of the levels cardinal 
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hierarchical utility function is concave. In other words, the change in the level of 
hierarchical utility (Zi,r,s) associated with increases in the preference value (Vi,r,s) of a 
representative variety falls. This function is presented in figure 6.3 alongside the case 
where si ,γ  is zero (i.e., preference homogeneity), where the derivative srisri VZ ,,,, / ∂∂  is 
zero.  
 
The second feature is that for values of si ,γ closer to one, proliferations (reductions) in 
the number of regional variants (ni,r) will lead to significant incremental increases 
(falls) in hierarchical utility to agents, vis-à-vis the case of low values of si ,γ (i.e., closer 
to zero), where consumers exhibit ‘sticky’ reactions to changes in varietal diversity of a 
given representative variety. Thus, when, si ,γ  = 0, percentage changes in hierarchical 
utility (zi,r,s) are zero, so Hicksian demands are standardised as functions of prices and 
sub-utility only, (i.e., preference homogeneity). In those cases where si ,γ  assumes a 
value closer to one, the consumer strongly identifies with varietal improvements 
(deteriorations), where, for example, proliferations (reductions) in regional variants of a 
given representative cheese, have big impacts on their choice set (i.e., larger changes in 
zi,r,s) leading to more marked increases (reductions) in purchasing behaviour. Where 
si ,γ  assumes a value close to zero, consumers exhibit more indifference between 
representative varieties, where new variants yield small improvements (deteriorations) 
on the benchmark varietal choice set.  
 
6.1.4 Nesting Structure 
In chapter 3, criticism was levelled at the Armington structure. Our approach follows 
the work of Swaminathan and Hertel (1996) and Francois et al. (1995) in implementing 
a non-nested Armington structure, where the lower import composite nest of the 
Armington framework is eliminated to allow domestic and foreign firm product variants 
to compete directly with one another.  
 
The modified nested structure for final demands is presented in figure 6.4. Examining 
the second level of the nest, composite commodity 1 (i=1….n) is differentiated, and 
commodity n is homogeneous. In the third level of the nest, qdfgs1,r,s and qdfps1,r,s are 
percentage changes in government and private household differentiated demands for 
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commodity 1 respectively. Moreover, in these same nests, each of the foreign (r≠s) and 
domestic (s=s) representative varieties compete directly with each other.  
 
Regional Utility – us 
       
      σ=1 
 
         Govt. utility– ugs    savings – qsaves          Private Utility – ups
          
            σ=1               σ=1 
 
                 Composite Tradables         Composite Tradables 
qg1,s………………………….. qgn,s    qp1,s …………………………..qpn,s
 
    σ1DF                          σ1DF             σ1HM  
          
      Differentiated demands             Differentiated demands  Composite                Domestic 
 qdfgs1,r,s…………….qdfgs1,s,s              qdfps1,r,s…………….qdfps1,s,s      Import                  Commodity 
      qpmn,s                                qhmpsn,s,s 
   
                    σ1HM
 
                             
        Homogeneous  demands 
                 qhmpsn,1,s…..qhmpsn,r,s 
Figure 6.4: The Utility Tree for Final Demands 
  
The structure of intermediate demands is identical (see figure 6.5), where representative 
varieties of differentiated commodity ‘i’ from region ‘r’ are demanded by each sector 
‘j’ in region ‘s’ (qdffsi,r,j,s). Similarly, domestic (r=s) and foreign (r≠s) representative 
variety intermediate input demands compete directly with one another in the second 
level of the nest (see figure 6.5).  
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Finally, for homogeneous demands of commodity ‘n’ (qhmpsn,r,s), the standard 
Armington structure is maintained. Thus, homogeneous goods demands (qhmpsn,1,s to 
qhmpsn,r,s) are aggregated into a composite homogeneous good (qpmn,s) which 
competes with the domestic (s=s) substitute qhmpsn,s,s. In figure 6.4, the schematic 
presentation of  homogeneous goods demands is shown for private households.  
 
6.1.5 Hierarchical Preferences and CES Hicksian Demands 
In this thesis, aggregate agents’ hierarchical preferences are approximated using a CES 
cost minimisation procedure (Lancaster, 1984). Thus, in levels form, and taking the 
private household as an example, minimising expenditure (cost) on all representative 
varieties: 
 
      (H.4) [∑
∈regr
srisri QDFPSPPS ,,,, ]
 
subject to a modified levels neo-Hotelling CES sub-utility function for composite 
differentiated tradable 'i' in region 's': 
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where: 
siA ,  - Scale parameter. 
siQP ,  - The level of sub-utility from the consumption of differentiated commodity 'i' in 
region 's' to the aggregate private household consumer. 
sriQDFPS ,,  - Demands by the aggregate private household agent for differentiated 
commodity 'i' from region ‘r’ to region ‘s’. 
sriZPS ,,  - (Private household) hierarchical utility preference variable 
sri ,,δ  - Differentiated commodity 'i' share parameters.  
iρ  – Elasticity parameter. 
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gives first order conditions: 
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Substitution of (H.7) into (H.6) simplifies the latter: 
 
 ( ) srisrisrisisisri ZPSQDFPSQPAPPS iii ,,)1(,,,,
1
,,,,
ρρρ δ +−+−Λ=   (H.8) 
 
where (H.7) and (H.8) are the levels first order conditions. Following the approach of 
appendix A.2.3, linearisation of (H.7) gives: 
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where zpi,s is a linearised expenditure share weighted average of bilateral hierarchical 
utilities: 
 
       (H.10) ∑
∈
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srisrisi zpsSzp ,,,,,
 
where the expenditure shares are given as:4
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4 See expressions (A12) and (A13) in appendix section A.2.3.2 for the derivation of this result. 
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Hence changes in hierarchical utility (zpsi,r,s) for more preferred representative varieties 
in region ‘s’ have larger effects on the composite (zpi,s). 
 
Linearisation of (H.8) gives: 
 
 ( ) ( ) srisriisiisri zpsqdfpsqppps ,,,,,,, .1.1 ++−++= ρρλ  (H.12) 
  
Thus, equations (H.9) and (H.12) are linearised first order conditions, where lower case 
letters are percentage changes in the corresponding upper case variables. Rearranging 
(H.12) in terms of qdfpsi,r,s gives: 
 
 sriisiisriisri zpsqpppsqdfps ,,,,,,, ... σλσσ +++−=   (H.13) 
 
where σi is the elasticity of substitution between all pair-wise types of representative 
varieties in the nest: 
 
 
i
i ρσ += 1
1        (H.14) 
 
substituting (H.13) into (H.9) and rearranging in terms of σiλ yields: 
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Substituting (H.15) into (H.13) eliminates the percentage change lagrangian variable λ. 
Factorising the resulting expression gives linearised CES Hicksian differentiated 
hierarchical demands: 
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 For consistent aggregation, expression (H.17) must hold: 
 
sri
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srisisi QDFPSPPSQPPP ,,,,,, .. ∑
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=     (H.17) 
 
By linearising (H.17), substituting (H.9) and rearranging, it is possible to derive the 
percentage change in the composite price (ppi,s) in the value added nest as: 
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Substituting the weighted composite hierarchical utility variable expression (H.10) 
gives: 
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Rearranging (H.19) 
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Substitution of (H.20) into (H.16), expanding the brackets and collecting terms gives: 
 
[ ]
[ ] ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−
+−−=
si
i
i
si
i
isisrii
sisriisisri
zpzpzpzps
ppppsqpqdfps
,,,,,
,,,,,,
1
ρ
σ
ρσσ
σ
   (H.21) 
 
Rearranging (H.14) in terms of ρi and substituting the result into (H.21), it is then 
possible to manipulate, factorise and cancel the result such that linearised CES Hicksian 
differentiated hierarchical demands (qdfpsi,r,s) are simplified to: 
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 [ ] sriisisriisisri zpsppppsqpqdfps ,,,,,,,, σσ +−−=   (H.22) 
 
 
The private household linearised differentiated Hicksian demands (qdfpsi,r,s) in equation 
(H.22) are a function of subutility (qpi,s), representative variety prices (ppsi,r,s) and 
hierarchical utility (zpsi,r,s). In a similar manner, the modified composite price (ppi,s) of 
representative variety ‘i’ is given as a weighted average of all representative variety 
prices and composite hierarchical utility (zpi,s) (equation (H.19)). Identical demand 
specifications are derived for government final and sectoral intermediate demands. 
 
Varietal effects can be discussed in the context of this framework. With s=EU, the 
effect of an increase in hierarchical utility (zpsi,r,s) due to increases in domestic 
variants/firms, will always have a positive effect (ceteris paribus) on the demand for 
the domestic representative variety, qdfpsi,r,s. Varietal effects may also occur at constant 
prices with increases in composite hierarchical utility. The parameter σi must be greater 
than one, implying that ρi is negative.5 Thus, reference to the composite price (ppi,s) 
equation (H.19) shows that increases in composite varietal diversity, zpi,s, which is 
dominated by increases in the favoured variety, has the effect of reducing the per unit 
expenditure necessary to acquire an extra unit of sub-utility qpi,s in the nest 
(Swaminathan and Hertel, 1996). This is because increases in the level of aggregate 
varietal diversity (dominated by improvements in the favoured variety) enable 
consumers to purchase higher utility yielding varieties with the same per unit cost, 
which is equivalent to accruing equal amounts of utility at lower cost. 
 
The price effects in the demand structure are characterised in a similar manner, with 
relative movements in the representative variety (ppsi,r,s) and composite (ppi,s) prices 
determining movements in demand (qdfpsi,r,s). Thus, in this structure there are 
hierarchical representative utility and price effects contained within the Hicksian 
demands. Moreover, following Lancaster (1984, pp139), it is possible to have the same 
                                                 
5 Referring to equation (H.9) in the main text, if σi were equal to or less than one, then ρi would be zero 
or positive. In the former case, 1/ρi in composite price equation would equal infinity which prevents a 
model solution. In the latter case, ρi would be positive which would be counter intuitive with respect to 
changes in composite hierarchical utility in the composite price equation. Moreover, values of σi less 
than 2 yield much larger foreign mark-ups than the domestic mark-up which implies that firms always 
have a better ‘foothold’ abroad than in the domestic market, which does not appear intuitively appealing. 
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level of demand for two representative varieties, where one variety has a lower 
preference ranking value, (Vi,r,s), but also a lower price, (ppsi,r,s).      
 
Following the agri-business and marketing literature discussed in chapter 3, it is our 
intention to characterise the domestic representative variety as most favoured on each 
agent’s varietal spectrum. Thus, the benchmark preference parameter values, Vi,r,s, are 
calibrated from sourced GTAP data expenditure shares by aggregate consumers in each 
market on domestic and competing imports of the differentiated commodity. The choice 
of expenditure share as a criteria for initial preference is based on the fact the domestic 
expenditure share is typically the largest. 
 
Thus, the base preferences of the private household in region ‘s’ are derived as: 
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    (H.23) 
 
The level of expenditure on a given representative variety from ‘r’ is a proxy for each 
agent’s degree of preference, where the domestic variety typically has the highest (trade 
share) preference ranking.  
 
6.2 Incorporating Pro-Competitive Effects and Internal Scale Economies 
In the following sections, a full description is given of the modified production 
structure for imperfectly competitive industries. This application draws on similar CGE 
studies (Hertel 1994, Harrison et al. 1995) combining strategic (Cournot) conjecture, 
with product differentiation and freedom of entry/exit of firms.6 Mark-ups are therefore 
allowed to adjust endogenously, and vary according to the seller’s market (i.e., 
domestic vs export). 
 
6.2.1 Modelling Pro-Competitive Mark-up Effects 
Due to a lack of data, it is assumed that all firms in the imperfectly competitive industry 
are symmetric (i.e. they have the same cost and technology structure and face the same 
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demand curve). This assumption allows the modeller to treat each firm as a micro-
scaled version of the industry which in turn allows the use of industry data. Secondly, 
there is a one to one relationship between firms and domestic product variants where 
the representative variety ‘j’ represents the composite (regional) industry variety ‘j’. 
The composite representative variety price will be equal to each firm’s product variant 
price, because each firm has the same cost and demand structure (identical prices) and 
an identical output share.  
 
Unlike profit maximising behaviour in perfect competition, which yields marginal cost 
pricing (P=MC), imperfectly competitive industries have enough market power to 
mark-up output price over marginal cost, thus leading to short run profits. The freedom 
of entry/exit ensures zero profits in the long run and determines output per firm. Thus, 
assuming each of the N symmetric firms in the industry face the same profit function: 
 
       (M.1) 
mcompi
TCPQ iii
∈
−=Π
 
where for each symmetric firm ‘i’: 
Πi – Firm profit. 
P – Industry output price 
Qi – Output level  
TCi – Total costs 
 
Under Cournot conjecture, each firm maximises profit through changes in output. 
Moreover, each symmetric firm anticipates, or conjectures, the output responses of 
rivals to changes in its output. Taking the derivative ( )ii Q∂∂ /π , and manipulating the 
resulting first order conditions gives the mark-up for each symmetric firm’s price over 
marginal cost.7  
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
6 Arguably, food processing sectors, typically regarded as oligopolistic, are more aware of quantity 
changes in perishables across bilateral routes vis-à-vis the alternative of price as a strategic variable. 
 
7 A full mathematical derivation of this result is given in appendix A.6.1. 
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1.
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MCPUPMARK iii
Ω=−=−     (M.2) 
where 
i
i Q
Z
∂
∂=Ω  - changes in industry output (Z) with respect to changes in firm              
output (Qi). 
N - The number of firms in the industry. 
ε
1  - The absolute value of the inverse elasticity of demand for the composite industry 
tradable. 
 
Under the assumption of long run zero profits in each imperfectly competitive sector 
(P=ATC), and constant returns to scale in variable costs (see sections 6.2.3 to 6.2.5) a 
mark-up (P-MCi/P) of 0.3, implies that the marginal cost (equal to average variable 
cost) and average fixed costs are 70% and 30% of the output price respectively.  
 
Employing this equation, it is possible to characterise a range of oligopoly cases.8 For 
example, the standard Cournot-Nash conjecture corresponds to Ω/Ν = 1/Ν (Francois, 
1998) where each firm believes that other firms will not change output, and that 
industry output changes correspond with its own. Thus, in the case of a symmetric 
duopoly, if only one firm increases output 10%, then in percentage terms, industry 
output will only increase by half the amount of that firm’s output change, i.e., 5%. 
 
By contrast, a perfectly collusive oligopoly, where all symmetric firms in the industry 
react to changes by the ith firm, implies that Ω/Ν = 1. In this case, a 10% increase by a 
single firm ‘i’, will be matched equally by all other firms in the industry, such that 
industry output increases 10%. At the other extreme, a conjectural variation (Ω) value 
of zero, where an output change by one firm has no effect on the industry, corresponds 
to perfectly competitive, average cost pricing. Hence, a range of market structures can 
be classified by 0 ≤ (Ω/N) ≤ 1. 
 
It is assumed that each of the 'n' symmetric domestic firms in region 'r' produces for 
both the domestic and export bilateral market routes. Thus, the inverse elasticity of 
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demand for the representative variety of the domestic region ‘r’ is indexed over 
domestic (r=s) and foreign (r≠s) routes.  
 
6.2.2 Domestic vs Foreign Mark-Ups 
To derive the absolute value of the inverse elasticity of demand requires the derivation 
of the inverse demand function. The levels neo-Hotelling inverse domestic (r=s) 
demand for each representative variety ‘i’ by the private household in each region (the 
same result is applicable to the government and sectoral demands) is given as:9
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The absolute value of the inverse elasticity of  domestic demand is given as: 
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Thus, from equation (M.3) this becomes:10
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where SPi,r,s is the expenditure by private households in 's' on representative variety 'r' 
as a share of expenditure by private households in 's' on all representative varieties (r=s 
and r≠s), and σi is the elasticity of substitution between representative varieties from 
each region 'r'. Similar inverse elasticities may be derived for government final 
demands and each j'th firm's intermediate demands: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
8 See appendix A.6.2  
9 See appendix A.6.3. 
10 The derivation follows a similar approach to Harrison et al. (1995) and Blake (1998). A full 
mathematical derivation of this result is given in appendix A.6.4.  
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To minimise the burden of model size and computational cost, it is assumed that the 
inverse price elasticity on final and intermediate purchases by agents is the same. Thus, 
the elasticity expressions (M.5), (M.6) and (M.7) are aggregated over all agents in ‘s’. 
Since the elasticity of substitution in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
database is equal for all agents in all regions, σi does not change in the aggregate 
domestic inverse elasticity expression. The aggregate (regional) expenditure share is 
expressed as:  
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where  is the expenditure by all agents in domestic region 's' on 
representative variety 'r' as a share of expenditure by all agents in 's' on all 
representative varieties of 'r'.  
sriAGGSHR ,,
 
 
Using the aggregate share and substituting the domestic inverse price elasticity of 
demand into equation (M.2) gives the levels mark-up by symmetric firms on sales of 
representative varieties to the domestic market (r=s): 
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As well as changes in the conjectural variation ratio (Ωi,r/Ni,r), changes in expenditure 
shares also affect the mark-up price. Thus, increases (decreases) in the market share of 
a single representative variety 'r', will increase (decrease) the market power of those 
firms selling in region 'r' and thus increase (decrease) their mark-ups.  
 
To derive the mark-up on export sales of each symmetric firm in 'r' to region 's' (r≠s), 
one must derive the inverse elasticity of demand for exports along each bilateral route 
(r≠s) of 'r'. Following Blake (1999), and using GTAP model notation (see glossary), the 
inverse elasticity of demand for exports of 'r' is given as: 
 
 
 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂×
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−
×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂=∂
∂−=
ri
sri
sri
ri
sri
sri
sri
sri
ri
sri
sri
ri
ri
sri
sri
ri
M
sri
M
QS
QS
M
PMS
M
M
PMS
PM
PMS
PMS
PM
PM
QS
QS
PM
,
,,
,,
,
,,
,,
,,
,,
,
,,
,,
,
,
,,
,,
,
,,
1
ε
 (M.10) 
 
 ∑
∈
++=
prodj
sjrisrisrisri QDFFSQDFGSQDFPSM ,,,,,,,,,  (M.11) 
 
where the export market price (PMi,r) is a function of the import market price (PMSi,r,s) 
which is determined by changes in the aggregate import quantity (Mi,r,s), itself reliant on 
changes in export quantities (QSi,r,s) of the (composite) representative variety.  
In the model, the market clearing accounting conventions of the model impose the 
constraint that the export and import quantities along a given bilateral trade route are 
equal, such that: 
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The second expression on the right hand side of (M.10) is interpreted as the inverse 
elasticity of demand for imports (r≠s) and is derived as: 
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Finally, the elasticity of changes in export prices in ‘r’ with respect to changes in 
import prices in ‘s’ is given as:11  
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Combining each of these terms into the inverse elasticity of demand for exports of 
region 'r' (r≠s) and substituting into expression (M.2) gives the levels mark-up on export 
sales: 
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The presence of a bilateral (TXSi,r,s) and generic (TXi,r) subsidy (tax) on exports sales 
affords producers in 'r' increased (reduced) market power which in turn may increase 
(decrease) the export sales mark-up.12 Increases in the global transport price, PT, lifts 
                                                 
11 A full mathematical derivation of this result is given in appendix A.6.5. 
 
12 In the standard model, export taxes are treated as the ratio of market prices to world prices (free on 
board): 
 
 Tax/subsidy = PMi,r/PFOBi,r,s
 
or similarly it is possible to use value ratios from the data: 
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the sales price of a given region’s exports thus increasing the mark-up. A relative 
increase in the composite market price of exports, PMi,r, leads to a fall in the mark-up. 
Finally, in the model, both domestic and foreign mark-ups are declared as levels 
variables which are automatically linearised by the software provided with the GTAP 
package (General Equilibrium Modelling PACKage – GEMPACK).  
 
6.2.3 Returns to Scale and Market Structure in CGE 
In section 2.1.3, the importance of constant returns to scale was discussed with 
reference to the perfectly competitive market framework, where firms take input and 
output prices as given, resulting in the pricing rule:  
 
)(ACMCP ==       (M.16) 
 
In our application, this standard structure is maintained in the primary agricultural, 
primary resource and capital goods manufacturing sectors of the model, whereas the 
remaining sectors (food processing, manufacturing, services) are classified as 
imperfectly competitive. Moreover, marginal cost pricing is not a characteristic of 
imperfectly competitive market structures, which gives the modeller an opportunity to 
incorporate a different treatment of costs.  
 
In our application, each imperfectly competitive industry exhibits an increasing returns 
to scale technology (IRS) at the firm level. The problem with imposing increasing 
returns to scale in the model is that one loses the linear homogeneity property which is 
                                                                                                                                              
 
 TXSi,r,s = VSMDi,r,s / VSWDi,r,s
 
Thus if the power of the ad valorem wedge TXS > 1 then we have a subsidy and vice versa 
From the data we do not know a priori whether it is the route specific (TXSi,r,s) or generic (TXi,r) 
tax/subsidy which accounts more for the wedge between market and free on board values of exports. The 
presence of an export tax (subsidy) on producers from region 'r' reduces (increases) market power by 
increasing (decreasing) the world price of r's exports and thus reduces (increases) the mark-up. The 
opposite is the case for an export subsidy. Thus, in levels terms, both taxes/subsidies are declared as a 
single variable given by the formula: 
  
 TLi,r,s = VSMDi,r,s / VSWDi,r,s 
 
If the size of the tax/subsidy wedge is zero, then TLi,r,s = 1. Similarly, if a tax (subsidy) is levied on a 
particular trade flow, VSMDi,r,s < (>)VSWDi,r,s, which using the formula gives a value of TLi,r,s less 
(greater) than 1. Thus, from the levels mark-up (r≠s) in the chapter, a subsidy produces a higher mark-up 
than a tax. 
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required for consistent aggregation in the nesting structure (see section 2.6.1). To 
overcome this problem, an alternative characterisation of IRS is employed which 
follows other similar treatments in the CGE literature (Krugman, 1979, Harris, 1984; 
Harrison et al., 1995; Swaminathan and Hertel, 1996). A full discussion of our 
framework is provided in sub-sections 6.2.4 to 6.2.6. 
 
6.2.4 The Structure of Costs in Imperfectly Competitive Industries 
In imperfectly competitive sectors, total long run costs are subdivided into a variable 
and fixed cost component, where the latter are interpreted as the advertising, research 
and development costs of product differentiation. Variable costs are composed of both 
value added (primary) and intermediate input costs and are subject to CRS, which 
implies that average variable and marginal cost are equal. Fixed costs are assumed to 
consist entirely of value added costs, which implies that the fixed overheads associated 
with the production of new products, such as the salaries of engineers and marketing 
staff engaged in research and development (R&D), are solely primary factor costs. 
Finally, it is assumed that primary factor intensities are the same in the fixed and 
variable cost components of value added. 
 
These assumptions are open to criticism. In the first case a lack of information exists on 
the composition of fixed costs at the specific level of sectoral and regional aggregation 
in the model. Moreover, data limitations pertaining to capital-labour intensities across 
fixed and variable costs in all regions also require a simplifying assumption. Hence, the 
position here is to adopt sensible ad hoc rules which are transparent and lend 
themselves to easy analysis and simple interpretation.   
 
 
 
Sectoral Production - qoj,s 
  LEONTIEF     
         0 
 
 
         fixed value added           variable value added            Composite intermediate inputs (i=1…n) 
                qvafj,s                                      qvavj,s                    qf1,j,s……………….. qfn,j,s
  190
 
 
          
     CES  σi 
  Value Added – qvaj,s   
 CES                   Differentiated intermediate demands  
   σVA              qdffs1,1,j,s…… qdffs1,r,j,s….. qdffs1,s,j,s  
 
     Land      Skilled       Unskilled     Capital     Natural        
                   Labour        Labour                     Resources     
             qfei,j,s         
(j=mcomp; r,s=region) 
    
Figure 6.5: A Modified Production Structure 
 
 
The production nest of each imperfectly competitive sector ‘j’ is given in figure 6.5. 
Homogeneous commodity demands (qhmfsn,r,j,s) are maintained within the standard 
Armington framework which is not shown in figure 6.5, although a similar structure is 
presented in figure 6.4 for private household homogeneous demands. Note that the  
perfectly competitive nest structure (not shown here) has no decomposition of value 
added cost, although it does exhibit the same intermediate input demand structure (i.e., 
homogeneous and differentiated demands).  
 
Total value added costs are decomposed as: 
 
 
regsmcompj
VAFVAVVA sjsjsj
∈∈
+= ,,,      (M.17) 
  
where VAVj,s and VAFj,s are the total value of variable and fixed value added demands, 
respectively. Since all fixed costs are value added, VAFj,s is in effect equal to total 
sectoral fixed costs.  
 
Referring back to section 6.2.1, under the assumption of long run zero profit 
(PS=ATC), the mark-up shows fixed cost (and variable cost) per unit as a proportion of 
output price. Hence, in total value terms, total benchmark sectoral fixed costs (VAFj,s) 
are calibrated to the composite mark-up fraction of sectoral sales, where the mark-up 
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values in each sector enables each firm to recoup the costs associated with their R&D 
and marketing activities: 
 
      (M.18) sjsjsj VOAMRKUPVAF ,,, =
 
 
The composite mark-up (M.19) is a trade share ( ) weighted average of each 
of the bilateral mark-ups (domestic and foreign) derived in (M.9) and (M.15): 
srjTRSHR ,,
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where VSMDj,r,s is the value of sales of imperfectly competitive industry ‘j’, from ‘r’ to 
‘s’. Thus, the larger the share, the more emphasis is afforded to that particular bilateral 
mark-up, (MARK-UPj,r,s). Finally, the proportion of value added going to variable costs 
is deduced by rearranging (M.17). 
 
Following Hertel and Swaminathan (1996), it is assumed that the quantity of fixed 
value added (qvafj,s) is proportional to the level of variety (differentiated products) 
offered by the industry. Thus, if the number of varieties, nj,s changes, then the quantity 
of fixed sectoral value added changes in proportion. This relationship is summarised 
by: 
 
        (M.20) sjsj nqvaf ,, =
 
 
As a result of constant returns to scale in variable costs, changes in the demand for 
variable value added, qvavj,s, are proportional to changes in industry output, qoj,s. Thus, 
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under the Leontief specification in the top nest of figure 6.5, these demands are given 
as: 
 
       (M.21) sjsj qoqvav ,, =
 
Linearising (M.17) with respect to quantities gives the percentage change market 
clearing equation for value added demands (qvaj,s) in imperfectly competitive 
industries: 
 
  sjsjsjsjsjsj qvafVAFqvavVAVqvaVA ,,,,,, +=    (M.22) 
 
Total sectoral variable costs (VCj,s) are a composite of both variable value added 
(VAVj,s) and intermediate input costs:  
 
      (M.23) sj
tradi
sjisj VAVVFAVC ,,,, += ∑
∈
 
where imperfectly competitive industry ‘j’ demands both homogeneous and 
differentiated (representative varieties) tradables, ‘i’. Moreover, to maintain the 
constant returns to scale assumption in total variable costs, the percentage change in 
intermediate input costs is also proportional to changes in output such that (see figure 
6.5): 
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Finally, total sales revenues (VOAj,s), which are equal to total costs after long run 
entry/exit of firms, are defined as: 
 
    (M.25) sjsj
tradi
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6.2.5 A Schematic Representation of Imperfectly Competitive Markets 
To help understand the algebraic characterisation of imperfectly competitive behaviour 
by firms given in section 6.2.6, a partial equilibrium representation of a representative 
symmetric firm (i.e. identical cost and demand conditions) in the industry is presented 
in figure 6.6, where marginal costs (MC) are represented as perfectly horizontal (CRS), 
and are equal to average variable cost. Average total costs are assumed to fall, with 
fixed costs being spread over a higher level of firm output and long run zero profits are 
assumed (P=ATC). At the initial equilibrium, there are N symmetric firms charging 
price P and producing output Q. Thus, fixed costs A + B are exactly covered by the 
mark-up revenues of output price ‘P’ over MC.  
 
For simplicity, assume that the industry ‘j’ in the figure undergoes sectoral 
liberalisation on its trade with partner countries. In the absence of general equilibrium 
effects on factor and intermediate input costs, the marginal and average cost curves 
remain the same for each symmetric firm. The reduction in the level of protection for 
industry ‘j’ results in a fall in the output price, short run losses and an exodus of less 
efficient firms from the industry with remaining firms sliding down their average cost 
curves (IRS). This leads to a fall in the long run zero profit output price and a reduction 
in the mark-up.  
 
The reduction in the mark-up results, ceteris paribus (see equation (M.2)), in an 
increase in the demand elasticity which implies that MC will cut MR' from below at a 
higher level of per firm output (see figure 6.6). The increase in the elasticity of demand 
is represented as a rotation of as well as a shift in the AR (demand) curve to the new 
point of equilibrium, P' and Q'. This reduction in the size of the price distortion to a 
level closer to that of the perfectly competitive position (P=MC) is known in the 
literature as the pro-competitive effect (Hertel 1994; Vousden, 1990). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       A 
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                                       B 
    MR    MR’  AR                  AR’ 
 
    Q              Q’ 
 
Figure 6.6 : Monopolistic firm behaviour with changing mark-up. 
Source : Harrison et al., (1995) 
 
 
In a general equilibrium context, the final level of per firm output is influenced much 
by the size of the change in the elasticity of demand (and thus the mark-up), movements 
in the cost structure of each firm and changes in the size of the industry. Thus, given 
that this exposition assumes that general equilibrium cost conditions remain constant, it 
is not necessarily the case that increases (decreases) in output per firm will be 
accompanied by falls (rises) in the number of firms (i.e., a rationalisation of the 
industry). Indeed, from the discussion in section 3.2.2.1, increases in varietal diversity 
(nj,r) in industry ‘j’ are associated, ceteris paribus, with falls in the mark-up (see 
equations (M.9) and (M.15)), which implies increases in the elasticity of demand for 
industry ‘j’ output. Clearly, for this to be the case, industry output must also increase 
(see chapter 7). 
 
6.2.6 The Relationship between Mark-Ups, Firm Output and the Structure of Costs 
This section presents an algebraic exposition of the imperfectly competitive 
mechanisms used to characterise the relationships between mark-ups, output per firm 
and cost structure in the modified GTAP model. Thus, having defined the composition 
and nature of the costs of the firm in section 6.2.4, it is now possible to determine the 
percentage change in sectoral total and variable costs.  
 
Since variable costs for each firm are subject to a constant returns to scale (CRS) 
technology, with fixed input prices total variable costs increase proportionately with 
output. Thus, average variable costs are only a function of changes in value added and 
intermediate input prices.  
 
However, changes in a firm’s average total cost (which is also output price under zero 
profits) can arise from: a) change in a firm’s output given constant prices of all inputs 
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and b) change in one or more of the input prices, at constant firm output level. Hence,  
the change in average total cost that is attributable only to changes in all input prices, 
holding the level of output per representative firm constant, is the scale-constant 
average total cost (scatcj,s). Totally differentiating (M.25) with respect to prices only 
yields an index of average total costs at constant scale: 
 
   sjsjsjsjsji
tradi
sjisjsj pvaVAFpvaVAVpfVFAscatcVOA ,,,,,,,,,, ++= ∑
∈
         (M.26) 
 
Since each firm is a micro scaled version of the industry, changes in sectoral and firm 
average costs will be equal. 
 
In this model structure, reference is made to Hertel (1994) where it is assumed that,  
 
"average total cost at constant scale will change at the same rate as average 
variable cost (which equals marginal cost)"(pp401). 
 
To implement this assumption under CRS implies that the price of the fixed value 
added factor is constant such that: 
 
       (M.27) 0,, =sjsj pvaVAF
 
where percentage changes in scale-constant average total costs and average variable 
costs are equal:  
 
       (M.28) sjsj avcscatc ,, =
 
 
The scale effect (i.e., increasing returns to scale) in the model arises from the decline in 
fixed costs, (VAFj,s) with increases in output per firm. Thus, sectoral average total costs 
(atcj,s) change with input prices and the scale of firm’s output. It is this effect which 
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characterises internal economies of scale (IRS).13 In the model, a composite firm 
output variable (qofj,s) is introduced, where under the assumption of symmetry, changes 
in composite firm output are representative of changes in each firm’s output. The 
change in average total cost is: 
 
sjsjsjsjsjsjrji
tradi
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         (M.29) 
 
 
Thus, if composite output per firm (qofj,s) increases, a rationalisation of the industry 
takes place where each firm slides down its average total cost curve (due to the 
negative sign in front of VAFj,s). The cost of production per unit of output now falls as 
fixed costs are being spread over higher levels of output.  
 
Substituting the expression for scale constant average total costs (M.26) into (M.29), 
implementing the relationship in (M.28) and assuming zero profits after long run entry 
and exit of firms, gives the long run zero profit expression, where output price (psj,s) 
must fall to re-equate the new lower per unit costs of production:  
 
  
sjsjsjsjsjsj qofVAFavcVOApsVOA ,,,,,, −=    (M.30) 
 
The role of the mark-up in expression (M.30) becomes clear in light of the assumption 
made in expression (M.28). From equation (M.2), the composite Cournot mark-up may 
be written as: 
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where average variable costs are equal to marginal costs due to the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. Rearranging in terms of PSj,s: 
 
                                                 
13 This is the usual approach adopted by imperfectly competitive applications (Krugman, 1979; Harris, 
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and linearising gives: 
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The effect of the regional weighted mark-up on scale effects becomes clear with 
reference to the zero profit expression (M.30). If mpj,s rises such that psj,s rises more 
(falls less) relative to avcj,s, ceteris paribus, short-run profit will signal an increased 
number of firms into the industry which in turn will lead to a fall in output per 
(composite) firm, qofj,s.  
 
In levels form, industry output (QOj,s) is the number of firms (Nj,s) multiplied by 
composite firm output (QOFj,s). In linear terms: 
 
 sjsjsj nqofqo ,,, +=       (M.34) 
 
Industry output (qoj,s) is calculated as a market clearing composite of domestic sales, 
exports and transport services to the global shipping sector. Composite firm output 
(qofj,s) is controlled by changes in the aggregate (weighted) regional mark-up and the 
zero profit expression. Thus, the change in the domestic number of firms (nj,s) is 
calculated as the residual to restore sectoral output market clearing.  
 
 
6.3 Changes to Model Structure to accommodate Non-Nested Differentiated 
Preferences 
Figure 6.7 shows the distribution of sales under the modified model framework from 
region ‘r’ to ‘s’ for both domestic (r=s) and foreign (r≠s) tradables. Exports and imports  
 
                                                                                                                                              
1984; Lancaster, 1991; Hertel, 1994; Francois et al., 1995). 
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‘Domestic’ Market 'r' 
(i=differentiated tradables; r,s=regions)         VOAi,r   :PSi,r .QOi,r
(+ TOi,r) 
= VOMi,r   :PMi,r.QOi,r
 
:PMi,r.QSi,r,s        VSMDi,r,s  VSTi,r    :PMi,r.QSTi,r 
             
         (r≠s)
(+TXS i,r,s/TX i,r,) 
= VSWD i,r,s   :PFOB i,r,s.QS i,r,s
World Market                        + VTWR i,r,s
= VDWS i,r,s   :PCIF i,r,s.QS i,r,s
(+ TMS i,r,s /TMi,s) 
= VDMS i,r,s   :PMS i,r,s.QS i,r,s
‘Foreign’ Market 's'  
 
                  (+ TFS i,r,j,s)   (+ TPS i,r,s)   (+ TGS i,r,s) 
              
                   VFASi,r,j,s                             VPASi,r,s                                 VGASi,r,s  
 
Note: VSMDi,r,s accounts for both domestic (r=s) and foreign sales (r≠s) 
 
Figure 6.7 Distribution of Sales in the modified Model Framework 
 
are renamed as 'sales' and 'demands' respectively. Thus, VXMDi,r,s, VXWDi,r,s, VIWSi,r,s 
and VIMSi,r,s become VSMDi,r,s, VSWDi,r,s, VDWSi,r,s and VDMSi,r,s respectively, and 
the value of domestic sales VDMi,s is now equal to VSMDi,s,s. Finally, the entries on the 
right hand side of figure 6.7 are the price and quantity indices for each value in the data. 
 
The values of export demands (VDMSi,r,s) by region ‘s’ of homogeneous and 
differentiated products from country 'r' are disaggregated by agent, in region 's' using 
Armington bilateral (including r=s) market clearing equations for differentiated (MS.1) 
and homogeneous (MS.2) tradables respectively where all demands are valued at the 
same market price PMSi,r,s and qsi,r,s is the percentage change in bilateral exports from 
region ‘r’ to ‘s’: 
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sjrisjrisrisrisrisri
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qhmfsVFMSqhmgsVGMSqhmpsVPMS
ogiqsVDMS
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...
hom.
++
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  (MS.2) 
 
sriVPMS ,, - The market value of final bilateral import purchases by the private 
household  
sriVGMS ,, - The market value of final bilateral import purchases by the government 
household 
sjriVFMS ,,, - The market value of intermediate bilateral import purchases by firms 
 
Reference to equations (MS.1) and (MS.2) shows that agents demand both homogenous 
and differentiated products. This is reflected in the terminology, where, for example, 
intermediate input demands for homogeneous and differentiated commodities by firms 
are separated into QHMFSi,r,j,s and QDFFSi,r,j,s. The same is the case for corresponding 
private household (QHMPSi,r,s and QDFPSi,r,s) and government final demands 
(QHMGSi,r,s and QDFGSi,r,s).  
 
Adding bilateral taxes/subsidies (TPSi,r,s, TGSi,r,s, TFSi,r,j,s) gives the values of demands 
at agents prices (PPSi,r,s, PGSi,r,s, PFSi,r,j,s). These flows are summarised in figure 6.8. 
For homogeneous commodities, the two level nested Armington framework is 
maintained. Thus, foreign demands (r≠s) by agents in ‘s’ are aggregated in the lower 
Armington nest into composite import demands by private household, government 
household and firms (QPMi,s, QGMi,s, QFMi,j,s respectively). Similarly, agents’ 
composite homogeneous import prices (PPMi,s, PGMi,s, PFMi,j,s), which enter the upper 
level Armington demands, are derived as weighted averages of agents’ bilateral prices. 
In the upper Armington nest, foreign composite demands, (i,s) compete with each 
agent’s domestic substitute, (i,s,s), as shown in figure 6.4 above. 
 
 
 
 
Agents’ Prices: 
Private Household      VPASi,r,s      i=homog QHMPSi,r,s.PPSi,r,s
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                        i=mcomp    QDFPSi,r,s.PPSi,r,s
Government Household     VGASi,r,s     i=homog QHMGSi,r,s.PGSi,r,s
                     i=mcomp     QDFGSi,r,s.PGSi,r,s
Firms    VFASi,r,j,s     i=homog QHMFSi,r,j,s.PFSi,r,j,s
                       i=mcomp   QDFFSi,r,j,s.PFSi,r,j,s
Market Prices: 
Private Household   VPMSi,r,s      i=homog QHMPSi,r,s.PMSi,r,s
                      i=mcomp    QDFPSi,r,s.PMSi,r,s
Government Household  VGMSi,r,s      i=homog QHMGSi,r,s.PMSi,r,s
                       i=mcomp   QDFGSi,r,s.PMSi,r,s
Firms     VFMSi,r,j,s     i=homog QHMFSi,r,j,s.PMSi,r,j,s
                         i=mcomp QDFFSi,r,j,s.PMSi,r,j,s
Figure 6.8 A Summary of Agent and Market Values in the Modified Model 
 
 
6.4 Data Requirements 
As a result of the modifications to the demand structure, changes must also be made to 
the GTAP data base. The first modification is with respect to the sets in which the 
indices in the model domain are defined. To implement imperfect competition requires 
the addition of three extra sets. Tradable commodities are now subdivided into perfectly 
competitive homogeneous (PCOMP) and imperfectly competitive (MCOMP) 
differentiated products/industries. Moreover, it is assumed that the non-tradable capital 
goods producing sector is perfectly competitive such that the intersection of the subsets 
PCOMP and CGDS yields the new set PCGDS.  
 
The second element of data manipulation pertains to the parameters file. As there are 
now two main subsets of the set of tradables, this requires the declaration of a separate 
elasticity of substitution parameter. Thus, ESUBDi and ESUBMi now index the set 
PCOMP_COMM only, and a new parameter, SIGMAi pertains to the set 
MCOMP_COMM.  
 
Changes must also be made to the format of the data. Thus, the first stage of the 
standard GTAP data transformation involves the sourcing of aggregate imports directly 
to agents. Since the full Armington structure is maintained for homogeneous goods, the 
sourcing of aggregate imports could just be applied to differentiated products only. 
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However, sourcing all imports to agents allows the modeller to choose imperfectly 
competitive characterisations for any sector in the model without the need to rerun the 
data transformation program.  
 
Thus, defining the variable: 
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gives the share of export source 'r' in composite imports of 'i' to region 's' valued at 
market prices. Having derived each share value, it is possible to multiply each agent’s 
imports of the composite 'i' from the standard data (VIPMi,s, VIGMi,s, VIFMi,j,s) to yield 
sourced purchases of imports of 'i' from 'r' by each agent in 's' at market price, 
(VPMSi,r,s, VGMSi,r,s, VFMSi,r,j,s). Where r=s, each agent’s purchases of domestic good 
'i' at market prices (VDPMi,s, VDGMi,s, VDFMi,s) become the domestic values of 
sourced purchases of imports from the same region 's' (VPMSi,s,s, VGMSi,s,s, VFMSi,s,s). 
 
The second part of the data transformation is to calculate the same sourced market price 
demands at agent’s prices. This is accomplished by calculating an average tax based on 
the ratio of total standard data purchases by each agent at agent’s and market prices. For 
example, the average tax on private household demand is:  
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Having calculated the average tax rates, one simply multiplies the sourced market 
demands by region of origin 'r' at market prices derived above, by the average tax for 
each agent (i.e. private households, government, firms) to derive the same flows at 
agent’s prices. Thus, the two steps above remove the distinction between composite 
import demands and domestic demands and replaces these with a single value flow 
which sources purchases from 's' by region of origin 'r' (including r=s). 
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 As the monopolistically competitive version of the model is now larger in dimensions 
than its standard perfectly competitive counterpart, this hampers the solution process of 
the model. In order to ease the burden on computational facility, model condensation is 
necessary before implementation of any closure application. There are several 
operations within GEMPACK which are used to reduce model size. For further details, 
see GEMPACK user documentation (Harrison and Pearson, 1994).  
 
6.5 A Stylised Numerical Example 
An effective way of understanding the model structure is to provide a simple example 
and examine changes in the endogenous variables of interest. The data aggregation is a 
three region, three tradable commodity example. The tradables are: Agriculture (AGR); 
Manufacturing (MANU); and Services (SERVS). The three regions are the European 
Union (EU), The United States of America (US) and the Rest of the World (ROW).  
 
The model structure employs the imperfectly competitive mechanisms discussed above, 
where manufacturing is imperfectly competitive, and agriculture and service sectors are 
perfectly competitive. In the manufacturing sector, the values of the preference 
heterogeneity (γi) and elasticity of substitution (σi) parameters are set at 0.75 and 6 
respectively. Moreover, the number of firms (N=3) in each region’s manufacturing 
sector is chosen arbitrarily, and the conjecture of each firms’ mark-up follows the 
traditional Cournot conjecture (i.e., Ωi,r/Ni,r = 1/ Ni,r). The calibrated base value of the 
mark-ups are presented in table 6.1.  
 
 
 
Region EU US ROW 
EU 0.292 0.129 0.146 
US 0.128 0.282 0.138 
ROW 0.174 0.193 0.302 
Table 6.1: Bilateral Manufacturing Mark-ups in the Benchmark data 
 
The choice of scenario shock is to simulate the complete abolition of the EU import 
tariff on USA agricultural exports.  In the model structure, tariffs are represented as ad 
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valorem rates where, for example, the power of the ad valorem import tariff is given as 
the ratio of market value (VDMSi,r,s) to world value (VDWSi,r,s) of imports: 
 
 
sri
sri
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VDMS
TMS
,,
,,
,, =       (N.1) 
 
A percentage reduction in tmsagr,us,eu of –20.72% is required to eliminate the distortion 
between market and world prices along this particular bilateral route. In other words, 
the EU is liberalising its agriculture sector unilaterally to the US alone. A brief 
summary of the main results is presented in the subsections below. 
 
6.5.1 Domestic Resource Reallocations 
In the absence of other exogenous tariff shocks, the elimination the EU import tariff on 
US agricultural exports leads to a reduction of the EU domestic market import price, 
pmsagr,us,eu, and thus agents' prices, pfsagr,us,j,eu, ppsagr,us,eu and pgsagr,us,eu all fall by the 
same percentage.  
 
The effect of this relative price fall leads to a substitution effect in favour of US 
agricultural exports by all agents in the EU (i.e., qhmpsagr,us,eu, qhmgsagr,us,eu and 
qhmfsagr,us,j,eu all increase 200%), which in turn displaces domestic goods demands in 
the EU. This displacement of demands results in a contraction of the EU agriculture 
industry (qoagr,eu = -0.97%) and therefore a fall in the Leontief composite intermediate 
input (qfi,agr,eu) and value added (qvaagr,eu) demands.  
 
In this aggregation, land is characterised as “sluggish” and is only purchased by a single 
aggregated agriculture sector in each region. Thus, land is effectively sectorally 
‘trapped’ which implies that relative factor price movements have no effect on location 
(i.e. qoesland,agr,eu  = qfeland,agr,eu  = 0). In larger aggregations, the responsiveness of the 
agriculture sector in each of the regions is governed by both the elasticity of 
substitution for value added and the elasticity of transformation . Thus, if 
 is large, then agricultural supply response will be greater as farms in different 
sectors are more capable of substituting labour and capital for land, although this may 
be dampened by land supply restrictions governed by the transformation elasticity. 
)( VAagrσ )( Tlandσ
VA
agrσ
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Thus, a sensitivity analysis of  and  can vary the degree of output response in 
agriculture and thus the extent of resource reallocations. 
T
landσ VAagrσ
 
 
 EU US ROW 
nmanu,r 0.3637 -0.9248 0.2149 
qofmanu,r 0.1443 -0.3836 0.1160 
mpmanu,r -0.1050 0.2842 -0.0823 
Table 6.2: Pro-competitive and scale effects from the base data (% changes) 
 
 
Contraction of the EU agriculture sector releases resources to other sectors of the 
economy such that output in manufacturing and services in the EU increases, with the 
largest diversions of resources going to EU manufacturing (qomanu,eu = 0.51%) due to 
pro-competitive effects (see table 6.2). Indeed, the fall in the EU regional mark-up 
(mpmanu,eu) results in scale effects (qofmanu,eu), as well as increases in the number of firms 
(nmanu,eu). 
 
As primary factors are immobile between regions, factor returns are only equated 
across sectors. In the EU, the reallocation of resources to other sectors leads to 
increased factor rewards to labour (pslabour,eu = 0.45%) and capital (pscapital,eu = 0.45%). 
In this aggregation, the land resource which is released due to the contraction of EU 
agriculture, cannot be employed in other sectors, so land rents in the EU fall (psland,eu = 
-0.73%).  
 
Expansion of agriculture in the US puts pressure on scarce resources resulting in factor 
price rises. Moreover, the expansion of the agriculture sector (qoagr,us = 3.09%) is 
accompanied by contractions in US manufacturing (qomanu,us =  -1.3%) and services  
(qoserv,us = -0.03%). Thus, intermediate input and primary factor demands fall in these 
sectors. The fall in US manufacturing is quite significant due to (negative) pro-
competitive effects (mpmanu,us) and scale effects (qofmanu,us) (see table 6.2).  
 
6.5.2 Trade Flows 
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As a result of the bilateral tariff reduction, trade flows increase overall. The values of 
aggregate exports, (vxwregr), and imports, (viwregr), increase for the US and the EU. 
EU bilateral exports only increase from the manufacturing sectors which exhibit pro-
competitive and scale effects, with slight falls in the services sector. In the US, the 
increase in the value of exports (vxwregus = 3.03%) is dominated by the increase in 
sales of agriculture to the EU (qsagr,us,eu = 198.16%), with slight increases in service 
exports. Imports of manufacturing by the US and agriculture by the EU dominate 
respective aggregate import flows.  
 
The ROW experiences a reduction in both exports (vxwregrow = -0.51%) and imports 
(viwregrow = -0.66%) suggesting a contraction of the economy. This may be dominated 
by agricultural effects. For example, the benchmark data show that the ROW's share of 
agricultural exports to the EU is large. Thus, increased EU agricultural imports from the 
US displace ROW exports significantly (qsagr,row,eu = -10.78%). Moreover, expansion in 
the EU’s other sectors also lessens the level of imports from the ROW. Although 
negative pro-competitive effects result in increased US imports of manufacturing goods 
from the ROW, there are declines in agricultural and services imports.  
 
Finally, increases in the level of trade increases the demand for transport services 
resulting in an increase in the supply of services by each region (qstsvces,r) and thus the 
global shipping good (qt=1.17%). Increased demands for shipping services leads to a 
corresponding rise in the price (pt = 0.19%) of global shipping services offered by the 
global shipping sector. 
 
6.5.3 Welfare 
Welfare effects may be classified into four categories: The terms of trade effect; 
efficiency effects, which are strongly linked to pro-competitive effects; varietal effects, 
relating to the levels of varietal diversity offered to consumers; and regional equivalent 
variation changes.  
 
The terms of trade results are small. This is symptomatic of the simpler investment-
savings mechanism chosen in this simulation run (see section 4.1.6). For the EU and the 
US, the terms of trade (totr – see table 6.3) have deteriorated very slightly, with in both 
cases the price of exports falling more than the price of imports. In the EU, this is partly 
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due to falls in manufacturing export prices due to the pro-competitive effects. For the 
US, reallocation of resources into agriculture, aided by the negative pro-competitive 
effect, contributes towards lower priced agricultural exports. In the ROW, the terms of 
trade has improved, where export prices (pswROW = 0.0043%) have risen relative to 
import prices, (pdwROW = -0.03%).  
 
 EU US ROW 
totr (%) -0.0346 -0.0358 0.0341 
qgdpr (%) 0.1813 -0.3225 0.1394 
ur (%) 0.1993 -0.3669 0.1664 
EVr  ($US 1995) 11,685 -19,288 15,117 
Table 6.3: Welfare Effects from the base data 
 
With factor endowments in the model fixed, increases in productive capacity only occur 
through reallocative resource effects. More specifically, changes in the quantity of GDP 
output (qgdpr) in each economy measures the growth in output for a region (with fixed 
endowments, changes in qgdpr will typically be small). Thus, for the EU, qgdpeu 
increases (see table 6.3) suggesting efficiency gains. This is due to the reallocation of 
resources from the less efficient agricultural sector to the manufacturing and service 
sectors. The presence of the pro-competitive effect in monopolistically competitive 
manufacturing contributes significantly to the overall increase in real EU GDP. In the 
US, the gains from specialisation in agriculture, are offset by large negative pro-
competitive effects in manufacturing leading to a fall in real GDP. In the ROW, qgdprow 
increases which in part are aided by the positive pro-competitive effects in 
manufacturing. 
 
Table 6.2 shows that the number of varieties/firms (nmanu,r) of EU and ROW 
differentiated (manufacturing) products has increased, whereas in the US it has fallen. 
Thus, representative varieties of European and ROW manufacturing goods are moving 
closer to agents’ ideals on the varietal spectrum, vis-à-vis the USA representative 
variety, which is becoming less popular.  
 
 EU US ROW 
zpmanu,r 0.2377 -0.4740 0.1477 
zgmanu,r 0.2351 -0.6050 0.1471 
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zfmanu,agr,r 0.2613 -0.6664 0.1567 
zfmanu,manu,r 0.2350 -0.5469 0.1462 
zfmanu,svces,r 0.2633 -0.6508 0.1579 
zfmanu,cgds,r 0.2203 -0.4781 0.1380 
Table 6.4: Varietal effects from the base data (% change) 
 
 
Clearly, expansion of the EU and the ROW manufacturing sectors leads to long run 
entry of firms and so higher levels of varietal diversity. Thus, bilateral utility variables 
(zpsi,r,s, zfsi,r,j,s and zgsi,r,s) (see table 6.4) all increase in the EU and ROW which, ceteris 
paribus, has a positive effect on representative demands for EU and ROW 
manufacturing goods by all regions. The level of composite (zpi,s, zgi,s, zfi,j,s) 
hierarchical utility also increases in the EU and ROW, but falls in the US (see table 
6.4). This suggests an overall increase in the level of varietal diversity for agents in the 
former regions, but a fall in the latter. Moreover, increases in composite varietal 
diversity reduces the per unit expenditure (ppi,s, pgi,s, pfi,j,s) required to attain an extra 
unit of composite utility (qpi,s, qgi,s, qfi,j,s) in the nest.  
 
The net result of the three welfare effects above can be summarised by the equivalent 
variation (EVr) figure (table 6.3) calculated from changes in the superhousehold 
regional utility variable ur. In the EU and the ROW, the level of regional utility 
increases whereas in the USA, regional utility falls.  
 
6.6 Conclusions 
The modifications to the standard treatment made in this chapter are twofold: First our 
application incorporates a neo-Hotelling type demand structure which exhibits ‘non-
nested’ hierarchical preferences, where the domestic representative variety is always 
most preferred. The modeller is also given freedom to alter the degree of ‘preference 
heterogeneity’, where a consumer’s perception of ‘variety’ may be high (low) and 
proliferations/reductions in varietal choice may create dramatic (minimal) changes in 
demand patterns. 
 
The second major modification to the model is the incorporation of an imperfectly 
competitive increasing returns to scale characterisation of the food processing, 
manufacturing and services sectors (primary agriculture, primary resource and capital 
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goods sectors remain perfectly competitive). The specification employed in our 
application allows for endogeneity in the mark-up of output price over average variable 
costs. Moreover, a conjectural variation approach is used which allows the modeller 
freedom to characterise different degrees of Cournot collusion by rival firms in each 
imperfectly competitive sector. 
 
To incorporate non-nested hierarchical preferences in the model (section 6.3), where 
domestic and foreign representative varieties compete directly in each agent’s demand 
nest, one must modify parts of the model data such that demands are sourced directly to 
consumers. These data manipulation techniques are discussed in section 6.4. The 
chapter concludes with a simple aggregation (3 region, 3 commodity) numerical 
example (section 6.5).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A:  Mathematical Derivations of Modifications to the Standard Model 
Structure   
A.6.1: Deriving the Mark-Up  
Starting with the profit function to each symmetric firm in industry ‘i’: 
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       (A.1) iii TCQP −=Π .
 
 
Under Cournot conjecture, maximise profit with respect to quantity. Using the product 
rule gives: 
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where Z is industry output. Rearranging: 
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Multiply both sides by (P/P)(Z/Z) and manipulating gives: 
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where 
 
 
P
Z
Z
P
Z
Q
NQ
Z i
i
i ∂
∂==∂
∂=Ω ε
11     (A.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
A.6.2: Characterising Different Oligopoly Structures within the model 
 
Due to the assumption of symmetry between rival firms, the reciprocal of the number of 
firms is actually equal to the output share of each ith firm: 
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Moreover, the conjectural variation parameter which measures changes in industry 
output (Z) with respect to changes in firm output (Qi) is given as: 
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Thus, Ωi/N is equal to the conjectural elasticity of variation: 
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or the percentage change in industry output brought about by a percentage change in the 
ith firm’s output. 
 
A.6.3: Deriving the Levels Inverse Demand Function 
Using the private household as an example, which is equally applicable to other agents, 
the Neo-Hotelling demand for representative varieties given in (H.22) is represented in 
levels form as: 
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Rearranging (C.1) in terms of PPSi,r,s gives the inverse neo-Hotelling levels demand 
function: 
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A.6.4: Deriving the Inverse Elasticity of Demand for Domestic (r=s) Representative 
Varieties  
Starting with expression (C.2), take the derivative (product and chain rules) with 
respect to domestic (r=s) representative varieties: 
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Multiplying by (QDFPSi,r,s/PPSi,r,s) and applying the derivative: 
 
 
si
sri
sri
si
si
si
si
si
sri
sri
sri
si
QP
QDFPS
QDFPS
QP
PP
QP
QP
PP
PP
QDFPS
QDFPS
PP
,
,,
,,
,
,
,
,
,
,,
,,
,,
,
∂
∂×∂
∂=∂
∂
     
(D.2) 
Yields the inverse elasticity: 
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Taking the derivative with respect to representative demands (QDFPSi,r,s) of the neo-
Hotelling utility function: 
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and multiplying by (QDFPSi,r,s /QPi,s) gives : 
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 (see expressions (A12) and (A13) in appendix section A.2.3.2 for the derivation of this 
result). Substitute this result into (D.3) and take the negative of the inverse elasticity of 
the derivative to obtain the absolute value of the inverse elasticity of demand for 
domestic (r=s) representative varieties.  
 
iisi
si
si
si
sri
sri
sri
sri
sri
sri PP
QP
QP
PP
SP
PPS
QDFPS
QDFPS
PPS
σσε
111
,
,
,
,
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −∂
∂−=∂
∂−=  
        (D.6) 
 
Moreover, following Blake et al. (1998), Harrison et al. (1995), assume that the 
absolute value of the inverse elasticity of demand for the composite good (QPi,s) is 
equal to unity: 
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A.6.5: Deriving the Inverse Elasticity of Demand for Foreign (r≠s) Representative 
Varieties 
Following Blake et al. (1998), the inverse elasticity of demand for exports from ‘r’ is 
given as: 
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where: 
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From the discussion in the chapter: 
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To calculate the elasticity of changes in export prices in ‘r’ with respect to changes in 
import prices in ‘s’ start from the levels expressions in the model for the “free on 
board” (PFOBi,r,s) export price and the “market” (PMSi,r,s) and “cost insurance freight” 
(PCIFi,r,s) import prices: 
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where 
TXi,r/ TXSi,r,s – Generic/Bilateral specific export tax/subsidy. 
TMi,r/ TMSi,r,s – Generic/Bilateral specific import tax/subsidy. 
PMi,r – Export market price in region ‘r’.  
PT – Global shipping sector per unit freight price 
 
Substitute (E.5) into (E.7) 
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 Substitute (E.8) into (E.6): 
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Rearrange in terms of PMi,r: 
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Taking the derivative gives: 
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Multiplying by market import and export prices, substituting (E.9) and canceling terms 
gives: 
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Combining each of these terms into the inverse elasticity of demand for exports of 
region 'r' (r≠s) (expression E.1) gives: 
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and substituting into the mark-up expression (M.2) gives the mark-up on foreign sales 
(r≠s) in expression (M.15): 
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Chapter 7 
 
The Costs of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
 
The results presented in this chapter focus on a number of different issues pertaining to 
CAP costs. The earlier sections place emphasis on measuring the costs of CAP abolition 
vis-à-vis the alternative of full implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) reforms. 
Although the model structure incorporates all of the stylised modifications detailed in 
chapters 5 and 6, (i.e., imperfect competition, varietal preferences, explicit CAP 
modelling etc.), preference heterogeneity is held as weak. This allows better focus on 
the policy scenarios themselves, which are then compared with other estimates of CAP 
costs in the computable general equilibrium (CGE) trade literature (chapter 1).  
 
Under the exact same model specification, the latter part of the chapter evaluates the 
cost of agricultural policies under conditions of high preference heterogeneity. Firstly, 
results are provided assessing the impact of varietal perception under a given scenario 
(CAP abolition), which is followed by model estimates on the cost of CAP abolition 
against the alternative of the UR reforms. Moreover, experiments are also carried out to 
ascertain the effect of variations in industry concentration and collusion levels in 
imperfectly competitive sectors on the costs of CAP abolition under both sets of 
heterogeneity conditions. 
 
Thus, the structure of the chapter is as follows: Sections 7.1 and 7.2 evaluate the costs 
of the CAP under low preference heterogeneity. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 examine the 
impact of different preference heterogeneity conditions, concentration levels and 
collusive behaviour on CAP costs. Section 7.5 concludes. 
 
7.1 The Cost of EU Agricultural Policy – Experimental Design 
Section 7.1 reports estimates of the costs of the CAP by comparing the results of full 
implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) agreement (experiment (i)) against the 
alternative of CAP abolition (experiment (ii)). The UR scenario includes full 
implementation of the agreed import tariff, export subsidy and output subsidy 
commitments by each region. The CAP abolition scenario includes the UR 
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commitments and complete removal of output subsidy, export subsidy and import tariff 
wedges pertaining to all food and agricultural sectors in both EU regions (UK and EU-
14).  
 
Experiments (i) and (ii) both include model projections on factor productivity and 
endowment growth through to 2005 and are evaluated under conditions of imperfect 
competition in the food processing, manufacturing and services sectors, with remaining 
sectors characterised as perfectly competitive (i.e., primary agriculture and the natural 
resource sector). A full schematic representation of the experiments is presented in 
figure 7.1. 
 
 
 
Benchmark data (1995)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment (i):  
UR scenario + 
projections (2005); 
low γ 
Experiment (ii): 
CAP abolition 
scenario + 
projections (2005) ; 
low γ 
Experiment (iii): 
Agenda 2000 
scenario + 
projections (2005); 
low γ 
Figure 7.1: A Schematic Representation of the Experimental Design  
 
 
From the discussion in section 6.1.3, the value of the preference heterogeneity 
parameter, γi, is assumed to range from between zero and one, where values of γi greater 
than one lead to instability in the model solution. Hence, an arbitrarily low value of γi is 
chosen (γi = 0.01) in both experiments such that model results concentrate more on the 
effects of the policy scenarios themselves. This contrasts with the latter part of the 
chapter, where the model examines the impacts of preference heterogeneity by 
employing a much higher value of γi (= 0.75). In the absence of data on imperfectly 
competitive firm concentration ratios for this specific aggregation, the benchmark data 
are calibrated to five symmetric firms (N=5), where it is assumed that rivals compete 
under standard Cournot conjecture (Ω/Ν = 1/Ν). 
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 Finally, a third policy experiment examining the costs of the Agenda 2000 scenario, vis-
à-vis the UR case, is also included under identical conditions and assumptions to 
experiments (i) and (ii). The inclusion of the Agenda 2000 reforms is restricted to the 
results tables in appendix A, the numbering of which corresponds to that in the main 
text.  
 
7.2 Overview of agricultural liberalisation scenarios  
In each of the policy scenarios, prices and outputs are affected by a number of factors, 
where in the case of price effects, it is difficult to predict, a priori, the final direction 
and magnitude of the results. In the first instance, the relative levels of subsidy support 
and tariff protection in the EU primary agricultural and food industries are high 
compared to other regions in the GTAP data. Thus, partial/complete removal of these 
wedges will render these EU sectors relatively less competitive. 
 
Subsequent reductions in EU agricultural and food demands have a depressing effect on 
the prices of these goods within the EU. Moreover, reductions in EU exports on world 
markets is expected to have an inflating effect on world prices. Finally, increases in EU 
imports encourage price and output increasing effects in those countries which have a 
comparative advantage in agricultural production. 
 
The typical supply response effect within the EU regions is that mobile resources from 
agricultural sectors are reallocated into non-agricultural sectors which are less heavily 
protected.1 Since the agricultural industry has sector specific factors (cereals and non 
cereals land), the reduction in output will be somewhat slower than the increase of 
output in the manufacturing and services sectors where all factors are mobile, such that 
the latter has a higher supply elasticity. Thus, resource re-allocation increases aggregate 
demands for value added, bidding up rent and wage payments to mobile capital and 
labour factors, which has an inflationary effect on output prices. Contraction of the 
agricultural sector will result in falling land rents, where these sector specific factors 
have no uses outside of primary agriculture. 
 
                                                          
1 In the EU regions, there are no subsidies in the production of manufacturing or services goods in the 
benchmark data. 
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A number of other factors increase the degree of indeterminacy of price effects within 
the model. Firstly, in the EU primary agricultural sectors, the land endowment (which is 
fixed) and unskilled labour endowment (which is projected to fall in the EU regions 
only) become more scarce, which has a cost-inflationary effect on factor returns in these 
sectors. Moreover, these effects are in opposition to strong productivity projections in 
arable and livestock sectors, which along with falling returns to land, has a depressing 
effect on agricultural output prices. Finally, endowments of capital and skilled labour 
(and unskilled labour in non-EU regions) are projected to rise under the projections, 
where greater abundance of these factors reduces their respective factor rewards. 
 
7.2.1 Experiment (i) 
Experiment (i) includes shocks which project the world economy through to 2005 and 
the Uruguay Round (UR) constraints. Table 7.1 shows the percentage changes in market 
prices and output in 2005 from the 1995 benchmark data.2 In the EU regions, prices in 
many of the agricultural sectors fall. The exceptions are the quota constrained sectors 
(raw sugar / raw milk), where large increases in the tariff equivalent rent variable (tq) 
are required to keep output at a fixed level, particularly the milk sector. The rise in the 
quota constrained primary sugar price is only slight (0.14%). In the UK primary sugar 
sector, imports of primary sugar (and sugar processing) are larger in absolute terms then 
the EU-14.3 Thus, the relaxation of protection in the UK under the UR reforms attracts 
large increases in primary and processed sugar imports into the UK from the LDC 
region (32% and 56% respectively).4 As a result, UK sugar processing contracts and 
reduces the quantity of its purchases of primary sugar (-22%) which dampens the 
upstream sugar price rise. There is no intervention buying in any of the EU sectors, 
although the fall in the price of ‘other grains’ is very close to the support trigger. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
2 In the standard implementation of the model, the global demand and supply of investment is the 
Walrasian nth market (see section 5.2.5), where the clearing price (psave) is held as the numeraire 
variable. Thus, 1995 price changes in each of the following tables in this chapter are relative to this 
exogenous numeraire variable. Finally, note that the percentage changes may in some cases be as a 
proportion of a very small benchmark level. 
3 This is due to the preferential trade links with the African, Carribean and Pacific Countries (ACP), 
which in this aggregation mainly appears in the LDC composite region. 
4 All italicised results are not presented in the main text. 
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 UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Market Price 
Other agriculture -10.51 -7.55 3.51 3.57 -5.96 3.99 
Other primary 46.47 43.24 48.94 44.27 43.69 49.38 
Wheat -10.90 -9.62 6.04 -7.32 -6.90 1.86 
Other grains -9.14 -10.16 5.65 1.91 -3.79 3.43 
Oilseeds -0.71 1.20 6.02 -1.66 5.71 6.48 
Raw Sugar 0.14 29.89 9.84 -7.09 -0.72 4.72 
Cattle & sheep -13.12 -8.24 -11.59 -6.52 -12.25 -6.90 
Raw milk 41.98 39.65 -6.85 -13.65 -8.77 -5.35 
Meat processing -1.25 -1.34 -12.32 -0.90 -7.14 -3.76 
Other meat processing -1.77 -2.20 -3.51 6.26 0.73 3.53 
Other food processing 6.11 6.49 6.03 1.23 -5.13 5.20 
Milk processing 24.60 26.66 -1.52 -7.80 -9.85 -1.21 
Sugar processing 1.77 14.39 5.59 -3.10 -1.43 1.38 
Manufacturing 10.60 10.10 10.58 4.35 -6.54 7.33 
Services 6.45 6.83 6.86 -8.39 -26.29 3.90 
Output 
Other agriculture 45.08 36.51 33.52 42.56 52.30 33.28 
Other primary 19.83 21.95 21.22 42.58 45.86 22.98 
Wheat 22.67 21.21 20.07 56.96 54.68 5.34 
Other grains 18.44 11.19 27.03 39.27 50.18 -1.89 
Oilseeds 27.79 25.89 25.65 49.04 41.78 19.55 
Sugar beet 0.00 0.00 -3.38 60.25 41.32 12.67 
Cattle & sheep 15.05 17.79 44.75 46.00 54.08 35.33 
Raw milk 0.00 0.00 39.59 66.63 50.46 42.05 
Meat processing 17.53 25.23 59.83 59.33 59.72 37.09 
Other meat processing 33.36 35.79 49.93 43.88 53.30 36.72 
Other food processing 25.87 24.24 34.34 57.06 58.74 35.69 
Milk processing 0.46 2.55 43.93 82.65 76.04 46.68 
Sugar processing 0.35 8.08 10.54 67.13 51.83 31.97 
Manufacturing 19.92 22.51 25.45 49.76 70.59 37.41 
Services 24.80 25.03 35.49 64.49 69.34 39.40 
Table 7.1: Experiment (i): (% changes from the 1995 benchmark) 
 
7.2.2 CAP Abolition – Outputs and Prices 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 detail the percentage changes in outputs and market prices from the 
CAP abolition scenario compared to the UR case (experiment (i)). Thus, removal of all 
forms of CAP support leads to significant UK and EU-14 output falls in most primary 
agricultural sectors compared to the UR case, with concurrent increases in UK and EU-
14 non-agricultural outputs (i.e., manufacturing and services) (table 7.2). The largest 
falls in UK primary agricultural output occur in the ‘cattle and sheep’ (-35%), ‘sugar’ (-
25%), ‘other grains’ (-13%) and ‘other agriculture’ (-8%) sectors, with significant 
market price (table 7.3) falls in many primary agricultural sectors (particularly 
unrestricted quota sectors raw milk (-68%) and sugar (-31%)). In some UK sectors, 
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(‘oilseeds’, ‘primary livestock’) complete removal of compensation (input subsidies) 
has led to price rises (17% and 12% respectively). In the UK cereals sectors, large 
reductions in cereals land prices (see table 7.7) lead to output price falls despite removal 
of compensation (i.e., input subsidies). In both EU regions, these price and output 
effects are passed onto downstream food processing sectors. 
 
 
Sector UK EU14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture -8.04 -4.06 0.11 -0.85 0.18 0.15 
Other primary -0.13 -0.06 -0.11 -0.19 -0.07 -0.05 
Wheat -1.14 -0.82 0.14 -0.01 -0.27 0.51 
Other grains -13.29 -8.69 1.91 0.80 0.18 1.42 
Oilseeds -8.73 -22.34 2.44 1.18 0.51 2.52 
Sugar -25.02 6.55 -0.25 -0.08 1.03 3.42 
Cattle & Sheep -34.50 -37.01 2.61 12.23 2.59 7.72 
Raw Milk 26.40 19.42 0.36 2.69 0.13 3.61 
Meat Processing -49.16 -24.12 2.26 18.14 8.58 4.30 
Other Meat Processing -3.32 -2.66 -0.21 0.40 0.40 0.41 
Other Food Processing 4.48 0.49 -0.06 -0.75 0.46 -0.39 
Milk Processing 21.31 21.51 0.33 3.73 6.19 6.81 
Sugar Processing -36.77 2.10 -0.03 -0.06 4.85 4.17 
Manufacturing 0.32 0.82 -0.19 -0.79 -0.84 -0.22 
Services 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 
Table 7.2: Percentage changes in sectoral output under CAP abolition  
 
 
 
Sector UK EU14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture 0.96 1.51 1.18 1.88 0.84 0.85 
Other primary -0.25 -0.25 -0.33 -0.35 -0.37 -0.37 
Wheat -3.23 -3.18 1.10 1.21 0.88 0.81 
Other grains -5.76 -3.69 1.34 1.82 0.90 0.99 
Oilseeds 16.63 17.27 1.42 1.61 1.13 1.18 
Sugar -30.58 -59.48 1.76 1.41 1.03 1.07 
Cattle & Sheep  12.31 7.12 1.02 1.79 0.85 0.92 
Raw Milk -68.42 -63.93 0.96 1.22 0.96 0.90 
Meat Processing  3.32 1.77 0.76 0.14 0.10 0.60 
Other Meat Processing 1.46 0.36 0.72 1.29 0.80 0.77 
Other Food Processing -3.93 -2.01 0.22 0.83 0.39 0.33 
Milk Processing -36.23 -36.09 0.61 0.72 0.46 0.32 
Sugar Processing -11.94 -20.50 0.93 1.18 0.31 0.78 
Manufacturing 0.23 -0.01 0.03 0.20 0.07 0.09 
Services 0.01 -0.10 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.14 
Table 7.3: Percentage changes in market prices under CAP abolition  
 
 
 
The pattern is much the same in the EU-14 region, although sugar beet production rises 
(7%) after CAP support is removed. This is primarily due to pro-competitive (see 
section 6.2) effects in the downstream sugar processing sector, where a fall in the mark-
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up is associated with increases in output per firm which implies increases in hierarchical 
intermediate input purchases.5 In both EU regions, the largest single user of sugar is the 
downstream sugar processing industry, where UK sugar processing experiences strong 
negative pro-competitive (mark-up increases 12%) effects which affects primary sugar 
production significantly in this region (-25%).6 Hence, large market price falls in the 
UK for primary sugar appear to be outweighed by negative pro-competitive effects 
further down the supply chain resulting in a net fall in sugar production under CAP 
abolition compared to the UR case. In the EU-14, this is not the case, with the mark-up 
falling 1.6%, output rises in both processed and sugar beet sectors.  
 
In the raw milk sectors, quota-free production increases 26% and 19% in the UK and 
EU-14 regions respectively, compared to the UR scenario. This is due to the large 
market price falls from abolition of the quota leading to increased demand. Further, the 
milk processing sector in the GTAP data accounts for 64% and 82% of total domestic 
raw milk production in the UK and EU-14 regions, respectively. In milk processing, the 
mark-ups fall in the UK (8.6%) and EU-14 (8.4%) regions with positive varietal effects, 
which further encourages the production of raw milk compared to the UR case.  
 
Table 7.4 shows percentage changes in aggregate consumer prices under CAP abolition 
compared to the UR case. The aggregate consumer price is an expenditure weighted 
share average of imported and domestically consumed goods, where the domestic price 
tends to dominate the composite price as domestic expenditure shares are significantly 
larger. Thus, changes in the consumer price will generally shadow changes in domestic 
market prices. A notable exception, however, is in the meat processing sector in both 
EU regions, where market prices (table 7.3) have risen, but aggregate consumer prices 
have fallen.  
 
In the UK, the domestic expenditure share in the ‘meat’ sector is smaller than in other 
sectors, such that domestic price rises in meat have smaller inflationary effects on the 
consumer composite price. More importantly, there are significant increases in imports 
                                                          
 
5 Intermediate input demand results are not tabulated since the number of subscripts (four) would require 
prohibitively large number of results tables. 
6 Under CAP abolition, elimination of the UK import tariff on processed sugar further encourages imports 
from the LDC region, which leads to further contractions in UK sugar processing. 
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to the UK (176%) and EU-14 (231%) (see table 7.6 below) of relatively lower priced 
meat processing products into both EU regions, resulting in net reductions in the 
composite consumer tradable price. Proliferations/reductions in product variants under 
conditions of high preference heterogeneity would have a much more significant effect 
on the composite consumer price. This will be discussed further in sub-section 7.4.5. 
 
 
Sector UK EU14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture 0.56 0.60 1.19 1.83 0.86 0.90 
Other primary -0.30 -0.32 -0.33 -0.35 -0.37 -0.37 
Wheat -3.58 -3.33 1.11 1.16 0.85 0.85 
Other grains -6.69 -5.80 1.37 1.75 0.98 1.06 
Oilseeds 6.04 4.26 1.56 1.54 1.17 1.53 
Sugar -32.07 -58.28 1.13 1.44 0.87 1.29 
Cattle & Sheep  5.50 0.39 1.14 1.82 0.98 1.18 
Raw Milk -68.42 -63.93 0.96 1.22 0.95 0.90 
Meat Processing  -11.88 -2.58 0.74 0.12 0.52 0.88 
Other Meat Processing 1.16 -0.19 0.76 1.29 0.91 0.89 
Other Food Processing -3.82 -2.19 0.21 0.76 0.32 0.29 
Milk Processing -36.15 -35.85 0.70 0.96 1.50 0.88 
Sugar Processing -23.60 -20.67 0.89 1.20 0.58 1.35 
Manufacturing 0.47 0.17 0.04 0.15 0.05 -0.07 
Services 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.19 0.01 -0.14 
Table 7.4: Percentage changes in aggregate consumer prices under CAP abolition  
 
 
7.2.3 CAP Abolition – Trade Effects 
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show the percentage changes in aggregate exports and imports by 
sector for each region under CAP abolition compared to the UR case. Under CAP 
abolition, each EU region’s exports reflect the domestic output changes (compare tables 
7.2 and 7.5), although in the case of UK milk processing and EU-14 milk and sugar 
processing sectors, exports fall despite domestic output increases. The reason for this 
lies in the strong domestic demand effects, both from final and intermediate consumers.  
 
For example, in the UK and EU-14 milk processing sectors, domestic private demands 
account for approximately 54% and 52% respectively of total milk processing 
production in the database. Significant increases in domestic private demand (UK – 
38%; EU-14 - 38%) capture much of the increase in domestic output (21% in both 
regions – table 7.2). Moreover, the milk processing sector also uses much of its own 
output as an intermediate input (particularly in the EU-14), where these demands also 
increase 11% and 18% in the UK and EU-14 regions respectively.  
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Sector UK EU14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture -11.21 -8.61 3.25 -2.72 7.52 16.52 
Other primary -0.52 -0.80 -0.04 -0.07 0.61 0.15 
Wheat -3.34 -2.20 -0.27 -0.53 7.90 3.15 
Other grains -41.57 -42.33 5.58 6.71 11.53 20.64 
Oilseeds -65.11 -66.72 6.86 9.00 6.32 12.98 
Sugar -19.24 -21.56 0.56 1.03 2.07 -0.60 
Cattle & Sheep  -80.48 -85.46 120.57 17.06 24.87 185.49 
Raw Milk* - - - - - - 
Meat Processing  -39.00 -73.77 33.98 120.05 156.39 245.08 
Other Meat Processing -10.73 -11.16 4.29 6.05 10.49 28.74 
Other Food Processing 15.11 7.48 2.61 -0.15 11.13 8.46 
Milk Processing -0.29 -35.63 10.50 30.12 45.52 83.56 
Sugar Processing -37.77 -38.63 7.72 3.31 59.73 46.62 
Manufacturing 0.03 0.34 -1.22 -1.94 -2.55 -1.34 
Services 0.10 0.37 -0.17 -1.27 -0.05 0.63 
Table 7.5: Percentage changes in aggregate sectoral exports under CAP abolition 
* Raw Milk is non-tradable. 
 
The reasons for these large increases in domestic demands are twofold. Firstly, the 
private and government household utility functions in the second level of the utility tree 
are specified as Cobb-Douglas. Consequently, income and own-price elasticities of 
demand are equal to 1 and –1 respectively. The implication is that increases in EU real 
incomes under CAP abolition leads to strong domestic final demand effects for all 
composite commodities. These effects are further compounded in the milk sectors, 
where large price falls under CAP abolition lead to concurrently large increases in 
domestic final demands for composite milk tradables. Secondly, significant increases in 
UK and EU-14 milk processing output to meet increases in final demands lead to large 
intermediate input purchases by processed milk sectors.  
 
Similar effects are also responsible for the significant falls in EU-14 primary and 
processed sugar exports (despite increases in output) relative to the UR case, where 
large domestic market price falls in primary sugar and therefore processed sugar, result 
in significant increases in domestic demands. Moreover, output increases in EU-14 
sugar processing increases domestic intermediate demands for EU-14 primary sugar 
which also undergoes export falls despite increases in output (table 7.2).  
 
In the non-EU regions, sectoral exports react to the strength of the EU market. CAP 
abolition leads to rises in non-EU exports in primary agricultural and food sectors (e.g. 
  225 
 
sugar, other grains, oilseeds, meat and other meat, milk and sugar processing sectors – 
table 7.5).  
 
 
Sector UK EU14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture 1.65 9.84 -0.87 1.38 -2.11 -1.70 
Other primary 0.53 0.85 -0.10 -0.52 -0.62 -0.27 
Wheat 0.96 4.22 -0.45 0.13 -0.26 -1.89 
Other grains 0.75 27.52 -1.49 -1.00 -2.60 -3.46 
Oilseeds 4.48 13.78 -1.08 0.15 -2.75 0.09 
Sugar 20.49 -59.30 0.16 1.23 1.10 3.93 
Cattle & Sheep  104.81 127.17 -1.44 -3.36 -34.33 -28.26 
Raw Milk* - - - - - - 
Meat Processing  175.90 233.17 1.77 -2.55 -31.21 -9.59 
Other Meat Processing 5.72 29.12 -10.99 -1.44 -5.57 -5.91 
Other Food Processing 1.60 17.43 2.16 6.28 2.89 -3.31 
Milk Processing 41.12 77.52 -31.33 -32.72 -27.33 -26.45 
Sugar Processing 52.24 128.11 0.23 -4.31 -14.61 -14.43 
Manufacturing -0.91 -4.90 -0.05 0.53 0.03 -0.71 
Services -0.47 -0.25 0.41 1.12 0.11 -0.84 
Table 7.6: Percentage changes in aggregate sectoral imports under CAP abolition  
* Raw Milk is non-tradable. 
 
 
In table 7.6, the tendency is for EU-15 imports to rise in food related sectors under CAP 
abolition compared to the UR case. On the other hand, EU-14 sugar beet imports fall 
markedly (-59%), where domestic production has increased. Moreover, in UK and EU-
14 manufacturing and services sectors, increases in domestic output also result in falling 
import demands.  
 
7.2.4 Land Uptake in the EU Agricultural Sectors 
Table 7.7 shows the percentage changes in the price and use of land in the primary 
agricultural sectors of the EU under CAP abolition compared to the UR case. The 
bottom row shows the percentage change in cereals land required to abolish all set-
aside. The total endowment of non-cereals (i.e. pasture) land area stays exogenous in all 
simulation scenarios. 
 
CAP abolition has a noticeable impact on land allocation in the EU regions. In both the 
UK and the EU-14 regions, there is a further shift towards the cereals sectors’ uptake of 
cereals land, (although significant cereals land price falls are required for cereals sectors 
to take up former set-aside land), with concurrent reductions in land use for livestock 
pasture (-23% and -27% for the UK and EU-14 respectively). On the other hand, 
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changing land use patterns suggests that there is a clear shift of emphasis in raw sugar 
production from the UK to the EU-14. In the case of raw milk, abolition of the binding 
quota results in significant increases in land uptake in both regions.  
 
 UK EU-14 
Aggregate Factor Price 
Non-Cereals Land                      -26.74                     -13.69 
Cereals Land                      -71.63                     -63.26 
Quantity Demanded 
Other Agriculture                        -1.53                       -0.99 
Wheat                       17.98                      17.31 
Other Grains                       14.85                      16.97 
Oilseeds                       14.24                        6.57 
Raw Sugar                      -17.23                        7.59 
Cattle & Sheep                      -22.82                     -26.66 
Raw Milk                       27.05                      18.33 
Non-Cereals Land Area                         0.00                        0.00 
Cereals Land Area                       16.57                      15.60 
Table 7.7: Percentage changes in land use and aggregate factor prices under CAP 
abolition  
 
Finally, the return on both land types under CAP abolition, compared to the UR 
scenario, declines dramatically. This is due to contractions in most EU primary 
agricultural sectors, where the return on sectorally trapped land falls. Moreover, the 
abundance of the cereals land endowment is further increased with complete elimination 
of all forms of set-aside.  
 
7.2.5 Agricultural Household Income 
Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show the component parts of incomes to the agricultural producers 
and asset holders in each of the EU regions. The composition of the total income is 
disaggregated into factor incomes minus depreciation, CAP support and quota rents. 
Each of the cells in both tables gives values in millions of dollars (1995 prices). The 
final column on the right hand side compares the component changes in agricultural 
household income between the UR and CAP scenarios. 
 
In the UR case, most of the increase in ‘agricultural household’ income comes in the 
form of the increase in the quota rent in the milk sector. With the quota still in place, 
large price increases are required to keep milk output levels within binding limits (the 
price increase is a shortcoming of the chosen characterisation of the quota, and is 
discussed further in chapter 8). Net factor incomes rise US$3,192m and US$34,260m 
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 UK Region 
 1995 data UR CAP CAP vs. UR 
Cereals Land 324 369 86 -283 
Non Cereals Land 4,252 5,205 4,068 -1,137 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labour 473 488 460 -28 
Unskilled Labour 10,797 12,987 12,262 -725 
Capital 2,983 2,975 3,047 72 
Depreciation  2,033 2,036 1,976 -60 
NET FACTOR INCOME 16,796 19,988 17,947 -2,041 
Headage Payments 584 525 0 -525 
Set-Aside Compensation: 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
 
201 
111 
71 
 
201 
111 
71 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
-201 
-111 
-71 
Price Support Compensation:  
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
 
1,273 
707 
276 
 
1,463 
766 
340 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
-1,463 
   -766 
   -340 
Quota Rent: 
Raw Milk 
 
1,633 
 
5,654 
 
0 
 
-5,654 
TOTAL 21,652 29,119 17,947 -11,172 
Table 7.8: Decomposition of Agricultural Producer and Asset Holders Regional 
Income in the UK ($US millions) 
 
EU-14 Region 
 1995 data UR CAP CAP vs. UR 
Cereals Land 2,452 2,349 652 -1,697 
Non Cereals Land 31,811 42,630 38,275 -4,355 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labour 6,433 6,816 6,576 -240 
Unskilled Labour 94,640 117,148 113,280 -3,868 
Capital 31,685 32,470 32,256 -214 
Depreciation  22,894 22,906 20,692 -2,214 
NET FACTOR INCOME 144,247 178,507 170,347 -8,160 
Headage Payments 2,083 1,955 0 -1,955 
Set-Aside Compensation: 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
 
1,057 
1,100 
613 
 
1,057 
1,100 
613 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
-1,057 
-1,100 
-613 
Price Support Compensation:  
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
 
6,694 
6,977 
2,672 
 
6,752 
6,050 
2,587 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
-6,752 
-6,050 
-2,587 
Quota Rent: 
Raw Milk 
 
9,895 
 
32,777 
 
0 
 
-32,777 
TOTAL 175,338 231,398 170,347 -61,051 
Table 7.9: Decomposition of Agricultural Producer and Asset Holder’s Regional 
Income in the EU-14 ($US millions) 
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from the 1995 benchmark for the UK and EU-14 respectively, with minor changes to 
de-coupled area compensation. Set-aside compensation is left unchanged under the UR 
scenario. 
 
Under CAP abolition, all forms of de-coupled support and quota rent are eliminated. As 
a result, much of the loss in income to agricultural producers and asset holders under 
CAP abolition compared to the UR base case (US$11,172m and US$61,051 for the UK 
and EU-14 respectively) is attributed to these reforms, although there are also 
reductions in net factor incomes to both regions of US$2,041 and US$8,160 from the 
UK and EU-14 regions respectively. 
 
7.2.6 The CAP Budget 
Details of the modelling behind the CAP budget were given in section 5.6.10, and the 
results for each policy scenario are presented in Table 7.10, with figures for the UK, the 
EU-14 and the entire EU. Reductions in export and output expenditures in the UR 
scenario, as well as reductions in tariff rates, result in falls in CAP expenditures and 
revenues compared to the benchmark 1995 data. With significant falls in CAP 
expenditure in the UR case, UK and EU-14 resource contributions fall US$1,849.33m 
and US$6,220.82m respectively relative to the 1995 benchmark. The net contributory 
position in the UK improves, which implies that the EU-14 net contributory position 
worsens to preserve zero CAP budget balance. 
 
US $millions 1995 data UR CAP 
UK 
CAP Expenditure 5,756 4,359 0 
Tariff Revenue 804 787 0 
Resource Contribution 8,952 7,103 0 
Net Contribution -4,000 -3,531 0 
EU-14 
CAP Expenditure 36,911 29,992 0 
Tariff Revenue 2,799 2,569 0 
Resource Contribution 30,112 23,892 0 
Net Contribution 4,000 3,531 0 
EU-15 
CAP Expenditure 42,667 34,351 0 
Tariff Revenue 3,603 3,356 0 
Resource Contribution 39,064 30,995 0 
Net Contribution 0 0 0 
Table 7.10: Changes in the CAP Budget ($millions 1995) 
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Under CAP abolition, all payments/receipts with respect to the FEOGA budget are 
discontinued. Thus, the saving to the EU-15, in terms of import tariffs and resource 
contributions (i.e., GDP and VAT contributions) compared to the UR scenario, is 
US$34bn. Disaggregating this figure by both EU regions, the UK and EU-14 save 
approximately US$8bn and US$26bn in FEOGA contributions compared to the UR 
case.  
 
7.2.7 Welfare Effects 
Table 7.11 shows each region’s change in regional real incomes under CAP abolition. 
Before discussing the results, a few caveats must be mentioned. Firstly, it seems 
intuitively appealing to gauge the costs of a policy compared to the existing state of 
agriculture under the Uruguay Round reforms plus factor endowment and productivity 
projections, rather than comparing results to a simulation solely consisting of 
projections. In the latter case, it is likely that such a comparison would suggest 
exaggerated gains in EU real incomes. Secondly, because much of the support under the 
CAP has been characterised as either partially or completely de-coupled from 
production, it can be expected that the estimated benefit/loss of a policy scenario will be 
smaller compared to most studies where CAP support is treated as an ad valorem output 
subsidy wedge. Finally, the presence of imperfect competition in the model is likely to 
raise the size of the estimates somewhat, where pro-competitive effects lead to 
increased output magnitudes, and varietal effects increase consumer utility, particularly 
under high preference heterogeneity which will be discussed in detail in the next 
section.  
 
 EV ($mill) change from UR scenario EV (% change) 
UK   8,814   0.90 
EU-14 17,770   0.29 
EU-15 26,584   0.54 
USA      170 +0.00 
CAIRNS   2,100   0.09 
LDCs                              -2,610 -0.12 
ROW                            -10,820 -0.16 
Total EV 15,424  0.06 
Table 7.11: Changes in equivalent variation (EV) under CAP abolition 
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Under CAP abolition, real incomes in the UK and EU-14 increase 0.90% and 0.29% 
respectively relative to the UR case, with increases in EU-15 real incomes of 0.54%.7 
Clearly, removal of all support and quantity constraints results in resource allocation 
effects in favour of more efficient industries, which is reflected by real output (qgdpr) 
increases of 0.49% and 0.31% for the UK and EU-14 respectively. The USA and 
CAIRNS regions are in improved positions after CAP abolition, although LDC and 
ROW real incomes fall. Global welfare improves 0.06% from the UR case. Finally, 
changes in real food expenditure (not shown) by food consumers in each EU region 
shadows changes in real incomes (EV) relative to the base case. This is due to unitary 
income elasticities for composite tradables by both private and public households.  
 
7.3 Varietal Effects and Agricultural Policy Costs – Experimental Design  
The results the following sections focus on the influence on welfare of patriotic product 
perceptions by UK consumers. Thus, the CAP abolition case (experiment (ii) in section 
7.1) is compared to a corresponding scenario where only UK consumers exhibit high 
preference heterogeneity (experiment (iv), see figure 7.2).  
 
Experiment (v): 
UR scenario + 
projections (2005); 
high γ 
 
Experiment (iv): 
CAP abolition  
scenario + 
projections (2005); 
high γ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benchmark data (1995)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment (ii): CAP 
abolition scenario + 
projections (2005); 
low γ 
Experiment (i):  
UR scenario + 
projections (2005); 
low γ 
Figure 7.2: A Schematic Representation of the Experimental Design  
 
                                                          
7 Clearly, with abolition of the CAP budget, the UK (which is a net loser in 1995) stands to gain large 
additions to its income (i.e., US$3.5bn. of the US$8.8bn EV gain comes from the abolition of the CAP 
budget. In the case of the EU-14, being a net gainer in 1995, the opposite is the case where the EU-14 
loses some income from abolition of the CAP budget. 
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 In light of constraints on the preference heterogeneity parameter (0≤γi≤1) and in the 
absence of any detailed data, the value of γi (= 0.75) is chosen arbitrarily to reflect an 
extreme behavioural position relative to that of low preference heterogeneity under 
experiment (ii). A similar experiment is carried out under the UR low (experiment (i)) 
and high (experiment (v)) heterogeneity cases, although these results are not presented 
here. A full list of tables for this comparison is provided in appendix B. Figure 7.2 
presents a full schematic interpretation of these experiments. 
 
Once again, each imperfectly competitive sector is calibrated to a five firm 
concentration ratio with standard Cournot conjectural behaviour exhibited by each firm. 
Further experiments are carried out to isolate the effects of changes in imperfectly 
competitive concentration ratios as well as conjectural variation scenarios other than the 
standard Cournot case. 
 
7.4 Overview of Preference Heterogeneity Conditions 
The emphasis of this section is to examine the effects of preference heterogeneity. In 
experiment (ii), all agents exhibit low preference heterogeneity. The implications of this 
are twofold. Firstly, different representative varieties yield a narrower band of 
benchmark hierarchical utility levels. Secondly, proliferations/reductions in product 
variants in the choice set of representative varieties have negligible effects on consumer 
behaviour. Experiment (ii) is used as the comparator for experiment (iv), where only UK 
consumers exhibit high preference heterogeneity. Thus, preference orderings are 
‘strong’, with favoured representative varieties yielding significantly larger levels of 
benchmark hierarchical utility. Moreover, the responsiveness of purchasing behaviour 
to proliferations/reductions in product variants is high, where variety perceptions (based 
on region of origin) are considered by UK consumers to be much more important.  
 
7.4.1 Benchmark Representative Variety Preferences 
This approach follows the work of Kaynak et al. (1983), Howard (1989), Morris and 
Hallaq (1990) and Juric et al. (1996) (see chapter 3), where consumers of food products 
have a strong tendency to favour the domestic variety. To capture this patriotic bias in 
the preference hierarchy using a suitably tailored criterion, hierarchical preferences for 
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representative varieties are calibrated using trade shares by agent, where typically the 
domestic variety trade share is the largest.  
 
 Region of Origin 
Representative 
Varieties 
UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDC ROW 
 
Total 
Meat  processing 0.735 0.068 0.003 0.164 0.025 0.005 1 
Other meat processing 0.834 0.156 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.001 1 
Other food processing 0.813 0.126 0.010 0.018 0.016 0.017 1 
Milk processing 0.893 0.072 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.002 1 
Sugar processing 0.546 0.054 0.004 0.013 0.379 0.004 1 
Manufacturing 0.451 0.318 0.066 0.027 0.035 0.103 1 
Services 0.943 0.022 0.015 0.003 0.005 0.012 1 
Table 7.12: UK Private Consumer Preferences (Vi,r,s) by Representative Variety 
 
 
 Region of Origin 
Representative 
Varieties 
UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDC ROW 
 
Total 
Meat  processing 0.537 0.119 0.005 0.287 0.043 0.009 1 
Other meat processing 0.739 0.244 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.002 1 
Other food processing 0.654 0.233 0.018 0.033 0.029 0.033 1 
Milk processing 0.459 0.369 0.003 0.156 0.002 0.011 1 
Sugar processing 0.853 0.018 0.001 0.004 0.123 0.001 1 
Manufacturing 0.591 0.236 0.049 0.020 0.026 0.078 1 
Services 0.973 0.010 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.006 1 
Table 7.13: UK Public Consumer Preferences (Vi,r,s) by Representative Variety 
 
The rankings for UK private and public consumers are given in tables 7.12 and 7.13 
respectively. Larger rankings are associated with higher hierarchical benchmark 
utilities, where these utility differences are controlled by the heterogeneity parameter, γi. 
Note that in some sectors, the strength of this patriotic preference is considerably 
weaker than in other sectors. For example, UK manufacturing has relatively small 
private and public preference values (0.451 and 0.591 respectively), implying weaker 
patriotic preference 
 
7.4.2 Varietal Diversity and Hierarchical Utility 
Changes in UK domestic support and protection lead to resource reallocations which 
may result in proliferations/reductions in the number of domestic product variants. With 
UK consumers now exhibiting high preference heterogeneity, changes in diversity 
associated with a given representative variety result in significant movements in 
hierarchical utility which lead to changes in final and intermediate consumer demands. 
As a result, relative changes in demand patterns will lead to resource shifts in industry 
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output. Moreover, in some sectors where patriotic preference is not strong in the 
benchmark case, large proliferations in second or even third favoured foreign 
representative varieties may have detrimental effects on UK domestic outputs and 
sectoral trade balances. 
 
It must be made clear that absolute changes in varietal diversity from the 1995 
benchmark data are as important as relative changes in varietal diversity between low 
and high preference heterogeneity scenarios. For example, a 25% absolute increase in 
varietal diversity under both sets of preference heterogeneity conditions will have a 
much more significant effect on hierarchical utility under high preference heterogeneity, 
although there is a zero percent relative change in variety between low and high 
preference heterogeneity scenarios. 
 
On the other hand, it may be the case that the level of relative varietal diversity has 
fallen under high preference heterogeneity. It is still possible for hierarchical utility to 
rise relative to the low heterogeneity case, provided there is an absolute increase in the 
level of variety from the 1995 benchmark under high heterogeneity. Table 7.14 presents 
percentage changes in varietal diversity in absolute terms.    
 
 
  Meat  Other 
meat  
Other 
food  
Milk  Sugar  Manu Service 
LOW -31.73 12.76 11.70 5.61 -29.35 7.24 10.56 UK 
HIGH -54.62 16.01 13.47 7.29 -49.60 4.77 11.25 
LOW -6.44 13.98 9.37 8.83 1.74 9.06 10.57 EU-14 
HIGH -6.25 13.88 9.33 8.83 1.72 9.26 10.54 
LOW 25.17 20.37 13.91 18.75 0.18 9.11 14.99 USA 
HIGH 25.17 20.36 13.93 18.74 0.23 9.16 14.99 
LOW 30.93 18.79 23.04 35.29 27.22 20.95 26.74 CAIRNS 
HIGH 33.11 18.70 23.02 35.28 27.02 20.98 26.73 
LOW 28.18 22.74 24.04 39.34 23.85 30.94 28.12 LDC 
HIGH 28.52 22.73 24.05 39.34 25.09 30.99 28.09 
LOW 15.89 15.11 14.35 21.83 14.83 15.33 16.50 ROW 
HIGH 16.03 15.13 14.36 21.89 14.96 15.43 16.49 
Table 7.14: Absolute percentage changes in the number of firms/product variants 
(ni,r) under low (experiment (ii)) and high (experiment (iv)) preference 
heterogeneity 
 
 
Thus, UK meat processing, sugar processing and manufacturing sectors show declines 
in varietal diversity relative to experiment (ii). On the other hand there are relative rises 
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in the number of product variants compared to experiment (ii) in ‘other meat’, ‘other 
food’, ‘milk processing’, and ‘services’ sectors in the UK. 
 
In the EU-14, changes in the number of firms are of the same sign as in the UK, except 
for sugar processing, where the number of firms increases. Under high preference 
heterogeneity, increases in LDC sugar variants have a greater impact on UK consumer 
choice, such that UK sugar processing imports from the LDCs increase which leads to 
further contractions in the UK sugar processing sector.  
 
Relative changes in variety between low and high preference heterogeneity scenarios 
are small. Indeed, relative varietal diversity changes in all the non-EU regions are 
insignificant. Clearly, large resource re-allocative effects from high preference 
heterogeneity within a ‘small-country’ such as the UK, have negligible effects on non-
UK sectors. 
 
Changes in varietal diversity are reflected in the levels of hierarchical utility associated 
with the consumption of a representative variety (see section 6.1). Table 7.15 shows 
changes in UK hierarchical utility under experiment (iv) relative to experiment (ii) for 
final consumers.8 In all cases, relative increases/decreases in the number of product 
variants of the domestic representative variety lead to associated increased/reduced 
hierarchical utility. For example, reference to table 7.14 shows that UK meat processing 
undergoes a reduction in varietal diversity of  -22.89% relative to experiment (ii). This 
is reflected in table 7.15 by reductions in domestic hierarchical utility of 19.26% and 
16.03% for private and public final consumers, respectively, relative to experiment (ii). 
 
 Domestic private (zpsirs) and public (zgsirs) hierarchical utility 
 zpsirs zgsirs
Meat  processing -19.26 -16.03 
Other meat processing    5.21   4.88 
Other food processing   4.36   3.84 
Milk processing   2.52   1.68 
Sugar processing                        -15.35                        -19.53 
Manufacturing   1.08   1.28 
Services   3.95  4.01 
Table 7.15: UK private and public domestic representative hierarchical utility 
under experiment (iv) relative to experiment (ii) (% changes) 
                                                          
8 Intermediate hierarchical utility (zfsi,r,j,s) results are not tabulated since the number of subscripts (four) 
would require prohibitively large number of results tables. 
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In the case of UK manufacturing, the number of product variants is still rising in 
absolute terms under experiment (iv), although compared to the low heterogeneity 
experiment (ii) there is a fall. In this case, hierarchical utility still increases for the 
domestic product under high preference heterogeneity, where the importance of 
absolute increases in the number of product variants under high preference 
heterogeneity outweighs the relative varietal fall.  
 
A separate but related hierarchical utility effect on final demands is the resulting 
changes in composite hierarchical utility. Composite hierarchical utility (see appendix 
6.1, (A13)) is an expenditure weighted share of changes in hierarchical utility from the 
consumption of representative varieties from each region. Thus, changes in domestic 
varietal diversity (where domestic expenditure shares dominate), command changes in 
composite hierarchical utility in a given region. Table 7.16 shows changes in composite 
hierarchical utility in the UK. In most cases composite hierarchical utility shadows 
hierarchical utility movements in the dominant domestic variety (compare table 7.16 
with table 7.15).  
 
Private (zpis) and public (zgis) hierarchical composite utility  
zpi,UK zgi,UK
Meat  processing -10.02    -3.27 
Other meat processing    4.56     4.08 
Other food processing    3.67     2.85 
Milk processing    2.30     2.03 
Sugar processing  -4.05 -14.94 
Manufacturing   1.16     1.15 
Services   3.73    3.90 
Table 7.16: UK private and public domestic composite hierarchical utility under 
experiment (iv) relative to experiment (ii) (% change) 
 
At constant prices, a proliferation in the level of overall (i.e., composite) variety 
(dominated by the favoured domestic variety) on each consumer’s varietal spectrum 
lowers the per unit expenditure (i.e., composite price) necessary to attain the same 
amount of utility (section 6.1.5). Falls in the composite price of a particular commodity 
under Cobb-Douglas preferences (i.e., price elasticity = -1), will lead to rises in final 
demands for composite differentiated commodity ‘j’, which will also have positive 
effects on final demands for regional representative varieties of commodity ‘j’ in the 
nest. 
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Thus, in those sectors where proliferations occur, final demands will rise, which will 
further encourage pro-competitive effects and vice-versa. Moreover, following Francois 
et al. (1995) the implications of including non-nested Armington structures into 
representative variety demands enlarges the size of the market, where domestic and 
foreign firms compete directly, resulting in larger pro-competitive effects. Given the 
 ‘small country’ assumption, significant reallocative effects within the UK have muted 
effects on foreign prices and outputs. It is for this reason that the results in the following 
sections concentrate mainly on the UK. 
 
7.4.3 UK Final Demands  
Table 7.17 shows changes in UK private and public agents’ final demands for domestic 
and foreign representative varieties when moving from low to high preference 
heterogeneity in the UK under CAP abolition. In the UK ‘other meat’, ‘other food’, 
‘milk’, ‘manufacturing’ and ‘services’ sectors, increases in domestic hierarchical utility 
(see table 7.15) lead to increases in domestic final demands (see table 7.17). For 
example, relative to experiment (ii), the UK ‘other food’ sector experiences a rise in 
varietal diversity of 1.77% (calculated from table 7.14), which leads to an increase in 
final demand of 9.69% and 10.53% for private and public final consumers respectively. 
 
 
  Meat  Other 
meat  
Other 
food  
Milk  Sugar  Manu Service 
PHH -36.11 10.18 9.69 8.02 -43.81 1.30 4.83 DOMESTIC 
GHH -33.45 10.96 10.53 1.23 -27.50 3.35 4.64 
PHH 46.40 -3.44 -1.14 4.63 11.27 13.71 3.19 EU-UK 
GHH 8.95 1.51 4.13 7.02 86.87 12.94 2.37 
PHH 193.84 -13.11 -3.94 6.28 36.84 8.55 4.01 USA-UK 
GHH 59.85 -10.21 -0.09 3.16 195.73 9.89 3.18 
PHH 210.99 -8.46 -3.77 17.91 50.05 9.48 4.96 CAIRNS-UK 
GHH 109.47 -7.67 1.45 45.01 249.14 11.09 4.13 
PHH 176.62 -11.54 -4.18 8.06 99.36 14.19 7.59 LDC-UK 
GHH 62.97 -9.05 1.51 4.30 277.69 16.17 6.24 
PHH 119.98 -7.90 -3.60 5.77 43.38 12.50 4.43 ROW-UK 
GHH 33.21 -7.32 0.73 3.97 221.15 13.39 3.60 
Table 7.17: Percentage change in final demands (private and public) by UK 
consumers under experiment (iv) compared to experiment (ii) (% changes) 
Final Demands: PHH – Private HouseHold; GHH – Government HouseHold. 
 
The opposite occurs in the UK ‘meat’ and ‘sugar’ sectors, where large reductions in 
varietal diversity result in significant falls in UK final demands relative to experiment 
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(ii). For example, in the ‘meat’ sector, private and public final demands for the UK 
representative variety fall 36% and 33% respectively. Moreover, relative reductions in 
UK sugar and meat sector product varieties are accompanied by large absolute increases 
in rival foreign product variants (table 7.14). Thus, non-UK variety final demands for 
‘sugar’ and ‘meat’ by UK consumers increase significantly relative to the low 
preference heterogeneity case (see table 7.17). 
 
Increases in UK private and public final demands for domestic ‘milk’ (8% and 1%), 
‘manufacturing’ (1% and 3%) and ‘service’ (5% for both) varieties are accompanied by 
concurrent increases in non-UK ‘milk’, ‘manufacturing’ and ‘service’ representative 
variety demands by UK agents relative to experiment (ii). This is due to falls in 
corresponding foreign sector market prices relative to the UK (due to significant rises in 
UK domestic factor prices - see table 7.20) when moving to the high preference 
heterogeneity experiment (ii).  
 
Increases in UK final demands for non-UK manufacturing representative varieties are 
also linked to weak patriotic preference (section 7.4.1). Since UK manufacturing is 
weakly preferred by UK consumers, strong absolute proliferations in foreign 
manufacturing product varieties (table 7.14) leads to increased UK manufacturing 
imports by final consumers relative to the low heterogeneity case.  
 
Percentage differences in foreign demands (not shown here) for UK products between 
the low and high heterogeneity experiments under each policy scenario are small for 
two reasons. Firstly, foreign demands are still characterised by low preference 
heterogeneity. Secondly, UK representative varieties typically have a low ranking value 
on foreign private and public consumers’ varietal spectrums. Thus, 
proliferations/reductions in varietal diversity in the UK only has a small 
positive/negative effect on foreign purchasing decisions. Finally, all percentage changes 
in foreign demands are based on small benchmark UK export trade values. 
 
7.4.4 UK Pro-Competitive and Output Effects 
The mark-up characterises the size of the wedge between the output price and long run 
average variable costs of the firm. Thus, if the mark-up is 0.15, then average variable 
cost per unit is 85% of the output price. Clearly reductions in the mark-up narrow the 
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gap between output price and average variable costs, which by implication leads to 
pricing policies closer to those of perfect competition.  
 
 
 Regional Mark-Ups  
 UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDC ROW 
Meat  processing 0.152 0.187 0.189 0.187 0.187 0.165 
Other meat processing 0.168 0.192 0.192 0.185 0.182 0.179 
Other food processing 0.163 0.185 0.187 0.180 0.177 0.189 
Milk processing 0.173 0.195 0.196 0.187 0.171 0.180 
Sugar processing 0.136 0.190 0.173 0.185 0.185 0.162 
Manufacturing 0.127 0.172 0.163 0.145 0.151 0.172 
Services 0.190 0.195 0.195 0.191 0.191 0.195 
Table 7.18: 1995 Regional Weighted Mark-Ups 
 
The regional benchmark mark-ups for each sector, presented in table 7.18, are weighted 
by sales share over all markets (i.e. domestic and export), where domestic market mark-
ups have a dominant weight. Table 7.19 presents percentage changes in UK industry 
output, output per firm and sectoral mark-ups in the UK in experiment (iv) compared to 
experiment (ii). 
 
 Industry output Firm output Mark-up 
Other agriculture -0.93 - - 
Other primary -1.80 - - 
Wheat -2.76 - - 
Other grains -3.25 - - 
Oilseeds -1.49 - - 
Raw Sugar -18.10 - - 
Cattle & sheep -3.71 - - 
Raw milk* 3.21 - - 
Meat processing -25.70 -3.76 4.09 
Other meat processing 5.48 1.74 -1.21 
Other food processing 2.22 0.24 -0.17 
Milk processing 3.33 1.42 -0.99 
Sugar processing -25.64 -11.26 11.58 
Manufacturing -4.11 -1.41 1.07 
Services 1.04 0.27 -0.18 
Table 7.19: Industry/Firm Output and Mark-ups in the UK in experiment (iv) 
compared to experiment (ii)  (% change).  
(*Raw Milk is non-tradable) 
 
Domestic demand changes have significant effects on sectoral output. For example, 
large falls in meat and sugar processing final (see table 7.17) and intermediate 
hierarchical demands result in 26% falls in sectoral outputs in both of these sectors 
relative to experiment (ii) (table 7.19). The same effect occurs in the opposite direction 
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in the ‘other meat’, ‘other food’, ‘milk processing’ and ‘services’ sectors, which 
experience increases in industry output of 5%, 2%, 3% and 1% respectively. 
 
In the UK manufacturing sector, significant increases in factor prices (see table 7.20), 
weak patriotic preference and significant manufacturing product proliferations in non-
UK regions, leads to a contraction of 4% in UK manufacturing relative to experiment 
(ii). Significant output falls under high preference heterogeneity in primary ‘sugar’ and 
‘cattle and sheep’ sectors are due to contractions in their downstream counterparts (i.e. 
‘sugar’ and ‘meat’ processing), although raw milk production increases in response to 
rising intermediate input demands by the downstream milk processing sector. Falls in 
other primary sectors are largely due to resource reallocations in favour of expanding 
food processing and service sectors. Pro-competitive effects (i.e., mark-up falls) 
improve in the ‘other meat’ (-1.21%), ‘other food’ (-0.17%), ‘milk’ processing (-0.99%) 
and ‘services’ (-0.18%) sectors relative to experiment (ii). In all cases, changes in 
industry and firm output are all positively correlated relative to experiment (ii). 
 
7.4.5 Price Effects 
Table 7.20 shows percentage changes in prices in the UK compared to experiment (ii). 
Increases in raw milk production are sufficient to bid up the relative price of non-cereals 
land (3.79%) despite output contractions in all other non-cereals land using sectors (i.e., 
‘other agriculture’, ‘sugar beet’, ‘cattle and sheep’, see table 7.19). The ‘cereals land’ 
factor price falls 0.17% relative to experiment (ii) since the cereals sectors also contract 
(see table 7.19) relative to the low heterogeneity case.  
 
The natural resource factor is specific to the ‘other primary’ sector, and falls 15.57% 
relative to experiment (ii) due to reductions in output in this sector. In the perfectly 
mobile labour and capital markets, factor prices are bid up by expanding food 
processing and services sectors (particularly the unskilled labour endowment which is 
projected to fall in the UK), although these factor price rises are dampened by 
reductions in manufacturing primary factor demands. Market prices in all productive 
sectors increase due to rises in mobile and non-cereals land factor prices.  
 
Aggregate consumer prices are a weighted average of domestic (which are much more 
heavily weighted) and imported goods prices. In all primary agricultural sectors, 
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increases in aggregate consumer prices are primarily due to the increases in domestic 
market price rises which are passed onto consumers. However, in most imperfectly 
competitive sectors, under both policy scenarios, consumer price changes are now 
generally dictated by varietal effects through changes in composite hierarchical utility 
(see section 6.1.5). This contrasts with the model estimates in section 7.2, where 
preference heterogeneity is low. 
 
 
 CAP Abolition 
 Market/factor  Price Consumer Price 
Cereals Land -0.17 - 
Non-Cereals land 3.79 - 
Unskilled labour 9.78 - 
Skilled labour 8.83 - 
Capital 8.48 - 
Natural resources -15.57 - 
Other agriculture 2.21 1.89 
Other primary 0.50 0.39 
Wheat 2.96 1.16 
Other grains 2.98 0.14 
Oilseeds 3.18 0.11 
Raw Sugar 3.29 0.03 
Cattle & sheep 3.08 2.66 
Raw milk 3.47 2.97 
Meat processing 2.73 12.53 
Other meat processing 1.24 -4.81 
Other food processing 1.52 -3.56 
Milk processing 1.50 -1.38 
Sugar processing 3.23 3.55 
Manufacturing 2.40 -0.56 
Services 3.75 -1.62 
Table 7.20: UK Prices under experiment (iv) compared to experiment (ii) (% 
changes) 
 
 
For example, in table 7.16, composite hierarchical utility in the meat processing sector 
falls 10% and 3% for UK private and public final consumers respectively. As a result, 
this increases the composite consumer price 13%. In other words, since varietal 
diversity in the meat sector in the UK has fallen under high preference heterogeneity, 
the cost of attaining an extra unit of utility from meat processing consumption has risen 
13% relative to experiment (ii).  
 
Moreover, private and public household demands are characterised by Cobb-Douglas 
preferences, which implies a unitary price elasticity of demand. Hence, if the composite 
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meat processing price rises, composite final demands for meat processing will fall 
which, in the absence of bilateral hierarchical and price effects, exerts downward 
pressure on all bilateral meat demands in the nest. 
 
7.4.6 Trade Effects 
Table 7.21 shows percentage changes in UK sector exports and imports in experiment 
(iv) relative to experiment (ii). Since non-UK preferences are still characterised by low 
preference heterogeneity, and the benchmark ranking of the UK representative variety 
on foreign varietal spectrums is typically very low, foreign imports of proliferating UK 
representative varieties do not change dramatically. Hence, the main source of relative 
changes in UK trade compared to experiment (ii) comes from relative demand and 
output changes from within the UK.  
 
 CAP Abolition 
 Exports Imports 
Other agriculture -13.80     4.76 
Other primary   -1.71    -1.73 
Wheat -13.05     6.53 
Other grains -10.25     5.50 
Oilseeds -13.67     4.71 
Sugar -13.68     5.08 
Cattle & sheep     0.07   11.65 
Raw Milk* - - 
Meat processing   -8.03 139.88 
Other meat processing   -4.94   -6.50 
Other food processing   -7.26   -4.74 
Milk processing   -5.45     3.71 
Sugar processing -13.14   44.47 
Manufacturing   -9.25    9.98 
Services -12.69    0.12 
UK Total   -9.64 - 
UK Total -   7.54 
Table 7.21: Percentage changes in sectoral trade under experiment (iv) compared 
to experiment (ii)  
(*Raw milk is non-tradable). 
 
Reductions in UK primary agricultural output (see table 7.19) under high preference 
heterogeneity result in falls in exports and rises in imports, although the exception is the 
primary livestock export market. Indeed, since the meat processing sector contracts 
significantly (-26% see table 7.19), intermediate inputs of cattle and sheep from this 
sector are affected accordingly.  Since UK meat processing is the second biggest user of 
UK cattle and sheep production, some cattle and sheep output is diverted towards export 
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markets, despite falls in domestic primary livestock production, resulting in a rise in 
exports of 0.07% relative to experiment (ii). 
 
In the ‘other meat processing’, ‘other food processing’ and ‘service’ sectors, output 
increases (table 7.19) relative to experiment (ii) are met by strong relative increases in 
domestic final (table 7.17) and intermediate demands in both scenarios, which are in 
response to strong domestic product proliferations in these sectors. This has the effect of 
diverting exportable produce under the corresponding low heterogeneity scenarios onto 
domestic markets. Moreover, UK exports are also relatively less competitive due to 
relative market price rises (from relative factor price increases) in the UK under high 
preference heterogeneity. 
 
Overall, relative reductions in final (table 7.17) and intermediate demands for ‘other 
meat’ and ‘other food’ leads to falls in sectoral imports of 6.5% and 4.74% respectively 
relative to experiment (ii). In the service sector, there are rises in final demands for 
foreign service products (table 7.17) leading to an overall increase in regional services 
imports of 0.12%. 
 
Relative increases in final and intermediate demands under high heterogeneity 
conditions for milk processing, outstrip domestic output increases (table 7.19) which 
leads to reductions in exports as well as a concurrent increase in imports. Moreover, 
strong absolute proliferations in foreign milk product variants also increase imports 
(3.71%) of milk into the UK compared to the low heterogeneity case.  
 
In the case of meat and sugar processing, relative falls in varietal diversity in the 
domestic sector, lead to increases in UK imports and concurrent reductions in UK 
exports. This effect is also increased by relative increases in UK market prices. 
Manufacturing sector exports also decline relatively due to significant increases in UK 
manufacturing prices, which reduce the competitiveness of the domestic representative 
variety. Moreover, the reduction in competitiveness coupled with weaker patriotic 
preference for UK manufacturing varieties and strong proliferations abroad, results in a 
10% increase in manufacturing imports relative to experiment (ii). The bottom two rows 
of table 7.21 show that UK regional exports decline 9.64% with concurrent increases in 
UK imports of 7.54% relative to experiment (ii). 
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Table 7.22 presents benchmark 1995 sectoral trade balances in the UK. Table 7.23 
shows the changes in sectoral trade balances and the UK trade balance under low and 
high preference heterogeneity conditions under CAP abolition as well as the relative 
change compared to the low heterogeneity case. The main result here is that the largest 
contributors to the deterioration in the UK trade balance are the manufacturing and 
services sectors. 
 
Sector Trade Balance Sector Trade Balance 
Other agriculture -5,669 Meat processing       16 
Other primary  1,621 Other meat processing -1,706 
Wheat    390 Other food processing    -535 
Other grains     70 Milk processing    -586 
Oilseeds  -403 Sugar processing    -879 
Sugar beet  -662 Manufacturing            -31,659 
Cattle and sheep   153 Services             20,717 
Raw milk* - Total Balance            -19,131 
Table 7.22: Benchmark sectoral trade balances in the UK ($US million 1995) 
(*Raw milk is non-tradable) 
 
 
CAP Abolition Sectors 
Low (experiment (ii)) High  (experiment (iv)) Change: (iv) – (ii) 
Other agriculture    -209      -728   -519 
Other primary  2,010    2,041      31 
Wheat      92        30     -62 
Other grains   -165     -217     -52 
Oilseeds   -150     -178      -28 
Sugar beet   -368     -409      -41 
Cattle and sheep   -559    -582      -23 
Raw milk - - - 
Meat processing              -3,912 -6,020  -2,108 
Other meat processing  -713     -581       132 
Other food processing                1,970   1,919         -51 
Milk processing -1,350 -1,466       -116 
Sugar processing -1,096 -1,682      -586 
Manufacturing             -22,277               -57,745 -35,468 
Services -8,244               -15,349   -7,105 
UK Trade Balance             -34,974               -80,969 -45,995 
Table 7.23: Changes in UK sectoral and total trade balances under low and high 
preference heterogeneity ($US Millions 1995) 
 
 
The changes in table 7.24 show the effects of introducing high preference heterogeneity 
on the aggregate exports and imports by other regions in the model aggregation. Note 
that each of the partner countries’ trade balances improves at the cost of the UK when 
high preference heterogeneity is introduced into the model. 
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 % Changes  EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Aggregate exports  0.70  0.36  0.28  0.42  0.73 
Aggregate Imports -0.85 -0.75 -0.48 -0.45 -1.11 
Table 7.24: Aggregate exports and imports in other regions following the 
introduction of high preference heterogeneity (%) 
 
 
7.4.7 Welfare Effects in the UK 
Table 7.25 shows that UK equivalent variation (EV) increases significantly when high 
preference heterogeneity is introduced into UK final and intermediate demands. Global 
product proliferations and resulting relative increases in composite hierarchical utility 
(see table 7.17) in most UK sectors lead to falls in representative variety composite 
prices. Thus, with Cobb-Douglas final demands, composite representative variety 
purchases (qpi,s, qgi,s) increase significantly which influences regional utility (ur) at the 
top of the utility tree.  
 
Thus, in table 7.25, EV increases in the UK when varietal effects are more heavily 
weighted. The terms of trade in the UK improves under high preference heterogeneity. 
As expected, real food expenditure by private and public consumers increases under 
each scenario with increases in regional incomes and Cobb-Douglas preferences 
(income elasticity of unity). The agricultural household fares better under high 
preference heterogeneity as agriculturally owned factor prices (mainly labour and 
capital factors) are bid up by increased activity in imperfectly competitive sectors. 
 
 CAP Abolition 
 Low (experiment (ii)) High (experiment (iv) 
EV $billion 280.690 382.423 
EV % 28.63 39.15 
Terms of Trade (%) 3.12 4.64 
Private food consumers 
EV $billion 
20.002 26.471 
Public food consumers 
EV $billion 
0.680 0.900 
Agric hhld EV $billions 0.199 2.151 
Table 7.25: Welfare changes in the UK under the CAP scenario 
 
Finally, the costs of the CAP to the UK are re-examined in table 7.35 by comparing the 
Uruguay Round and CAP abolition scenarios (experiments (v) and (iv)) under high 
preference heterogeneity. Table 7.26 compares these results with the low heterogeneity 
CAP costs in section 7.2.7. In a world characterised by high preference heterogeneity 
  245 
 
exhibited by UK consumers only, real income in the UK increases 1.08% which is 
greater than the 0.90% increase under low heterogeneity conditions. For the EU-14, 
there is no change in EV (due to the small country assumption). Thus, EU-15 real 
incomes increase 0.54% and 0.57% under low and high preference heterogeneity 
respectively. These welfare improvements are due to increases in varietal diversity 
which are now considered as more important (i.e., higher utility) by high preference 
heterogenous consumers in the UK.  
 
 EV (US$billions) EV (% change) 
CAP low vs. UR low:     UK   8.814 0.90 
                                         EU-14 17.770 0.29 
                                         EU-15 26.584 0.54 
CAP high vs. UR high:  UK 10.534 1.08 
                                         EU-14 17.940 0.29 
                                         EU-15 28.474 0.57 
Table 7.26: The costs of the CAP under low and high preference heterogeneity 
 
7.4.8 Further experiments 
Further simulations were run to examine the effects of changes in the imperfectly 
competitive structure under conditions of low and high preference heterogeneity. In 
each case, the comparisons are between the Uruguay Round scenario and the CAP 
abolition scenario. In this way, a range of estimates may be found for the costs of the 
CAP. 
 
The first set of experiments conducted involved calibrating the model to different 
numbers of firms in each imperfectly competitive sector (firm concentrations) in the 
benchmark. In the absence of any data on firm concentration levels to the sector/region 
aggregation of the model, the number of firms chosen for each sector in each 
experiment are the same, (3, 5, 10 and 15 firms under each experiment). Strategic 
conjecture between firms remains as standard Cournot, where firms do not react to 
output changes by rivals. The results of this experiment are displayed in table 7.27, 
where figures in parenthesis show the percentage change in EV from the corresponding 
UR case. 
 
In the EU regions, the results clearly show that the higher the concentration ratio (i.e., 
smaller number of firms) in the benchmark, the larger are the potential welfare gains 
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under both heterogeneity scenarios. This is because the initial mark-up distortions are 
larger which allows scope for larger pro-competitive effects and subsequent resource re-
allocations when protection is removed in the imperfectly competitive sectors.  
 
Under low preference heterogeneity, the costs of the CAP to the EU-15 range from 
0.44% to 0.67%. Under high preference heterogeneity, these welfare results are slightly 
larger and range between 0.47% and 0.73%. The LDC and ROW regions experience 
welfare losses, which diminish with reductions in concentration levels. In the USA and 
CAIRNS region, the welfare gain rises very slightly under both scenarios with lower 
firm concentration ratios. Finally, the global welfare results are also larger under higher 
firm concentration ratios (i.e., global pro-competitive effects are larger), where the EV 
range over both heterogeneity scenarios is between 0.05% and 0.09% of global GDP. 
 
 N=3 N=5 N=10 N=15 
Low heterogeneity 
UK  11.540    (1.18)    8.814    (0.90)     8.378   (0.86)    8.023    (0.82) 
EU-14  21.360    (0.34)  17.770    (0.29)  14.510    (0.24)  13.651    (0.22) 
EU-15  32.900    (0.67)  26.584    (0.54)  22.888    (0.46)  21.674    (0.44) 
USA    0.087    (0.00)    0.173    (0.00)    0.340    (0.00)    0.390    (0.00) 
CAIRNS    1.400    (0.05)    2.100    (0.09)    2.400    (0.11)    2.440    (0.11) 
LDC  -3.783    (-0.14)   -2.610   (-0.09)   -1.550   (-0.06)   -1.380   (-0.05) 
ROW -13.640   (-0.19) -10.820   (-0.15)   -9.830   (-0.14)   -9.146   (-0.13) 
Global EV  16.964    (0.07)  15.424    (0.06)  14.248    (0.06)  13.978    (0.05) 
High heterogeneity 
UK  12.424    (1.28)  10.534   (1.08)     9.849   (1.01)    9.633   (0.99) 
EU-14  24.340    (0.39)  17.940   (0.29)  14.660   (0.24)  13.940   (0.23) 
EU-15  36.764    (0.73)  28.474   (0.57)  24.509   (0.49)  23.573   (0.47) 
USA     0.064   (0.00)    0.120   (0.00)    0.290   (0.00)    0.330   (0.00) 
CAIRNS     1.700   (0.08)    2.260   (0.10)    2.620   (0.12)    2.670   (0.13) 
LDC   -5.820   (-0.21)  -2.660   (-0.10)   -1.550  (-0.06)   -1.380  (-0.05) 
ROW -11.170   (-0.16) -11.090  (-0.16) -10.050  (-0.14)   -9.780  (-0.14) 
Global EV  21.538    (0.09)  17.104   (0.07)  15.819   (0.06)  15.413   (0.06) 
Table 7.27: The Costs of the CAP ($US billions and % change in parenthesis) with 
different concentration ratios under both sets of heterogeneity conditions 
 
 
A second set of experiments explores the implications of changes in strategic conjecture 
between firms in each industry. A recapitulation of the structure of the mark-up (see 
section 6.2.1) reveals that price-cost ratios vary inversely with the number of firms and 
the market elasticity of demand, where Ω/Ν ranges between zero (perfect competition) 
and one (pure collusion). In the absence of detailed data on collusion levels throughout 
the imperfectly competitive sectors of the world, low and high arbitrary values of 
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Ω/Ν (0.05 and 0.7 respectively) are employed in the CAP abolition scenario under both 
heterogeneity conditions, and compared to the corresponding UR case.  
 
As before, the aim is to acquire a range of CAP costs under different conditions of 
collusion. The EV results (US$ billions 1995) are presented in table 7.28, where figures 
in parenthesis show the percentage change in EV from the UR case under both sets of 
heterogeneity conditions. For completeness, the standard Cournot conjecture (1/N) 
results are included in the table. In the case where rivals’ reactions to a given firm’s 
increase in output (0.05) are minimal, the UK and the EU-14 gain $US8bn (0.81%) and 
$US13bn (0.20%), respectively from abolition of the CAP, with the EU-15 gaining 
$US21bn (0.42%) of EU GDP. With the increased effects of variety, the high 
heterogeneity case leads to larger EU-15 welfare gain of $US26bn (0.52%), with most 
of this coming from the UK with a gain of  $US14bn (1.39%).  
 
 
Conjectural Variation Parameter = 0.05 =1/N = 0.70 
Low Heterogeneity 
UK    7.910     (0.81)    8.814     (0.90)    7.171    (0.74) 
EU-14  12.690     (0.20)  17.770     (0.29)   -1.321   (-0.02) 
EU-15  20.600     (0.42)  26.584     (0.49)    5.850    (0.12) 
USA    0.420     (0.01)    0.173     (0.00)    7.860    (0.12) 
CAIRNS    2.490    (0.10)    2.100     (0.09)  11.690    (0.49) 
LDC   -1.210   (-0.04)   -2.610    (-0.09)    5.460    (0.19) 
ROW   -9.260   (-0.13) -10.820    (-0.15)  10.390    (0.14) 
Global EV  13.040    (0.05)   15.424    (0.06)  41.250    (0.16) 
High Heterogeneity 
UK  13.537    (1.39)  10.534      (1.08)  11.784    (1.21) 
EU-14  12.670    (0.20)  17.940      (0.29)   -2.802    (-0.05) 
EU-15  26.207    (0.52)  28.474      (0.57)    8.982    (0.18) 
USA    0.290    (0.00)    0.120      (0.00)    6.890    (0.11) 
CAIRNS    4.320    (0.19)    2.260      (0.10)  11.980    (0.53) 
LDC   -1.380   (-0.05)   -2.660     (-0.10)    5.100    (0.19) 
ROW -10.300   (-0.15) -11.090     (-0.16)    7.580    (0.11) 
Global EV  19.137     (0.08)  17.104      (0.07)   40.532   (0.17) 
Table 7.28: Changes ($US billions and % change in parenthesis) in EV under 
different conjectures compared to the ‘base case’ 
 
 
In the case of highly collusive sectors, the EU-14 actually loses slightly from abolition 
of the CAP relative to the UR case, although the UK’s gains ($US7bn (0.74%) and 
$US12bn (1.21%) increases in real income under low and high preference 
heterogeneity, respectively) results in relative real income welfare gains to the EU-15 of 
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$US6bn (0.12%) and $US9bn (0.18%) under low and high heterogeneity conditions, 
respectively. The other notable result is that all non-EU regions gain under the high 
collusion scenario, which leads to significant global welfare gains under both low and 
high preference heterogeneity, respectively. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
Estimates in the CGE literature in the 1980s placed the cost of the CAP between 0.27% 
and 2.7% of EU GDP.  In the 1990s, these estimates have been revised downwards, 
with gains somewhere between 0.22% and 0.8% of EU GDP (see chapter 1). The 
corresponding estimate from sub-section 7.2.7, measured against the UR scenario 
(experiment (i)), places the cost of the CAP as 0.54% of EU GDP with welfare gains to 
the UK and EU-14 regions of 0.90% and 0.29% of regional GDP, respectively.   
 
Despite contractions in EU agricultural sectors under CAP abolition, land use patterns 
suggest that cereals production is still of considerable relative importance in primary 
agricultural sectors. Moreover, the pattern of sugar production moves in favour of the 
EU-14 and away from the UK.  Raw milk production also increases considerably in 
both regions relative to the UR case, where the reduction in market prices (from 
removal of the quota) attracts considerable increases in domestic final demand. 
 
Under CAP abolition, the UK trade balance deteriorates (US$4bn) relative to the UR 
case, although in the EU-14 there is an improvement (US$2bn). In the UK, considerable 
falls/rises in agri-food exports/imports are not compensated for by improvements in the 
manufacturing trade balance, as in the EU-14. Removal of all forms of support under 
CAP abolition reduces agricultural household incomes by US$11bn and US$61bn for 
the UK and EU-14, respectively, compared to the UR scenario. Finally, the analysis 
suggests that abolition of the CAP saves the EU US$34bn in resource and import tariff 
costs, of which approximately US$8bn of this saving accrues to the UK. 
 
Sections 7.3. and 7.4 examined the impacts of high preference heterogeneity in the UK 
under the CAP abolition scenario. Relative (to the UR case) and absolute (positive 
percentage change) product proliferations occur in the ‘other meat’, ‘other food’, ‘milk’ 
and ‘services’ sectors. In the ‘meat’ (‘manufacturing’) sector, varietal diversity is falling 
(rising)  under CAP abolition, although by less than under the corresponding low 
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heterogeneity case. In the ‘sugar’ sector, there is a significant relative and absolute (i.e., 
negative percentage change) fall in varietal diversity. 
 
There are two main price effects under these policy experiments. Firstly, 
proliferations/reductions in domestic variety generally dictates composite representative 
variety price falls/rises which leads to increases/falls in final demands in the UK.  
Secondly, increases in factor prices in response to large sectoral supply shifts are passed 
onto output prices, which result in reduced competitiveness in many UK tradable export 
markets.   
 
The net effect in the UK is that, while in many cases, increases in UK final patriotic 
demands encourages increases in domestic sectoral outputs, many of these sectors may 
also suffer trade balance deteriorations relative to the low heterogeneity case.  Examples 
of this include the ‘other meat’, ‘other food’, ‘milk’ and ‘services’ sectors.  
 
In the case of manufacturing, weak patriotic benchmark preferences, significant foreign 
manufacturing product proliferations and factor/output price rises in the UK contribute 
to significant relative falls in manufacturing output (4.11%) and exports (9.25%) and a 
large concurrent increase in the sectoral trade balance deficit (US$46bn). The 
importance of this is evident when examining the UK trade balance, where the 
manufacturing sector accounts for much of the deterioration in the overall UK trade 
deficit.   
 
In terms of welfare, proliferations in many UK sectors, as well as strong global product 
proliferations, result in increases in composite hierarchical utility to UK final and 
intermediate consumers.  With reductions in per unit expenditure (i.e., composite 
representative variety prices) to achieve the same level of utility, composite utilities rise 
significantly under Cobb-Douglas preferences, which leads to significant increases in 
regional utility in the top nest of the utility tree.  
 
Further, comparison of CAP abolition with the Uruguay Round scenario under high 
preference heterogeneity in the UK only, shows that the UK gains 1.08% of GDP, with 
the EU-14 gaining 0.29% of GDP (the same as the low preference heterogeneity case). 
As a result, the EU-15 gains 0.57% of GDP from CAP abolition under high preference 
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heterogeneity, which is greater than the corresponding low heterogeneity case (0.53%). 
The improvement to the EU-15 comes from the UK, where the utility gain from richer 
varietal diversity to UK consumers (on a global scale) gives an extra gain of 0.18% of 
UK GDP from CAP abolition compared to the corresponding low heterogeneity 
scenario.  
 
Further EV welfare experiments show that increases in firm concentration ratios yield 
higher relative welfare gains from CAP abolition to the EU regions, with gains ranging 
from 0.44%-0.67% of EU-15 GDP for low preference heterogeneity, and 0.47%-0.73% 
of EU-15 GDP under high preference heterogeneity. Similarly, global gains increase 
from between 0.05%-0.09% of GDP over both heterogeneity scenarios. Finally, under 
different conjectural variation scenarios, higher collusion results in smaller welfare 
gains to the EU-15, mainly due to relative falls in EV for the EU-14 relative to the UR 
case. Global gains are, however, significant under high collusion, with all non-EU 
regions experiencing welfare gains. 
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Appendix A: The Cost of the Agenda 2000 Reforms compared to the UR scenario. 
The numbering of the tables in the appendix corresponds to those in the main text. 
 
 
 
 UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture 0.86 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Other primary -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Wheat 3.41 2.43 -0.50 -0.61 -0.22 -0.18 
Other grains 4.20 1.91 -0.21 -0.12 -0.06 -0.14 
Oilseeds -0.28 -2.23 0.29 0.22 0.04 0.25 
Raw Sugar 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 
Cattle & sheep 4.59 5.39 -0.17 -0.53 -0.19 -0.67 
Raw milk 1.50 1.50 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 -0.20 
Meat processing 1.48 4.39 -0.09 -0.69 -0.36 -0.14 
Other meat processing 2.88 0.29 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
Other food processing 0.49 0.28 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Milk processing 1.49 1.36 -0.01 -0.18 -0.12 -0.35 
Sugar processing 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Manufacturing -0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Services -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Table A7.2: Percentage changes in sectoral output under Agenda 2000  
 
 
 
 
 UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture -0.15 0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 
Other primary -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Wheat -3.42 -2.50 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 
Other grains -3.25 -2.37 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 
Oilseeds 0.50 1.64 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 
Raw Sugar 0.22 0.77 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
Cattle & sheep -6.93 -6.89 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 
Raw milk -3.22 -2.92 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 
Meat processing -1.58 -3.34 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 
Other meat processing -1.68 -0.34 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 
Other food processing -0.25 -0.16 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Milk processing -1.69 -1.73 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
Sugar processing 0.07 0.14 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 
Manufacturing 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Services 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Table A7.3: Percentage changes in sectoral market prices under Agenda 2000  
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 UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture -0.13 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 
Other primary 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Wheat -2.44 -2.40 -0.13 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 
Other grains -1.91 -2.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 
Oilseeds 0.50 0.27 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 
Raw Sugar -0.04 0.73 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 
Cattle & sheep -6.29 -6.13 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.11 
Raw milk -3.22 -2.92 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 
Meat processing -1.26 -3.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 
Other meat processing -1.47 -0.34 -0.05 -0.07 -1.04 -0.06 
Other food processing -0.22 -0.15 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Milk processing -1.56 -1.68 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
Sugar processing 0.02 0.14 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 
Manufacturing 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Services 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 
Table A7.4: Percentage changes in aggregate consumer prices under Agenda 2000  
 
 
 
 
 
 UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture 0.97 -0.38 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.20 
Other primary 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
Wheat 10.38 10.70 -0.97 -1.97 -3.79 -2.72 
Other grains 10.37 6.12 -0.79 -1.18 -1.08 -2.75 
Oilseeds -1.38 -8.43 0.83 1.39 0.53 1.38 
Raw Sugar -0.80 -0.46 0.09 0.17 0.50 0.06 
Cattle & sheep 21.17 14.50 -13.17 -2.21 -2.36 -21.38 
Raw milk - - - - - - 
Meat processing 3.20 7.31 -1.51 -4.43 -4.27 -9.20 
Other meat processing 6.92 -0.89 -0.21 -0.23 -0.46 -0.60 
Other food processing 0.85 0.43 -0.12 -0.01 -0.14 -0.15 
Milk processing 1.34 1.41 -0.37 -1.65 -1.74 -4.62 
Sugar processing -0.01 -0.20 0.09 0.17 0.49 0.67 
Manufacturing -0.13 -0.24 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 
Services -0.20 -0.21 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.09 
Table A7.5: Percentage changes in aggregate sectoral exports under Agenda 2000  
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 UK EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDCs ROW 
Other agriculture 0.43 0.34 -0.04 -0.09 0.05 -0.03 
Other primary -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
Wheat -0.62 -0.81 -0.17 0.30 1.22 0.70 
Other grains 0.56 -2.16 0.14 0.18 0.50 0.37 
Oilseeds 0.52 1.78 -0.01 -0.06 -0.25 0.08 
Raw Sugar 0.66 2.31 -0.02 -0.09 0.08 0.05 
Cattle & sheep -3.48 -9.66 0.13 0.86 5.75 3.31 
Raw milk - - - - - - 
Meat processing 0.50 -11.51 -0.14 0.27 2.70 0.39 
Other meat processing -4.01 1.39 0.32 0.24 -0.38 0.39 
Other food processing -0.15 -0.05 0.26 0.10 0.20 0.21 
Milk processing -0.28 -2.52 1.13 1.12 0.60 1.15 
Sugar processing 0.57 1.39 -0.03 -0.11 0.05 -0.06 
Manufacturing 0.03 0.19 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.13 
Services 0.11 0.27 -0.16 -0.14 -0.04 -0.13 
Table A7.6: Percentage changes in aggregate sectoral imports under Agenda 2000  
 
 
 
 
 
 UK EU-14 
 AG2000 AG2000 
Aggregate Factor Price 
Non-Cereals Land   4.24   2.39 
Cereals Land  -3.50  -1.78 
Quantity Demanded 
Other Agriculture  -0.06  -0.30 
Wheat  15.31 11.45 
Other Grains  15.12 11.77 
Oilseeds  -2.01 -7.10 
Raw Sugar  -0.62 -0.33 
Cattle & Sheep  -0.40  0.55 
Raw Milk   0.63  0.90 
Non-Cereals Land Area   0.00  0.00 
Cereals Land Area 13.14  8.84 
Table A7.7: Percentage Change in land use and aggregate factor prices under the 
Agenda 2000 scenario  
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UK Region 
 
 
 
 
1995 data UR AG2000 AG2000 vs. 
UR 
Cereals Land 324 369 403 34 
Non Cereals Land 4,252 5,205 5,386  181 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labour 473 488 492 4 
Unskilled Labour 10,797 12,987 13,112 125 
Capital 2,983 2,975 2,566 -409 
Depreciation  2,033 2,036 2,369 333 
NET FACTOR INCOME 16,796 19,988 19,590 -398 
Headage Payments 584 525 1,398 873 
Set-Aside Compensation: 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
 
201 
111 
71 
 
201 
111 
71 
 
194 
107 
68 
 
-7 
-4 
-3 
Price Support Compensation:  
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
 
1,273 
707 
276 
 
1,463 
766 
340 
 
1,750 
925 
266 
 
287 
   159 
   -74 
Quota Rent: 
Raw Milk 
 
1,633 
 
5,654 
 
5,472 
 
-182 
TOTAL 21,652 29,119 29,770 651 
Table A7.8: Decomposition of Agricultural Producer and Asset Holder’s Regional 
Income in the UK ($US millions) 
 
 
UK Region 
 1995 data UR AG2000 AG2000 vs. 
UR 
Cereals Land 2,452 2,349 2,606 257 
Non Cereals Land 31,811 42,630 43,392 762 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labour 6,433 6,816 6,850 34 
Unskilled Labour 94,640 117,148 117,729 581 
Capital 31,685 32,470 30,896 -1,574 
Depreciation  22,894 22,906 23,059 153 
NET FACTOR INCOME 144,247 178,507 178,414 -93 
Headage Payments 2,083 1,955 5,068 3,113 
Set-Aside Compensation: 
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
 
1,057 
1,100 
613 
 
1,057 
1,100 
613 
 
1,016 
1,057 
590 
 
-41 
-43 
-23 
Price Support Compensation:  
Wheat 
Other Grains 
Oilseeds 
 
6,694 
6,977 
2,672 
 
6,752 
6,050 
2,587 
 
8,259 
7,621 
1,948 
 
1,507 
1,571 
-639 
Quota Rent: 
Raw Milk 
 
9,895 
 
32,777 
 
31,737 
 
-1,040 
TOTAL 175,338 231,398 235,803 4,405 
Table A7.9: Decomposition of Agricultural Producer and Asset Holder’s Regional 
Income in the EU-14 ($US millions) 
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US $millions 1995 data UR AG2000 
UK 
CAP Expenditure 5,756 4,359 5,003 
Tariff Revenue 804 787 772 
Resource Contribution 8,952 7,103 8,027 
Net Contribution -4,000 -3,531 -3,796 
EU-14 
CAP Expenditure 36,911 29,992 33,265 
Tariff Revenue 2,799 2,569 2,468 
Resource Contribution 30,112 23,892 27,001 
Net Contribution 4,000 3,531 3,796 
EU-15 
CAP Expenditure 42,667 34,351 38,268 
Tariff Revenue 3,603 3,356 3,240 
Resource Contribution 39,064 30,995 35,028 
Net Contribution 0 0 0 
Table A7.10: Changes in the CAP Budget ($millions 1995) 
 
 
 
 
Agenda 2000  
EV ($mill) change from UR scenario EV (% change) 
UK    -744 -0.08 
EU-14    -450 -0.00 
EU-15 -1,194 -0.02 
USA    -230 -0.01 
CAIRNS    -280 -0.01 
LDCs     -40 -0.00 
ROW   -190 -0.00 
Total EV -1,934 -0.01 
Table A7.11: Changes in EV ($million and %) under the Agenda 2000 reforms  
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Appendix B: An evaluation of the cost of high preference heterogeneity under the 
UR simulation (i.e., experiment (v) vs. experiment (i)). The numbering of the tables 
in the appendix corresponds to those in the main text. 
 
 
  Meat  Other 
meat  
Other 
food  
Milk  Sugar  Manu Service 
LOW 3.42 14.47 10.04 -3.58 -4.73 6.97 10.50 UK 
HIGH 2.24 17.81 11.84 -4.73 -10.45 4.37 11.16 
LOW 9.17 15.21 9.54 -0.41 1.72 8.51 10.60 EU-14 
HIGH 9.19 15.10 9.51 -0.41 1.71 8.71 10.57 
LOW 24.80 20.46 14.01 18.51 0.29 9.16 14.98 USA 
HIGH 24.79 20.45 14.03 18.50 0.30 9.21 14.98 
LOW 24.40 18.85 23.47 33.70 27.22 21.29 26.72 CAIRNS 
HIGH 24.60 18.82 23.48 33.92 27.20 21.36 26.72 
LOW 25.10 22.57 24.13 35.33 21.37 31.25 28.14 LDC 
HIGH 25.13 22.57 24.15 35.40 21.68 31.32 28.11 
LOW 13.93 14.87 14.61 19.25 12.28 15.37 16.50 ROW 
HIGH 13.94 14.88 14.61 19.33 12.28 15.47 16.49 
Table B7.14: Absolute percentage changes in the number of firms/product variants 
(ni,r) under low (experiment (i)) and high (experiment (v)) preference heterogeneity 
 
 
 
 Domestic private (zpsirs) and public (zgsirs) hierarchical utility 
 zpsirs zgsirs
Meat  processing  0.70   0.57 
Other meat processing  5.79  5.41 
Other food processing  3.85  3.38 
Milk processing -1.67 -1.12 
Sugar processing -2.83 -3.67 
Manufacturing  0.99  1.18 
Services  3.92  3.99 
Table B7.15: UK private and public domestic representative hierarchical utility 
under experiment (v) relative to experiment (i) (% change) 
 
 
 Private (zpis) and public (zgis) hierarchical composite utility 
 zpi,UK zgi,UK
Meat  processing 1.01 1.67 
Other meat processing 5.06 4.52 
Other food processing 3.23 2.55 
Milk processing -1.43 0.21 
Sugar processing 0.31                        -2.85 
Manufacturing 1.09 1.07 
Services 3.70 3.87 
Table B7.16: UK private and public domestic composite hierarchical utility under 
experiment (v) relative to experiment (i) (% change) 
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  Meat  Other 
meat  
Other 
food  
Milk  Sugar  Manu Service 
PHH 2.32 10.21 9.13 1.74 -4.59 0.92 4.71 DOMESTIC 
GHH -2.84 10.56 9.42 -6.35 5.62 2.96 4.58 
PHH 9.72 -4.87 0.37 21.40 3.54 13.47 3.32 EU-UK 
GHH 5.74 0.45 5.28 6.73 14.47 13.32 2.52 
PHH 17.22 -12.59 -2.08 48.35 5.07 9.11 4.13 USA-UK 
GHH 7.69 -10.09 0.99 18.76 22.94 9.96 3.33 
PHH 31.19 -7.39 -1.37 70.15 8.86 10.31 5.30 CAIRNS-UK 
GHH 32.38 -5.82 2.94 56.72 32.33 11.29 4.49 
PHH 14.45 -10.18 -1.76 58.46 32.85 15.13 7.97 LDC-UK 
GHH 9.27 -8.18 2.84 23.35 39.18 15.78 6.63 
PHH 8.86 -7.12 -1.66 136.46 6.54 13.18 4.53 ROW-UK 
GHH 3.96 -5.74 1.79 14.43 27.37 13.38 3.72 
Table B7.17: Percentage change in final demands (private and public) by UK 
consumers under experiment (v) compared to experiment (i). (% change) 
Final Demands: PHH – Private HouseHold; GHH – Government HouseHold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Industry output Firm output Mark-up 
Other agriculture  0.51 - - 
Other primary -1.81 - - 
Wheat -2.19 - - 
Other grains -3.46 - - 
Oilseeds -1.88 - - 
Raw Sugar  0.00 - - 
Cattle & sheep  0.48 - - 
Raw milk*  0.00 - - 
Meat processing -0.60  0.58  -0.51 
Other meat processing  5.58  1.70 -1.17 
Other food processing  2.51  0.51  -0.37 
Milk processing -0.71  0.49  -0.39 
Sugar processing -6.96 -1.11   0.91 
Manufacturing -4.32 -1.48  1.14 
Services  0.96  0.23 -0.17 
Table B7.19: Industry/Firm Output and Mark-ups in the UK in experiment (v) 
compared to experiment (i)  (% change) 
(*Raw Milk is non-tradable) 
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 Uruguay Round 
 Market/factor Price Consumer Price 
Cereals Land -2.76 - 
Non-Cereals land 11.51 - 
Unskilled labour   9.75 - 
Skilled labour   8.76 - 
Capital   8.45 - 
Natural resources                        -15.80 - 
Other agriculture -2.72   2.35 
Other primary   0.48   0.37 
Wheat   3.10   1.21 
Other grains   3.07   0.14 
Oilseeds   3.21   0.06 
Raw Sugar   3.92  -0.01 
Cattle & sheep   3.31   3.38 
Raw milk   4.18   7.43 
Meat processing   2.01  -0.03 
Other meat processing   1.40  -5.27 
Other food processing   1.43  -3.23 
Milk processing   3.76   5.41 
Sugar processing  -0.71  -0.96 
Manufacturing   2.45 -0.44 
Services   3.77 -1.56 
Table B7.20: UK Prices under experiment (v) compared to experiment (i) (% 
change) 
 
 Uruguay Round 
 Exports Imports 
Other agriculture  -17.31    6.55 
Other primary   -1.59   -1.93 
Wheat -12.76    7.62 
Other grains -12.30    6.39 
Oilseeds -21.01    5.57 
Sugar  12.61    1.21 
Cattle & sheep                         -14.20  11.37 
Raw Milk* - - 
Meat processing -7.37 18.54 
Other meat processing -5.42   -7.41 
Other food processing -6.29  -2.78 
Milk processing                        -10.17 23.19 
Sugar processing  2.93 12.97 
Manufacturing -9.53 10.25 
Services                         -12.79   0.21 
UK Exports -9.84 - 
UK Imports - 7.27 
Table B7.21: Percentage changes in sectoral trade under experiment (v) compared 
to experiment (i)  
(*Raw milk is non-tradable). 
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Uruguay Round UK Regional sectors 
Low (experiment (i)) High (experiment (v)) Change: (v) – (i) 
Other agriculture      162     -524   -686 
Other primary   2,196   2,284       88 
Wheat     122         59      -63 
Other grains        -8        -69       -61 
Oilseeds       -78      -111       -33 
Sugar beet     -218      -223          -5 
Cattle and sheep       -62      -118        -56 
Raw milk - - - 
Meat processing      -861   -1,205      -344 
Other meat processing     -482        -331        151 
Other food processing      904        708       -196 
Milk processing      -885    -1,458       -573 
Sugar processing      -362      -514      -152 
Manufacturing -23,622 -60,115 -36,493 
Services   -7,869 -15,171   -7,302 
Total UK Trade Balance -31,062 -76,790 -45,728 
Table B7.23: Changes in UK sectoral and total trade balances under low and high 
preference heterogeneity ($US Millions 1995) 
 
 
% Changes  EU-14 USA CAIRNS LDC ROW 
Aggregate exports   0.71   0.37   0.24   0.40   0.72 
Aggregate Imports -0.87 -0.73 -0.53 -0.46 -1.07 
Table B7.24: Aggregate exports and imports in other regions under experiment (v) 
compared to experiment (i). (% change) 
 
 
 
 Low (experiment (i)) High (experiment (v)) Change (v) – (i) 
EV $billion 270.877 371.888 101.011 
EV % 27.73 38.07 10.34 
Terms of Trade (%)  2.94 4.51 1.57 
Private food consumers 
EV $billion 
19.507 25.876   6.369 
Public food consumers 
EV $billion 
 0.663  0.880   0.217 
Agric hhld EV $billions 4.170  6.224  2.054 
Table B7.25: Welfare changes under the UR scenario 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 Summary 
At the outset, the CAP was seen as the centre piece of a more co-operative Europe  
seeking to restore political and economic stability in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. However, the CAP’s effectiveness in fulfilling the criteria laid down under the 
Treaty of Rome was mixed. In some respects, it was judged to be an unbridled success 
(greater food security and agricultural productivity), although in others, it was heavily 
criticised (higher food prices, oversupply). In more recent times, it is the latter which 
has created further cause for concern. Indeed, from the late 1970s, the EU became a net-
exporter in most commodities, and budgetary costs associated with export restitutions 
and stock piling soared.   
 
Although the CAP has evolved to alleviate some of these problems, it still remains 
under internal and external political pressure to reform, particularly in light of the 
upcoming Millennium World Trade Organisation (WTO) Round negotiations. There is 
also internal pressure to reduce support from a budgetary viewpoint, and looking 
slightly further afield, there are the challenges of expansion to the East. 
 
Much of the conventional wisdom relating to the policy questions surrounding the CAP, 
seems to support the notion of further reductions in EU agricultural support. 
Comparative advantage gains in EU non-food related sectors will lead to real income 
gains as well as increases in world prices (Anderson and Tyers, 1988, 1993). Multi-
regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model structures have played a 
particularly important role in addressing these types of questions, where developments 
in computational facility have led to a burgeoning of CGE applications in the trade 
literature over the last fifteen years or so. 
 
This study develops the standard CGE model approach in several ways. Firstly, the 
application here draws on evidence from the agri-business and marketing literature 
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which assesses the influence of country of origin on food product preferences (Kaynak 
et al., 1983; Howard, 1989; Morriss and Hallaq, 1990; Juric et al., 1996), where 
consumers generally favour the home variety over the foreign substitute (patriotic 
preference). Thus, using a suitably tailored aggregation of the GTAP database biased 
towards primary agricultural and food processing sectors, a model was developed to 
incorporate the neo-Hotelling preference structure (Lancaster, 1979, 1984; Helpman, 
1981; Economides, 1984) to examine the influence of hierarchical product preferences 
(with patriotic preference behaviour) in the context of the welfare costs of the CAP. 
This contrasts with previous CGE studies of the CAP which measure the more 
traditional specialisation and efficiency gains associated with perfectly competitive 
market structures. 
 
A related issue is the influence of preference heterogeneity on CAP costs. More 
specifically, the degree of perceived product differentiation is controlled, where 
consumers exhibit a clearly defined ranking structure, with favoured representative 
varieties yielding higher levels of benchmark hierarchical utility.  Moreover, the 
responsiveness of purchasing behaviour to proliferations/reductions in product variants 
is high, where variety level perceptions (based primarily on region of origin) are of 
considerable importance. This is contrasted with preference structures exhibiting more 
homogeneous preferences. In this case, consumer perceptions between regional 
varieties (including domestic varieties) are not significantly different, and the ranking 
structure holds less importance. The study also follows the treatments of Harrison et al. 
(1995), and Francois (1998), where Cournot conjecture is employed to model producer 
behaviour in food processing, manufacturing and service sectors. 
 
Finally, efforts have also been made to characterise the varied nature of the policy 
regimes of the CAP.  In the standard CGE model treatments such policies are 
incorporated within ad valorem output subsidy wedges, which is not in step with the 
true (de-coupled) nature of some of the support payments afforded to various sectors.  
Hence, within the model there is explicit incorporation of milk and sugar quotas, area 
and set-aside compensation to cereal sectors, headage premia to livestock, intervention 
purchases and the CAP budget. Further, the world economy has also been projected 
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forward to 2005, by which time all of the Uruguay Round GATT commitments will in 
principle be completed. 
 
A summary of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 chronologically reviews the PE and 
CGE literature pertaining to the costs of the CAP placing a range of estimates between 
0.22% and 2.7% of EU GDP.  Moreover, the chapter also reports on the evolution of 
CGE characterisations of the CAP (particularly in light of the MacSharry reforms), 
where efforts have been made to more accurately characterise the precise mechanisms 
of CAP support in CGE models (Harrison et al., 1995; Weyerbrock, 1998; Blake et al., 
1999). This has had the effect of revising the range of CAP cost estimates in the CGE 
trade literature downwards. 
 
Chapter 2 gives a summary of the key issues in CGE model design and implementation. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the properties of ‘convenient’ functions often 
used in CGE modelling. Other issues such as ‘closure’, ‘calibration’, ‘solution methods’ 
and ‘nesting’ are also discussed. Further, the distinction between the levels and linear 
representations of CGE models are highlighted. The chapter also presents a simple 
stylised closed economy CGE model structure. 
 
Chapter 3 draws on the imperfectly competitive trade literature, and explores the nature 
of some of the leading imperfectly competitive trade theories (oligopoly, neo-Hotelling, 
neo-Chamberlinian).  Having identified these theories, the chapter proceeds to review 
the use and evolution of such theories in the CGE trade modelling literature and the 
range of policy questions to which these model types have been applied. Finally, 
reference is made to the agri-business and marketing literature on the role of food 
related preferences and region of origin. 
 
Chapter 4 describes a standard CGE multi-region model framework. In the second part 
of the chapter, there is an overview of the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and Input-
Output (I-O) data sources which are used to create benchmark data sets such as the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database. The discussion is then broadened to 
include the GTAP parameters and sets data and further issues pertaining to GTAP data 
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construction and reconciliation procedures. The final part of the chapter gives a 
description of the accounting conventions within the GTAP data. 
 
Chapter 5 is in two parts. The first part of this chapter explains the rationale behind the 
chosen aggregation of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database used in the 
final model implementation. Further discussion is provided on the specific trading 
positions and protective structures pertaining to each region. The second part of the 
chapter discusses the techniques employed to explicitly incorporate CAP support 
instruments (i.e., set-aside, cereals compensation, headage premia, CAP budget, 
intervention buying) as well as additional modelling issues pertaining to the Uruguay 
Round constraints and model projections. 
 
Chapter 6 brings together the trade and agri-business/marketing literature reviewed in 
chapter 3 with a detailed discussion on a stylised linearised CGE approach 
incorporating Cournot behaviour by rival firms, as well as neo-Hotelling preferences 
which exhibit a hierarchical ranking structure where the domestic variety is always 
preferred. 
 
Chapter 7 splits the results into two sections. The first section compares the costs of 
CAP abolition against the alternative scenario of full implementation of the Uruguay 
Round constraints. These scenarios are conducted under low preference heterogeneity, 
five-firms per imperfectly competitive sector and standard Cournot conjecture. Under 
CAP abolition, the EU-15 gains 0.53% of GDP, with subsequent gains to the UK and 
EU-14 of 0.90% and 0.29% of respective GDPs. The EU-15 gains are found to fit in 
with more recent estimates of CAP costs in the literature (0.22%-0.8% of GDP). Global 
welfare rises 0.06% of global GDP, although losses accrue to the LDC and ROW 
regions.   
 
The second set of results examine the effects of high preference heterogeneity by UK 
consumers only, under conditions of CAP abolition. These results are compared to the 
case where all agents in all regions exhibit low preference heterogeneity. Accounting 
for the extra effects of global varietal proliferations, UK welfare gains in both policy 
scenarios are “scaled up” accordingly. Comparing the costs of CAP abolition under 
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high preference heterogeneity with the corresponding Uruguay Round scenario, the EU-
15 gains 0.57% of GDP.  The increase of 0.04% of EU-15 GDP compared to the first 
set of results is due to welfare increases in the UK from 0.90% to 1.08% of GDP, where 
varietal diversity is considered by UK consumers to be of greater importance. 
 
Examining different firm concentration ratios (15 firms per sector up to 3 firms per 
sector) the costs of the CAP to the EU-15 range from 0.44% to 0.67% of GDP under 
low preference heterogeneity and 0.47% to 0.73% under high preference heterogeneity 
conditions. Finally, with high levels of collusion and 5 firm concentration levels the 
gains from CAP abolition to the EU-15 may be as low as 0.12% and 0.18% of GDP 
under low and high heterogeneity conditions, respectively.  In both cases, the low 
estimates are due to slight welfare losses in the EU-14 region. 
 
8.2 Limitations and Further Work 
It is perhaps not too surprising that the incorporation of high levels of preference 
heterogeneity into the model yields significantly higher welfare outcomes, where utility 
gains (from global proliferations) ‘scale’ up the results.  However, the size of these 
gains may be rather high, given that the preference heterogeneity parameter (γi) is 
specified rather arbitrarily. Indeed, searches of the literature give no indication on what 
the value of γi should be. This parameter holds the key to the magnitude of the welfare 
gains.   
 
On the other hand, these results do highlight the importance of variety and hierarchical 
utility based welfare gains which are often ignored, or subordinated, in standard CGE 
work. Moreover, one could argue that many of the other parameters (substitution 
elasticities, investment parameters) in CGE model applications are also somewhat 
arbitrary or based on old data and are thus subject to similar criticism.  
 
A related issue here surrounds the benchmark preference structure.  In this application, 
it was desirable to find a suitably tailored criterion upon which to base estimates of 
benchmark preferences, with domestic representative varieties ranked highest. The 
method we use is to calibrate these preferences to the expenditure shares, where 
domestic representative varieties have the largest share.  However, further work should 
 265  
be conducted in ascertaining other criteria for assigning values to benchmark preference 
values. 
 
On the characterisation of imperfectly competitive sectors, some distinction must be 
drawn on the nature of the food processor. For example, are we to assume that the 
downstream food industries solely process primary agricultural produce into “finished 
products” (i.e. biscuits, yoghurt, alcohol etc) or are they also responsible for retailing? 
This has implications on the level of concentration as well as the type of conjectural 
variation responses by rivals, which in turn will affect welfare results. 
 
In the final results section, a full range of CAP estimates is presented under different 
concentration ratios and conjectural variation levels. More research needs to be 
conducted to ascertain the nature of the welfare gains to each region.  A closely related 
point is the disaggregation of the EU welfare results. In CGE models, the exact sources 
of the welfare gains can be ascertained through a more detailed welfare decomposition 
of the results. Work such as this has been pioneered for the GTAP model by Huff and 
Hertel (1996) and is an important source of further research.1  
 
Another drawback of the model implementation is the characterisation of quotas in the 
model. More specifically, this study follows several other applications (Peerlings, 1993; 
Frandsen et al. 1998; Blake et al. 1998) which exogenise output in a sector to simulate a 
binding quota, where the output variable is swapped with some quota rent tariff 
equivalent variable to maintain correct closure. Thus, the use of model projections on 
endowments and productivity leads to inevitable output increases in all sectors under 
the UR scenario (see section 7.5.1). The CGE response of allowing the quota rent 
equivalent variable to adjust endogenously, leads to very large market price increases 
under CGE market clearing mechanisms to deter demand and maintain output at a fixed 
level. Relative to the UR scenario, CAP abolition leads to large price falls where the 
quantitative constraint is no longer in place. Such price effects are, however, unlikely to 
occur in the real world, which leads to some contention over the estimated magnitudes 
                                                          
1 While the source of welfare gains may be identified, the causes of the welfare change are much more 
difficult to ascertain. This would involve running a prohibitive number of simulations for each policy 
variable (tax/subsidy). Moreover, the sum of the results of these simulations, are unlikely to be the same 
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of the price and output estimates in the raw milk and sugar sectors in this study and 
others like it. Thus, some modification to this CGE modelling technique must be 
developed, which avoids these ‘side-effects’. 
 
Finally, the last issue pertains to the use of functional form.  This study follows a large 
body of work which characterise final demands with a convenient (i.e., Cobb Douglas, 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution) functional form. However, the welfare changes in 
the simulation runs in this study are rather higher than expected due to the use of Cobb-
Douglas preferences by private and public household agents.  With increases in real 
incomes and falls in consumer prices (particularly under high preference heterogeneity), 
final demands may react rather too sensitively, resulting in exaggerated resource 
reallocation effects between sectors. Clearly, income and price elasticities for 
agricultural (and food) products are rather less elastic than those specified by the Cobb-
Douglas function.  Thus, the need here is to further understand the use of alternative 
‘semi-flexible’ functions, which may allow for calibration of price- and income-
inelastic parameter values within the model. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
as the single simulation with all policy variables changing simultaneously due to the ‘general 
equilibrium’ effects within the model. 
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Glossary of Terms in the Standard GTAP Database and Model 
(Source: Hertel (ed), 1997) 
 
A.  Base Data 
 
1. Value Flows  
 
(i)  Value Flows Evaluated at Agents’ Prices 
 
SAVE(r) Value of net savings, in region r 
 SAVE(r) =PSAVE  *QSAVE(r)  ∀ rє REG 
 
VDEP(r) Value of capital depreciation expenditure in region r  rє REG ∀
  VDEP(r) = PCGDS(r)  *KB(r)  
 
(ii) Value Flows Evaluated at Market Prices 
 
VFM(i,j,r) value of purchases of endowment commodity i by   iє ENDW_COMM ∀
  firms in sector j of region r evaluated at market prices   jє PROD_COMM ∀
          ∀ rє REG 
           
  VFM (i,j,r) =PM(i,r) *QFE(i,j,r)   iє ENDWM_COMM ∀
          ∀ iє ENDWS_COMM 
 
 
VDFM(i,j,r) value of purchases of domestic tradable commodity i   iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  by firms in sector j of region r evaluated at market prices ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
  VDM(i.j,r) =PM(i,r) *QPD(i,r)   ∀ rє REG 
      
 
 
VIFM(i,j,r) value of purchases imported tradable commodity i by firms iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  in sector j of region r evaluated at market prices   jє PROD_COMM ∀
  VIFM(i,j,r)  =PIM(i,r) *QFM(i,r)   rє REG ∀
 
VDPM(i,r) value of expenditure on domestic tradable commodity i  by iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  private household in region r evaluated at market prices   rє REG ∀
  VDPM(i,r)  =PM(i,r) *QFM(i,r)    
 
VDGM(i,r) value of expenditure on domestic tradable commodity i by  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  government household in region r evaluated at market prices rє REG ∀
  VDGM(i,r)  =PM(i,r) *QGD(i,r) 
 
VIGM(i,r) value of expenditure on imported tradable commodity i by  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  government household in region r evaluated at market prices rє REG ∀
  VIGM(i,r)  =PIM(i,r) *QGM(i,r) 
 
VXMD(i,r,s) value of exports of tradable commodity i from source r to iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  destination s evaluated at (exporter’s) market prices  rє REG ∀
  VXMD(i,r,s)  =PM(i,r) *QXS(i,r,s)   sє REG ∀
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VIMS(i,r,s) value of imports tradable commodity i from source r to  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  destination s evaluated at (importer’s) market prices  rє REG ∀
  VIMS(i,r,s)  =PMS(i,r,s) *QXS(i,r,s)   sє REG ∀
 
 
VST(i,r) value of sales tradable commodity i to the international   iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  transport sector in region r evaluated at market prices  rє REG ∀
  VST(i,r,)  =PM (i,r,) *QST(i,r,) 
 
(iii) Value Flows Evaluated at World Prices 
  
VXWD(i,r,s) value of exports of tradable commodity i from source r  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  to destination s evaluated at world (fob) prices   rє REG ∀
   VXWD(i,r,s) =PFOB(i,r,s) *QXS(i,r,s)   sє REG ∀
 
VIWS(i,r,s) value of imports of tradable commodity i from source r  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  to destination s evaluated at world (cif) prices   rє REG ∀
           ∀ sє REG 
 
 
B.    Derivatives of the Base data 
 
1. Value Flows 
 
VOA(i,r) value of non-savings commodity i output or supplied  iє NSAV_COMM ∀
  in region r evaluated at agents’ prices    rє REG ∀
 
  VOA(i,r) = EVOA(i,r) 
  VOA(i,r) = ∑  VFA(j,i,r)    ∀ iє ENDW_COMM 
   jє DEMD_COMM     ∀ iє PROD_COMM 
 
VFA(i,j,r) value of purchases of demanded commodity i by firms   iє DEMD_COMM ∀
  in sector j of region r evaluated at agent’s prices   jє PROD_COMM ∀
          ∀ rє REG 
 
  VFA(i,j,r) = EVFA(i,j,r)      ∀ iє ENDW_COMM 
  VFA(i,j,r) = VDFA(i,j,r) + VIFA(i,j,r)    iє TRAD_COMM ∀
 
VOM(i,r) value of non-savings commodity i output or supplied in  iє NSAV_COMM ∀
  Region r evaluated at market prices    rє REG ∀
 
  VOM(i,r) = ∑  VFM(i,j,r)    ∀ iє ENDW_COMM 
    jє PROD_COMM 
  VOM(i,r) +  VXMD(i,r,s) + VST(i,r)   iє TRAD_COMM ∑ ∀
   sє REG 
  VOM(i,r) = VOA(i,r)      ∀ iє CGDS_COMM 
 
 
 
 
VIM(i,r) value of aggregate imports of tradable commodity i   iє TRAD_COMM ∀
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  in region r evaluated at market prices    rє REG ∀
 
VPA(i,r) value of private household expenditure on tradable  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  commodity i in region r evaluated at agent’s prices  rє REG ∀
 
  VPA(i,r) = VDPA(i,r) + VIPA(i,r) 
 
PRIVEXP(r) private household expenditure in region r evaluated   rє REG ∀
  at agent’s prices 
 
  PRIVEXP(r) =  VPA(i,r) ∑
   iє TRAD_COMM 
 
VGA(i,r) value of government household expenditure on tradable  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  commodity i in region r evaluated at agent’s prices  rє REG ∀
 
  VGA(i,r) = VDGA(i,r) + VIGA(i,r) 
 
GOVEXP(r) government household expenditure in region r   rє REG ∀
  evaluated at agent’s prices 
 
  GOVEXP(r) =  VGA(i,r) ∑
   iє TRAD_COMM 
 
INCOME(r) expenditure in region r which equals net income (net of  rє REG ∀
  capital depreciation) 
 
  INCOME(r) = PRIVEXP(r) + GOVEXP(r) + SAVE(r) 
 
INC(r)  initial value of income (expenditure) in the base data  rє REG ∀
  in region r stored as a parameter, used in calculating EV(r) 
 
  INC(r) = INCOME(r) 
 
GLOBINV global net investment 
 
  GLOBINV =  NETINV(r) =  ∑ ∑  SAVE(r) 
   rє REG    rє REG 
 
VTWR(i,r,s) value of transportation services associated with the shipment iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  of tradable commodity i from source r to destination s   rє REG ∀
  (fob – cif margin)      ∀ sє REG 
 
  VTWR(i,r,s) = VIWS(i,r,s) – VXWD(i,r,s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VT  value of total international transportation services  
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  (sum of fob – cif margins across all commodities and 
  all routes) 
  
  VT =   ∑ ∑   ∑  VTWR(i,r,s) 
  iє TRAD_COMM rє REG  sє REG 
 
 
 
2. Shares 
 
SHRDFM(i,j,r) share of domestic sales of tradable commodity i used   iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  by firms in sector j of region r evaluated at market prices ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
  SHRDFM(i,j,r) = 
),(
),,(
riVDM
rjiVDFM
 
 
FMSHR(i,j,r) share of imports in the composite for tradable commodity iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  i used by firms in sector j of region r evaluated at agent’s ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
  prices        ∀ rє REG 
 
  FMSHR(i,j,r) = 
),,(
),,(
rjiVFA
rjiVIFA
 
 
PMSHR(i,r) share of imports in the composite for tradable commodity i  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  used by private household in region r evaluated at agent’s rє REG ∀
  prices 
 
  PMSHR(i,r) = 
),(
),(
riVGA
riVIPA
 
 
GMSHR(i,r) share of imports in the composite for tradable commodity i  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  used by government in region r evaluated at agent’s  rє REG ∀
  prices 
 
   GMSHR(i,r) = 
),(
),(
riVGA
riVIGA
 
 
MSHRS(i,r,s) market share of source r in the aggregate imports of   iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  tradable commodity i in regions evaluated at market  rє REG ∀
  prices        ∀ sє REG 
  
  MSHRS(i,r,s) = VIMS(i,r,s) 
    ∑ VIMS(i,r,s) 
          rє REG 
 
 
 
 
SVA(i,j,r) share of endowment commodity i in value-added of   iє ENDW_COMM ∀
  firms in sector j of region r evaluated at agent’s prices  jє PROD_COMM ∀
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          ∀ rє REG 
 
REVSHR(i,j,r) share of endowment commodity i used by firms in  iє ENDW_COMM ∀
  sector j of region r evaluated at market prices  jє PROD_COMM ∀
          ∀ rє REG 
 
 
C.    Variables 
 
1. Quantity Variables 
 
QO(i,r) quantity of non-saving commodity i output or supplied iє NSAV_COMM ∀
  in region r       ∀ rє REG 
 
           ∀ iє ENDWS_COMM 
QOES(i,j,r) quantity of sluggish endowment commodity i supplied  jє PROD_COMM ∀
  to firms in sector j of region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
QXS(i,r,s) quantity of exports of tradable commodity i from source r  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  to destination s       ∀ rє REG 
          ∀ sє REG 
 
QST(i,r) quantity of sales tradable commodity i to the international iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  transport sector in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
QFE(i,j,r) quantity of endowment commodity i demanded by firms in iє ENDW_COMM 
sector j of region r      ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
∀
          ∀ rє REG 
 
QVA(j,r) quantity index of value-added (land labour composite) in ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
  firms of sector j in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
QF(i,j,r) quantity of composite tradable commodity i demanded by iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  firms in sector j of region r      ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
QFD(i,j,r) quantity of domestic tradable commodity i demanded by  ∀ iє TRAD_COMM 
  firms in sector j of region r     ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
QFM(i,j,r) quantity of imported tradable commodity i demanded by  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  firms in sector j of region r     ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
QP(i,r)  quantity of composite tradable commodity i demanded by iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  private household in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
 
QPD(i,r) quantity of domestic tradable commodity i demanded by  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  private household in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
QPM(i,r) quantity of imported tradable commodity i demanded by  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
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  private household in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
QG(i,r)  quantity of composite tradable commodity i demanded by iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  government household in region r    ∀ rє REG 
 
QGD(i,r) quantity of domestic tradable commodity i demanded by  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  government household in region r    ∀ rє REG 
 
QGM(i,r) quantity of imported tradable commodity i demanded by  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  government household in region r    ∀ rє REG 
 
QIM(i,r) quantity of aggregate imports of tradable commodity i   iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  demanded by region r using market prices as weights  rє REG ∀
 
QT  quantity of global transport services supplied 
 
QSAVE(r) quantity of savings demanded in region r   rє REG ∀
 
QGDP(r) quantity index for GDP in region r    ∀ rє REG 
 
WALRAS_DEM quantity demanded in the omitted market (equals global  rє REG ∀
  demand for savings)     
 
WALRAS_SUP quantity supplied in the omitted market (equals global    
  supply of new capital goods composite) 
 
 
2. Price Variables 
 
PS(i,r)  supply price of non-savings commodity i in region r  iє NSAV_COMM ∀
          ∀ rє REG 
 
PM(i,r)  market price of non-savings commodity i in region r  iє NSAV_COMM ∀
          ∀ rє REG 
 
PMES(i,j,r) market price of sluggish endowment commodity i   iє ENDWS_COMM ∀
  supplied to firms in sector j of region r    ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
PFE(i,j,r) demand price of endowment commodity i for firms  iє ENDW_COMM ∀
  in sector j of region r      ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
PVA(j,r) price of value-added sector j of region r    ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
 
 
PF(i,j,r) demand price of composite tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  firms in sector j of region r     ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
PFD(i,j,r) demand price of domestic tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
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  firms in sector j of region r     ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
PFM(i,j,r) demand price of imported tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  firms in sector j of region r     ∀ jє PROD_COMM 
          ∀ rє REG 
 
PP(i,r)  demand price of composite tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  private household in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
PPD(i,r) demand price of domestic tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  private household in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
PPM(i,r) demand price of imported tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  private household in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
PG(i,r)  demand price of composite tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  government household in region r    ∀ rє REG 
 
PGD(i,r) demand price of domestic tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  government household in region r    ∀ rє REG 
 
PGM(i,r) demand price of imported tradable commodity i for  iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  government household in region r    ∀ rє REG 
 
PPRIV(i,r) price index for private household expenditure in region r  rє REG ∀
 
PGOV(r) price index for government household expenditure in region r rє REG ∀
 
PFOB(i,r,s) world (fob) price of tradable commodity i exported from  ∀ iє TRAD_COMM 
  source r to destination s (prior to including transport margin) rє REG ∀
          ∀ sє REG 
 
PCIF(i,r,s) world (cif) price of tradable commodity i exported from   iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  source r to destination s (prior to including transport margin) rє REG ∀
          ∀ sє REG 
 
PMS(i,r,s) market price by source of tradable commodity i imported ∀ iє TRAD_COMM 
  from source r to destination s     ∀ rє REG 
          ∀ sє REG 
 
PIM(i,r) market price of aggregate imports of tradable commodity i iє TRAD_COMM ∀
  in region r       ∀ rє REG 
 
 
PSW(r)  price index received for tradables produced in region r  rє REG ∀
  including sales of net investment to the global bank 
 
PDW(r) price index paid for tradables used in region r   rє REG ∀
  including purchases of net investment to the global bank 
 
TOT(r)  terms of trade for region r     ∀ rє REG 
  TOT(r) = [PSW(r) / PDW(r)] 
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PT  price of global transport services supplied 
 
PCGDS(r) price of investment goods in region r (equals PS(“capital”(r)) rє REG ∀
 
PSAVE  price of composite capital good supplied to savers by    
  global bank 
 
PGDP(r) price index for GDP in region r     ∀ rє REG 
 
WALRASLACK        
  Slack variable in the WALRAS equation (this is exogenous as long as price  
  of savings, PSAVE, is endogenous as is the case in a standard GE closure.   
  When any one of the GE links is broken, this is swapped with PSAVE, the  
  numeraire price, thereby forcing global savings to equal global investment) 
 
VGDP(r) percentage change in value of GDP in region r (is identical  rє REG ∀
  to the linearised form of GDP(r)) 
 
Y(r)  percentage change in regional household income in region r rє REG ∀
  (is identical to the linearised form of INCOME(r)) 
 
U(r)  per capita utility from aggregate household expenditure in rє REG ∀
  region r 
 
UP(r)  per capita utility from private household expenditure in  rє REG ∀
  region r 
 
UG(r)  aggregate utility from government household expenditure rє REG ∀
  in region (r) 
 
3.  Welfare Variables 
 
EV(r)  equivalent variation in region r, in $ US million    rє REG ∀
  (positive figure indicates welfare improvement) 
   
WEV  equivalent variation for the world, in $ US million    
  (positive figure indicates welfare improvement) 
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